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The central aim of this thesis is to clarify the conceptual role which ‘myth’ plays 
in Lewis’s Vorticist ‘pattern of thinking’ and in doing so to deepen the existing 
critical understanding of Lewis’s central importance to modernism.1 As a 
reflective participant in modernism’s turn to myth, Lewis, as I treat him here, 
opens a new and important chapter in the philosophical discourse of modernity, 
showing both the creative possibilities which myth presented the modern artist 
and highlighting the alarming consequences of seeking a new home for art among 
the ruins of ancient ‘world pictures’.2 This point of focus leads me to join together 
two previously unconnected but highly relevant strands of Lewis scholarship, 
represented on one side by certain notable studies of Lewis’s application to 
mythical sources from Hindu, Buddhist and Gnostic typologies and, on the other 
side, in the identification of a corresponding anthropological rationale in Lewis’s 
early writings. My analysis focuses particularly on instances in Lewis’s Vorticist 
works when a mythopoeic tendency is consciously undercut by a lurking 
anthropological tendency which compels the rational disclosure of the myths 
being created. These warring elements of mythos and logos I take to be the 
‘master-subject’ of Lewis’s Vorticist text Enemy of the Stars and a crucial but 
previously underappreciated aspect of Lewis’s early thought.3 In order to access 
this feature of Lewis’s works it has been necessary to conduct some preliminary 
research into the context of modernist ‘primitivism’, the formulation of Vorticist 
aesthetics and philosophy, and the thematic relation which exists between Lewis’s 
early paintings and writings. These preparatory discussions are conducted in 
chapters one, two and three respectively, while the role played by myth in Lewis’s 
pattern of thinking and the broader philosophical significance of this are 
addressed directly in chapters four and five. 
																																																								
1 Wyndham Lewis, Rude Assignment: An Intellectual Autobiography, ed. by Toby Foshay (Santa 
Barbara: Black Sparrow Press, 1984), p.238. 
2 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2013), pp.115-154. 
3 Wyndham Lewis, The Lion and the Fox: The Rôle of the Hero in the Plays of Shakespeare 
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That we are eternal miners, lashed in the clumsy process of learning by the 
retribution that awaits our mistakes, and dreaming, steeped in transcendental 
values that transform the mechanical basis of our life into a fairyland, is the 
first truth that we must accept. 
 





(i) An Encounter at ‘the mouth of his cave’ 
 
In 1935 Wyndham Lewis suggested that the birthplace of his literary imagination could 
be found in a short story among the quixotic adventures of his early protagonist, Ker-
Orr the ‘Soldier of Humour’. In the short essay entitled ‘Beginning’ Lewis wrote: ‘It 
was the sun, a Breton instead of a British, that brought forth my first short story — “The 
Ankou” I believe it was: the Death-god of Plouilliou’.1 ‘The Death of the Ankou’ was 
not published until 1927 in The Wild Body and there is evidence to suggest that it was 
actually the last and not the first story of this collection to be written.2 But the 
prominence that Lewis gave ‘The Ankou’ in retrospect is revealing. While it was not the 
earliest work of his long writing career, it was evidently the one to which Lewis 
preferred to turn in search of the origin, or essence, of his early literary activities.  
There appear to be two significant reasons for this. The first is that the plot and 
characters of ‘The Ankou’ grew directly out of a carefully handwritten account of a 
beggar whom Lewis had painted in the Breton town of Gestel in 1908 and ‘preserved all 
his life’.3 This handwritten note, one of the earliest known excerpts of Lewis’s writing, 
would thus qualify as the original work to which he referred in ‘Beginning’. The 
second, more significant reason is that for Lewis, looking back in the mid-thirties on the 
early stages of his literary career, ‘The Ankou’ epitomized more clearly than any of his 
other works the preoccupations and strategies of his early writings. The encounter 
which lies at the heart of this unassuming ‘call of the wild’ tale is so expressive of the 
																																																								
1 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Beginning’, in Creatures of Habit and Creatures of Change: Essays on Art, 
Literature and Society 1914-1956, ed. by Paul Edwards (Santa Rosa: Black Sparrow Press, 1989), 
pp.262-267 (p.266).  
2 Paul Edwards provides evidence for this claim: ‘The contents page of the bound volume of typescripts 
[of The Wild Body] includes the title of the story […] as a late insertion, annotated by C. H. Prentice 
(Lewis’s editor at Chatto & Windus) as “to come”. Prentice also refers there to a letter of 19 September 
1927, indicating “The Death of the Ankou” did not arrive until some time after that date. The Wild Body 
was published on 24 November 1927’ (‘Wyndham Lewis’s Narrative of Origins: “The Death of the 
Ankou”’, The Modern Language Review, 92.1 (1997), pp.22-35 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3734682> 
[accessed 20 April 2012], Footnote 8, p.23).  
3 This short handwritten account is held in the Wyndham Lewis Collection in the Carl A. Kroch Library 
of Cornell University, filed with the ‘Breton Journal’ of 1908 and is published by Paul Edwards in 
‘Wyndham Lewis’s Narrative of Origins: “The Death of the Ankou”’, p.24. 
	 8	
theme which I here take as the central subject of my study that a brief recapitulation of 
the narrative is worthwhile at the outset.  
The story is presented through the first-person narration of Ker-Orr, a cultivated 
young Englishman who has departed the tame comfort of modern civilization on a 
journey, enticed by the primitive side of life. The tale begins with Ker-Orr sitting in the 
crowded inn of a small town on the Côtes-du-Nord of the Brittany coastline reading 
about the folklore and imbibing the spirit of the place. As he pores over a guidebook to 
the region he is taken especially with the local myth of ‘Ervoanik Plouillo’, the blind 
death-god traditionally associated with a statue in the church at Ploumilliau, whose 
spectral manifestation signified imminent death to the unfortunate beholder.4 According 
to local legend the death-god, the Ankou, was reputed to travel the lanes of the Breton 
countryside raised by his cart above the hedges, peering to left and right in search of his 
next victim, until, that is, he was struck blind by the ‘revolutionary archangel’ St. 
Peter.5  
Ker-Orr engages romantically with the sinister stories associated with the Ankou 
and experiences the reverie of the tourist entering vicariously into the ‘authentic’ mode 
of life and imaginative world of the native people. He speaks of his tendency to cross a 
threshold from his real-world setting into an imaginative space: 
 
When I am reading something that interests me, the whole atmosphere is affected. If I 
look quickly up, I see things as though they were a part of a dream. They are all 
penetrated by the particular medium I have drawn out of my mind.6 
 
Prone to daydreams, as he raises his eyes from his guidebook to the gnarled figure of an 
old blind beggar forcefully entering the crowd of people Ker-Orr momentarily inhabits 
a ‘fairyland’, believing that he is experiencing a visitation from the Ankou himself.7  
Pausing here for a moment, it is curious to note how Lewis’s story contains 
certain of the key ingredients of an M. R. James ghost story. A young scholar finds 
																																																								
4 According to the myth: ‘If the peasant were overtaken by the cart on the night-road towards the 
morning, he must die within the month’ (Wyndham Lewis, ‘The Death of the Ankou’, in The Complete 
Wild Body, ed. by Bernard Lafourcade (Santa Barbara: Black Sparrow Press, 1982), pp.105-115 (p.109)).  
5 Ibid., p.108. 
6 Ibid., p.109 
7 This reference to a ‘fairyland’ is taken from the epigraph (Wyndham Lewis and Paul Edwards, ‘The 
Anonymity of Perfection’, Modernism/Modernity, 4.2 (1997), pp.165-169 
<http://muse.jhu.edu/article/23164> [accessed 14th October 2013], p.166). 
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himself conducting some personal research into the folklore and ecclesiastical history of 
an unfamiliar and primitive community where he is confronted by forces beyond the 
scope of rational explanation. James’s Ghost Stories of an Antiquary had been 
published in 1904 and there are good reasons for believing that Lewis may have been 
familiar with these.8 Yet the narrative outcome of Lewis’s tale is far from being what 
we might expect from a typical Jamesian ghost story, in which a straight-laced scholar 
is wrenched from his rational worldview, learning the disconcerting truth that ‘[t]here 
are more things in heaven and earth, […] | Than are dreamt of in [his] 
philosophy’.9  Rather, Ker-Orr purposefully goes in search of occult mysteries and is 
highly conscious of the gratifying ‘sensation of mock-superstition’ which he 
experiences at the entrance of Ludo, the blind beggar.10 Quite unlike the protagonist in a 
Jamesian ghost story he savours the thrill of his ‘first impression, when [Ludo] was the 
death-god’ and seeks to preserve the power of the ‘superstition’ against rational 
exposition.11  
After their first encounter at the inn Ker-Orr indulges his fascination with this 
‘feeble death-god’, visiting him two days later at his ramshackle home in ‘the mouth of 
his cave’ on the road out of town.12 The balance of power subtly shifts as the story 
develops until the cultivated youth becomes a sinister omen in Ludo’s world: 
 
																																																								
8 Peter Caracciolo has documented the evidence of ‘parallels (too numerous […] to be coincidental)’ 
which exist between certain of Lewis’s writings and the ghost stories of M. R. James in three essays for 
the Wyndham Lewis Annual between 1999 and 2001 under the title ‘Wyndham Lewis, M. R. James, and 
Intertextuality’ Parts I to III (Peter L. Caracciolo, ‘Wyndham Lewis, M. R. James, and Intertextuality Part 
II: Canons of the Uncanny’, Wyndham Lewis Annual, VII (2000), pp.43-54 (p.43)). 
9 This line is spoken by Hamlet to Horatio in Shakespeare’s play ‘The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of 
Denmark’, The Oxford Shakespeare: The Complete Works, ed. by Stanley Wells and Cary Taylor 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), I.5.168-9. I allude here to the use which M. R. James makes of it in 
‘Oh, Whistle, and I’ll Come to You My Lad’, where the quotation is spoken in reference to the 
experience of Parkins, the story’s protagonist, as he encounters ghostly forces beyond his capability of 
rational understanding (M. R. James, ‘Oh, Whistle, and I’ll Come to You, My Lad’, Ghost Stories of an 
Antiquary (London: Dover Publications, 1971), pp.106-130).  
10 ‘The Death of the Ankou’, p.112. Often the names of Lewis’s fictional characters have thematic 
importance in their plots (we shall explore this in relation to the character ‘Arghol’ in Enemy of the Stars 
in chapter 4). The provenance of ‘Ludo’ is uncertain, but one possibility is worth noting. In the debate 
which raged in the pages of The New Age in 1913 between T. E. Hulme and Anthony Ludovici, regarding 
the significance of the ‘new’ geometric art which was emerging in England at that time, Hulme referred 
mockingly to his adversary as ‘Mr. Ludo’. Lewis was attuned to this debate and supportive of Hulme’s 
criticism of the reactionary views of Ludovici. It is possible then that ‘Ludo’ is in part a satirical portrait 
of Ludovici as a blind and dogmatic figure who dwells within an antique symbolic order, from which he 
is eventually wrenched by an archetypal modern intruder (T. E. Hulme, ‘Mr. Epstein and the Critics’, The 
New Age, 14.8 (1913), pp.251-253 <http://library.brown.edu/pdfs/1140814260105227.pdf> [accessed 20 
September 2016] (p.252)).   
11 ‘The Death of the Ankou’, p.113. 
12 Ibid., p.112. 
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When I said, ‘You don’t look well,’ his hands moved nervously on his club. His face 
responded by taking on a sicklier shade. 
‘I’m ill,’ he said. 
‘What is it?’ 
‘I’m indisposed.’ 
‘Perhaps you’ve met the Ankou.’ I said this thoughtlessly […] He did not say anything 
to this, but remained quite still, then stood up and shook himself and sat down again. He 
began rocking himself lightly from side to side. […] I felt that I had suddenly grown 
less popular. What had I done? I had mentioned an extinct god of death. Perhaps that 
was regarded as unlucky.13 
 
Realising that his presence was no longer appreciated, Ker-Orr finished his cigarette and 
simply ‘walked away’, on to the next stop on his travels.14 In the last line of the story 
the reader is left with the obscure sensation that the hunter had become the hunted, with 
Ker-Orr assuming the sinister role of the Ankou in an curious ritual of role-reversal 
when it is revealed that ‘later that summer […] Ludo was dead’.15  
This encounter between two contradictory characters and their distinct ways of 
perceiving the world provides an eloquent introduction to the central subject of this 
study. My focus here is upon precisely the ‘paradoxical fascination’ which steers the 
encounter between Ker-Orr and Ludo in Lewis’s story.16 As civilization meets 
ceremoniously with its exotic other distinctions between the modern and primitive 
mind, reason and myth, are underlined and brought into question. It is telling that Lewis 
described Friedrich Nietzsche as ‘the paramount influence’ on his thought ‘prior to 
world war I’, for Lewis’s tale is clearly developed from Nietzsche’s philosophical 
distinction between the debased and ‘unsatisfied modern culture’, with its ‘consuming 
desire for knowledge’, and the deep sense of ‘loss’ which this entails, ‘the loss of the 
mythical home’.17 However much Lewis may have distanced himself from ‘the 
																																																								
13 Ibid., p.114 
14 Ibid., p.115 
15 Ibid., p.115 
16 Bernard Lafourcade describes it as a tale of ‘paradoxical fascination’ in his brief introduction to the 
story (‘The Death of the Ankou’, p.106). 
17 Wyndham Lewis, Rude Assignment: An Intellectual Autobiography, ed. by Toby Foshay (Santa 
Barbara: Black Sparrow Press, 1984), p.128; Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Birth of Tragedy’, in Basic 
Writings of Nietzsche, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 2000), pp. 29-144 
(p.136). The full quote from ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ (1872): ‘The tremendous historical need of our 
unsatisfied modern culture, the assembling around one of countless other cultures, the consuming desire 
for knowledge—what does all this point to, if not to the loss of myth, the loss of the mythical home, the 
mythical maternal womb?’ 
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teachings of the execrable “Neech”’, from around the time of BLAST in 1914 the 
underlying structure of the Nietzschean dialectic of two opposed principles, the 
Apollonian and Dionysian, permeates much of the work throughout the first decade of 
Lewis’s career.18 In ‘The Death of the Ankou’ the Nietzschean conflict between two 
opposed worldviews, mythos and logos, provides the essential structure of the 
encounter.  
The fact that the narrative reaches its climax in the mouth of a cave is also 
important, since in one sense Lewis’s tale presents an updated version of Plato’s 
Allegory of the Cave. The encounter between Ker-Orr and the unfortunate Ludo 
highlights a distinction between two types of humanity. One is shown to manipulate the 
symbols and images to which the other is adherent, blindness and sight becoming 
equivalent to mythical and rational forms of knowledge.19 It is significant that Ludo 
‘retreated into his cave’ at Ker-Orr’s mention of the Ankou, the cave standing 
ultimately for the fatalistic mythic consciousness of the ‘primitive’ and unenlightened 
type of humanity which Plato imagines to be chained in the darkness.20 But ‘The 
Ankou’ is a cave allegory which toys with reversed designations of Plato’s original 
account. Ker-Orr’s journey among the ‘primitive’ inhabitants of the Brittany coastline is 
ultimately a Nietzschean-inspired bid to escape the blinding light of reason and delight 
himself instead with the mysterious shadows cast by ‘marionette players’ on the cave 
wall.21 He becomes contaminated, however, with his own ‘consuming desire for 
knowledge’, a guidebook providing his surest method of entry into the ‘mythical home’ 
which he seeks. In Lewis’s treatment, modern man — for whom Ker-Orr is a symbolic 
representative — is caught between the twin poles of his dissatisfaction. Fleeing the 
strict ordinance of modern rationality he finds, however, no refuge in the mythological 
cave of his ancestors. He flirts with the ‘primitive’ side of life but is ultimately too 
‘civilized’ to return. At the heart of Lewis’s tale is thus an acute crisis of identity. Erring 
																																																								
18 Wyndham Lewis, ‘The God of Sport and Blood’, in BLAST 2: The War Number (Santa Rosa: Black 
Sparrow Press, 1993), pp.9-10 (p.10). 
19 Paul Edwards highlights Lewis’s dependence on Henri Bergson’s analysis of language in Time and 
Free Will (1889) in writing ‘The Ankou’ and particularly the idea that ‘[l]anguage submits us to 
determinism’ by entailing ‘submission to the “symbolic order”’ (‘Wyndham Lewis's Narrative of 
Origins’, p.26). The relationship between Ker-Orr and Ludo is in this sense one between an adaptable 
‘educated man’ for whom ‘reality can be brought under quite different categories or sign-systems’ (p.29) 
and ‘the peasant’ who remains ‘peculiarly entrapped within a deterministic symbolic order’ (p.26).  
20 ‘The Death of the Ankou’, p.115. 
21 Plato, ‘The Republic’, in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. by Benjamin Jowett, 4 vols (London: Sphere 
Books, 1970) IV, p.296. 
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between rationality and superstition the modern human being is figuratively homeless, 
burdened with the task of balancing the opposed drives which govern over him.  
It is not difficult to see why Lewis attached such importance to the story of the 
Ankou in later life, for the dynamic confrontation which it orchestrates between these 
two worlds and their respective systems of knowledge is a theme which runs like a 
thread through most of his early writings, and indeed which animates many of his 
paintings also. In numerous instances, as we shall see, the Lewisian protagonist 
figuratively lurks in the mouth of the primordial cave, vacillating between the 
enlightenment offered by reason and the obscure enticements of myth. This thematic 
tension between the modern, rational worldview and its primitive, mythical counterpart 
has been largely overlooked in Lewis’s work until now, but the crisis which his early 
work sets up between these two worldviews leads us straight to the heart of his 
importance to modernism. 
 
(ii) Wyndham Lewis and the Crisis of Modernism 
 
The idea that modernism may be most effectively defined in terms of a ‘crisis’ situation 
is widespread among critics.22 Significant among these is Susan Stanford Friedman’s 
discussion of the way in which the term ‘modernism’ is prone to contradiction for the 
reason that the term itself ‘means not just different things, but precisely opposite 
things’.23 For the cultural critic, she writes, modernism ‘is the (illusory) break with the 
																																																								
22 ‘Crisis’ has been conceived by various critics as a coherent defining concept for modernism, though in 
different ways. For Theodor Adorno, modernism’s crisis was aesthetic and expressive. In his view early 
twentieth-century art had been placed in an ‘insufferable’ condition; being effectively denied an 
‘affirmative essence’ and thus a significance beyond its own activities, modern art turns to ‘challenge its 
own essence’ (Aesthetic Theory (1970), trans. by C. Lenhardt, ed. by Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p.2). For Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, 
modernism signifies ‘the point at which the idea of the radical and innovating arts, the experimental, 
technical, aesthetic ideal that had been growing forward from Romanticism, reaches formal crisis—in 
which myth, structure and organization in a traditional sense collapse, and not only for formal reasons. 
The crisis is a crisis of culture’ (‘The Name and Nature of Modernism’, in Modernism: A Guide to 
European Literature 1890-1930, ed. by Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane (London: Penguin, 
1991) pp.19-55 (p.26)). Of particular importance to the present study is the sense in which modernism 
signifies the point ‘collapse’ of a ‘mythic’ structure, for as we have already glimpsed, modernism also 
involves certain efforts to renovate ancient mythological and typological practices in order to more 
effectively ‘organize early-twentieth-century experience’ into a firm conceptual structure (Carrie J. 
Preston, Modernism’s Mythic Pose: Gender, Genre, Solo Performance (Oxford University Press, 2011), 
p.16).  
23 Susan Stanford Friedman, ‘Definitional Excursions: The Meanings of 
Modern/Modernity/Modernism’ Modernism/Modernity, 8.3 (2001), pp.493-513 
<https://muse.jhu.edu/article/23422>  [accessed 21 November 2015], p.494. 
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past, a willed forgetting of tradition, continuity, order. It is the embrace of chaos. It is 
the crisis of representation, fragmentation, alienation’.24 For the social scientist on the 
other hand, 
 
Modernism is state planning. Modernism is totalization, centralized system. Modernism 
is the Enlightenment’s rational schemata. ‘Progress’—‘Science’— ‘Reason’— ‘Truth.’ 
Modernism is the ideology of post-Renaissance modernity—conquest—and the 
inscriptions thereof.25 
 
The distinct objects of study to which the cultural critic and the social scientist are apt to 
turn in their respective endeavours may provide some explanation for the distinction 
which Friedman makes here. To some extent the distinct phenomena pertaining to the 
spheres of culture and of society can account for the critical assertion of the existence of 
two ‘modernisms’. Yet the deeper significance of Friedman’s comments is the insight 
they provide into modernism’s vacillation between an often chaotic vision of freedom 
and a will to rational control. Lewis playfully captured this when he described his 
political views as being ‘at bottom anarchist with a healthy passion for order’ in The 
Diabolical Principle (1931).26 According to Friedman such instances of modernist 
paradox are more than mere flippancy. She makes the vital point that modernism can 
only be properly understood through its ambivalent relationship with modernity, and 
thus that the ‘opposite things’ which modernism stands for are essentially linked in the 
art and literature of the period.  
Carrie J. Preston has recently continued this discussion about modernism’s 
paradoxical nature and the ‘crisis’ out of which it is formed, commenting that: 
 
Modernist studies has adopted […] crisis as one of the defining features of the field and 
tends to separate a group of what might be called antimodern-classicists from 
modernist-materialists. The former retreated from modernity into myth and tradition, 
the story goes, while modernist-materialists confronted the crisis and celebrated 
modernization, technology, revolution.27 
 
																																																								
24 Ibid., p.494 
25 Ibid., p.494 
26 Wyndham Lewis, ‘The Diabolical Principle’, in The Diabolical Principle and The Dithyrambic 
Spectator (London: Chatto and Windus, 1931), pp.1- 157 (p. 126). 
27 Preston, Modernism’s Mythic Pose, p.7. 
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Opposed factions of ‘antimodern-classicists’ and ‘modernist-materialists’ in truth never 
existed within modernism — as Preston herself comments ‘few artists fit neatly into 
either group’ — although the distinction provides a highly valuable characterization of 
the conflicting currents of thought which gave shape to modernism.28 
 Crucial to observe is the composite idea given off by the combined accounts of 
Friedman and Preston on this opposition at the heart of modernism. Through both 
accounts we are given, on the one hand, the idea of a rebellious ‘antimodern’ tendency 
within modernism which is motivated by a desire to break away from the path of the 
modern tradition — namely the rational order established in post-Enlightenment society 
and culture — and turn instead towards an ideal of radical liberation from the strictures 
of progress. As Preston points out, this narrative of liberation frequently involved a 
nostalgic return to the primordial energy of myth and the metamorphic vision of reality 
which this offers.29 On the other hand, they each indicate a materialist tendency within 
modernism. For Preston this is identifiable in modernism’s active celebration of 
‘modernization, technology, revolution’, while for Friedman it takes a more 
deterministic form as the ‘rational schemata’ of the modern world: ‘“Progress”—
“Science”— “Reason”’.  
 As we have already seen in the short analysis of ‘The Ankou’ with which this 
introduction opened, Lewis’s early fiction outlined and explored the same crisis within 
modernism’s identity. Ker-Orr embodies both modernism’s romantic wanderlust as it 
seeks a wilder, more fundamental connection to life, and its tendency to carry the 
rational schemata of modernity wherever it goes. Works like this which provide a 
contemporary lens on the paradoxical dispositions within the modernist psyche have an 
important role to play in our understanding of modernism, providing a mirror which we 
can hold up to the creative and critical works of the period. 
 Viewed in this way Lewis’s works provide compelling confirmation of 
modernist ‘paradoxy’, a word which Robert Scholes has used ‘to indicate a kind of 
confusion generated by a terminology that seems to make clear distinctions where clear 
distinctions cannot — or should not — be made’.30 While many of the key theorists of 
modernism have defined it in dichotomous terms — as a defensive, ‘rear-guard’ 
																																																								
28 Ibid., p.7. 
29 This idea is central to Adorno’s analysis of modernism. He writes: ‘[t]he gesture toward primeval 
history seemed to serve the emancipation of constricted art rather than its regimentation’ (Philosophy of 
New Music, trans. and ed. by Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 
p.112). 
30 Robert Scholes, Paradoxy of Modernism (London: Yale University Press, 2006), p.xi.  
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movement designed to bolster a threatened ‘High’ culture against the newly dominant 
‘Low’ or ‘kitsch’ culture, or as a movement towards a  ‘New’ kind of art which attacked 
the ‘Old’ traditions, for example — Scholes, and I shall argue Lewis too, urge us to seek 
the ‘middle’ ground which is suppressed by such ‘binary oppositions’ in order to 
properly understand the situation in which the modernist creative psyche existed.31 In 
his early works Lewis developed a rigorous analytical method designed to unpack and 
explore the dichotomies or dualistic tensions which were prevalent in modernist theories 
of culture. This method or style of thinking must be clarified at the outset.  
 
(iii) Lewis’s Dualistic ‘pattern of thinking’ in Context 
 
Looking back on his long career in 1950 Lewis suggested that his books all adhered to a 
‘type of thinking, belonging to a certain type of mind’.32 The thread of continuity 
among his ‘litter of books’ he described as ‘a central pattern of thinking, which is 
common to the past and to the present’.33 If we apply this fruitful idea to the first decade 
of Lewis’s career as a writer and painter a distinctive pattern of thinking can be readily 
outlined. In a superficial sense we might simply suggest that Lewis’s works of this 
period exhibit a delight in contradiction, but in a deeper sense it is evident that almost 
all of Lewis’s works before the First World War — paintings as well as writings — 
demonstrate some conceptual use of a programmed dualistic modus operandi. This 
dualistic method was given its clearest articulation by Lewis during the Vorticist period.  
In the first issue of BLAST (1914) Lewis described the Vorticists as ‘Primitive 
Mercenaries in the Modern World’ who sought figuratively to preserve and bolster both 
sides in any rhetorical conflict, fighting ‘first on one side, then on the other, but always 
for the SAME cause, which is neither side or both sides and ours’.34 As this 
																																																								
31 Martin Puchner, ‘The Aftershocks of Blast: Manifestos, Satire, and the Rear-Guard of Modernism’, 
Bad Modernisms, ed. by Douglas Mao and Rebecca L. Walkowitz (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2006), pp.44-67 (p.45); Scholes, Paradoxy of Modernism, p.xi. Puchner argues the existence of a ‘rear-
guard’ faction within modernism which sought ‘to correct and contain the avant-garde’s excess without 
falling behind and losing touch with it entirely’ and suggests that this ‘culminates in Lewis’ and is 
‘crystallize[d] in the journal Blast’ (‘The Aftershocks of Blast’, p.45). This reduction of Lewis and 
Vorticism to a singular, reactionary position within modernism is a gross oversimplification, however. 
Lewis’s activities within Vorticism were more an effort to explore the binary terms of modernism’s self-
definition; to lay out the terms of modernism’s paradoxical nature in order to evade partisanship of the 
kind Puchner suggests.  
32 Rude Assignment, p.153. 
33 Ibid., pp.153, 238. 
34 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Manifesto’, in BLAST (London: Thames and Hudson, 2009), pp.30-43 (p.30). 
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demonstrates, one aspect of the rationale that underpins Lewis’s adherence to dualistic 
opposition was a ‘mercenary’ pragmatism. By evading partisan allegiance to either side 
in a conflict, remaining free from any singular principle or position, the mercenary is at 
liberty to change sides in the interests of self-advancement. While such pragmatism is 
certainly observable in the rhetorical marketing strategies that accompanied the launch 
of the Vorticist movement, there is a deeper significance to Lewis’s use of dualism than 
this.  
The rationale was given further definition in the second issue of BLAST, ‘The 
War Number’ (1915), where Lewis propounded the maxim: ‘You must catch the 
clearness and logic in the midst of contradictions: not settle down and snooze on an 
acquired, easily possessed and mastered, satisfying shape’.35 The idea that a ‘clearness 
and logic’ may be attained ‘in the midst of contradictions’ is connotative of the Vorticist 
still point at the centre of conflicting forces, which is also the ‘point of maximum 
energy’.36 This figurative clearing or no man’s land, outside the remit of defined battle 
lines or positions, is a revered site in Lewis’s early pattern of thinking, which provides a 
detached view of the conflict which rages around it. In ‘The Ankou’ this liminal site of 
privileged perception is the figurative mouth of the cave from which we are afforded a 
clear glimpse into both the fatalism of the mythic consciousness and the spiritual 
homelessness of the modern human being.  
By setting these two worldviews in conceptual opposition against each other 
Lewis reveals aspects of their relation that would be lost in any isolated treatment of 
either one. We learn how they may relate to each other intimately through a form of 
magnetism, which both attracts and repels. While the modern mind is drawn 
nostalgically to the superstitions of the old world, the ‘primitive’ recoils with a dread 
fascination at the power of the domineering interloper. We learn also that ‘[t]he essence 
of an object is beyond and often in contradiction to, it’s simple truth’, as Lewis put it in 
‘A Review of Contemporary Art’ in BLAST 2, since the ‘enlightened’ rationality which 
Ker-Orr parades on his travels amongst ‘primitive’ communities is shown becoming 
‘deeply engulfed in mythology’ as it fetishizes the object of its fascination.37 In Lewis’s 
dualistic treatment, the free human rationality, having emerged from the ‘self-incurred 
immaturity’ of superstition as Immanuel Kant described it, is found faltering 
																																																								
35 Lewis, ‘Wyndham Lewis Vortex No.1’, in BLAST 2, p.91. 
36 Ezra Pound, ‘Vortex’, in BLAST, pp.153-154 (p.153). 
37 Lewis, ‘A Review of Contemporary Art’, in BLAST 2, pp.38-47 (p.45); Theodor W. Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London: Verso, 2010), p.11-12.  
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nostalgically back towards the comforting dogmas of the past.38 As the instance of the 
encounter in ‘The Ankou’ demonstrates, the strategies underpinning Lewis’s dualistic 
pattern of thinking were analytical and philosophical, propelled by a desire to unpack or 
‘deconstruct’ the binary theoretical oppositions which dominated the intellectual climate 
of Europe at this time.  
A range of important influences on Lewis’s early thought are found fused 
together in his dualistic pattern of thinking. As already discussed, Lewis clearly took 
much philosophical inspiration from the dialectical or dualistic oppositions which he 
found in the writings of Nietzsche. From Nietzsche’s aphoristic writing style and 
technique of revealing philosophical insight through staged contradictions Lewis also 
clearly took a lot of stylistic inspiration, and it is likely that his ‘mercenary’ 
philosophical position was also influenced at least in part by Nietzsche’s own self-
styled identity as an intellectual outsider of the mainstream culture of his day. The 
clearest indication of Nietzsche’s influence on Lewis at this time is to be found in ‘The 
Code of a Herdsman’ (1917), a text which not only reiterates the distinction between 
superior and inferior types of humanity found in The Genealogy of Morals but which 
does so in a decidedly Nietzschean style, developing through a numbered series of 
philosophical maxims.39   
Lewis also appears to have been highly attuned to the emerging structuralist 
theories of culture and social organization during the first decade of the twentieth 
century. His early literary style represents a philosophical approach to language which 
is very much of its time, echoing the contemporary work of the founder of structural 
linguistics — and the inspiration for the later twentieth-century structuralist movement 
— Ferdinand de Saussure. Lewis’s pattern of thinking, like Saussure’s theory, 
represents a reaction against the prevailing theoretical model of positivism, proposing 
instead a radical new model of thought which involves ‘a movement from a substantive 
way of thinking to a relational one’, so that ‘for units, entities, substances, are 
substituted values and relationships’, as Fredric Jameson writes in The Prison-House of 
																																																								
38 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, trans. by H. B. Nisbet (London: 
Penguin, 2009), p.1.  
39 Lewis’s figurative possession of a lofty ‘mountain’ top position from which to command the ‘herd’ 
below (‘The Code of a Herdsman’, The Little Review, 4.3 (1917), pp.3-7  
<http://library.brown.edu/pdfs/1297799167671879.pdf > [accessed 6 November 2015] (p.5)) clearly 
grows out of Nietzsche’s distinction between the ‘great birds of prey’ and the ‘little lambs’ that they hunt. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals (New York: Dover Publications, 2003), p.25. 
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Language (1974).40 Lewis’s anthropological interests during this time would seem to 
account for the route of this influence. According to Bernard Lafourcade Lewis ‘must 
have been acquainted in some way or other with the work of Durkheim and Frazer, and 
possibly with that of Lévy-Bruhl and Van Gennep, all part and parcel of the new 
Zeitgeist’ by the summer of 1909, since his short story ‘Les Saltimbanques’, which was 
published in The English Review in August that year, clearly reflected ‘the new 
intellectual interests of the age in anthropology and sociology’.41 
Amongst the influences on Lewis’s early thought a special note must be made 
about William Blake. As a prolific painter and writer similarly engaged in dualistic 
themes Blake may quite appropriately be described as Lewis’s ‘great English 
predecessor’.42 The parallels between the two run deep, particularly when we 
acknowledge the ‘theological dimension to Lewis’s interests’.43 Richard	Humphreys 
writes that by the time Lewis was settling in London in December 1908 this tendency is 
indicated:  
 
by a fascination with occult and mystical matters, often seemingly at odds with the 
hard, satirical tone of much of his art and writing. Nevertheless, the ‘hardness’ itself has 
roots in Lewis’s deep interest in dualistic philosophies and religious traditions.44 
 
The fact that Blake’s work exerted an early influence on Lewis during his three years of 
study at the Slade School of Fine Art (1898-1901) may help to account for the origin of 
Lewis’s lifelong fascination with dualism.45  
 The work of each is marked by a fascination with Gnostic myth and the dualistic 
tension between light and dark, good and evil which lies at its core. Receptive to the 
dualist programme of Gnostic thought, each similarly consolidated an expressive 
strategy out of the contradistinction of two opposed principles. In his exploration of the 
antagonistic symbolic figurations of Blake’s ‘myth’, Leopold Damrosch provides some 
comments specific to Blake which could almost be taken as applying to Lewis: 
																																																								
40 Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian 
Formalism (Princeton University Press, 1974), p.13 and p.15. 
41 Bernard Lafourcade, Introduction to ‘Les Saltimbanques’, in The Complete Wild Body, ed. by Bernard 
Lafourcade (Santa Barbara: Black Sparrow Press, 1982), p.236.  
42 Paul Edwards, ‘“Creation Myth”: The Art and Writing of Wyndham Lewis’, in Wyndham Lewis (1882-
1957), (Madrid: Fundación Juan March, 2010), pp.21-33 (p.22).  
43 Richard Humphreys, ‘“A Strange Synthesis”: Lewis, British Art and a World Tradition’, Wyndham 
Lewis (1882-1957), (Madrid: Fundación Juan March, 2010), pp.35-43 (p.36). 
44 Ibid., p.37. 
45 ‘Illustrated Biography’, in Wyndham Lewis (1882-1957), p.10.  
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Blake scholarship has tended to organize dilemmas into diagrams and to celebrate 
‘contraries’ without examining them rigorously, but what A. C. Bradley said of 
Wordsworth is still more true of Blake: the way into his mind ‘must be through his 
strangeness and his paradoxes, and not round them’.46 
 
The applicability of these comments to Lewis is striking, for the great critical works of 
Lewis scholarship have likewise found it necessary to enter the artist’s creative psyche 
directly through ‘his strangeness and his paradoxes, and not round them’. One valuable 
example of this, which has exerted a significant influence on my own analytical method 
in this thesis, is found in David A. Wragg’s treatment of the theoretical ‘contradictions’ 
and ‘aporias’ which Lewis’s works frequently develop as ‘structurally binding 
dualities’.47 In consolidating a way of working with, and not against, Lewisian paradox 
Wragg attempts to ‘flag up the danger of reducing Lewis’s work to a “watertight” 
critical schema’ and further reveals the sense in which his work does not merely voice a 
singular critical and theoretical perspective but ‘can be read as a symptomatic 
expression of the problems let loose by a discourse of Enlightenment’.48 
In one sense then Lewis emerges within modernism as the artistic and 
philosophical protégé of Blake, using similar dualistic strategies to undertake a 
philosophical critique of modernity. Certainly both devoted their extraordinarily diverse 
talents to a rigorous interrogation of the social and cultural processes which were 
unleashed by the Enlightenment, and both ultimately invested their creative energies 
into a vision of the modern human condition which is derived from the structure of 
Gnostic myth.49 In another sense, however, Lewis’s pattern of thinking is very much of 
its time. Framed by Nietzschean philosophical concepts and the emerging structuralism 
of the era, Lewis’s dualistic modus operandi is an important exponent of the crisis 
situation of modernism which highlights the continuities as well as the distinctions 
between the modern world and its imagined ‘primitive’ counterpart. 
 
																																																								
46 Leopold Damrosch, Symbol and Truth in Blake’s Myth (Princeton University Press, 1980), p.4. 
47 David A. Wragg, Wyndham Lewis and the Philosophy of Art in Early Modernist Britain: Creating a 
Political Aesthetic (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2005) p.3. 
48 Ibid., pp.1, 4. 
49 For a detailed account of Lewis’s engagement with Gnostic myth in The Human Age trilogy see 
Michael Nath, ‘“Monstrous Starlight”: Wyndham Lewis and Gnosticism’, in Volcanic Heaven: Essays on 
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(iv) The Aims of the Study and its Contribution to Existing Research 
 
The central aim of this thesis is to clarify the conceptual role which ‘myth’ plays in 
Lewis’s Vorticist pattern of thinking and in doing so to deepen the existing critical 
understanding of Lewis’s central importance to modernism. As a reflective participant 
in modernism’s turn to myth, Lewis, as I treat him here, opens a new and important 
chapter in the philosophical discourse of modernity, showing both the creative 
possibilities which myth presented the modern artist and highlighting the alarming 
consequences of seeking a new home among the ruins of ancient ‘world pictures’.50 
This point of focus leads me to join together two previously unconnected but highly 
relevant strands of Lewis scholarship. This is represented on one side by the studies of 
Lewis’s application to mythical sources from Hindu, Buddhist and Gnostic typologies 
which have been conducted by James Selby and Michael Nath, each focussing on 
different mythological traditions and different periods of Lewis’s career.51 On the other 
side is the identification of a corresponding anthropological fascination in Lewis’s work 
which has been made by Bernard Lafourcade and Victor Barac.52  
The combination of these two trends in Lewis scholarship is highly fruitful. In 
the first instance it reveals in detail the way in which Lewis’s mythopoeia was borne out 
of his anthropological research, which led him to adopt and renovate ancient myths for 
his own narrative purposes. Secondly, in bringing together the mythological and the 
anthropological aspects of Lewis’s work the nature and the method of Lewis’s 
philosophical critique of modernity becomes clarified. The irony which stalks a ‘myth’ 
formulated out of anthropological knowledge — namely that it is a myth contaminated 
by its own rational disclosure — was clearly not lost on Lewis. Modernism’s attraction 
to myth as a possible ground for art and spirituality in the modern world provided him 
with valuable materials for an analysis of the culture of modernity. By tracing this 
aspect of Lewis’s early works the thesis continues the attempt made by David A. Wragg 
																																																								
50 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, in The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2013), pp.115-154.  
51 James Selby, ‘Enemy of the Stars: An Inquiry into its Intellectual Sources’, Wyndham Lewis Annual, 2 
(1995), pp.30-40 and Nath’s ‘“Monstrous Starlight”: Wyndham Lewis and Gnosticism’. 
52 Bernard Lafourcade, Introduction to ‘Les Saltimbanques’ (p.236) and Victor Barac, ‘The Anthropology 
of Wyndham Lewis’, Wyndham Lewis Annual, 8 (2008), pp.36-43. 
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‘to read Wyndham Lewis’s literary and artistic production before 1930 as a 
symptomatic response to Enlightenment’.53 
 Modernism’s turn to myth is most readily identified in T. S. Eliot’s advocacy of 
the ‘mythical method’ as an ‘ordering’ principle in his essay on Ulysses of 1923 but, as 
numerous scholars convey, modernism’s mythic posing took on a variety of forms.54 
Lewis appeared to draw attention to his own mythopoeic credentials when he cited the 
influence which his Vorticist play Enemy of the Stars, first published in BLAST in 1914, 
had exerted on James Joyce’s masterwork of ‘mythic’ modernism. In Time and Western 
Man Lewis wrote: 
 
Into Ulysses a great many things have been mixed […] The Enemy of the Stars, a play 
written and published by me in 1914, obliterated by the War, turned up, I suspect, in 
Zurich, and was responsible for the manner here and there of Joyce’s book.55  
 
Given the marginalization which Lewis’s reputation suffered in the late 1920s, this is 
most clearly explicable as an attempt to reinsert himself in the modernist canon and thus 
raise his profile as an experimental modernist writer every bit as important as the then 
widely acclaimed Joyce. But Lewis built the case for this alleged influence even further 
in the commentary which accompanied the 1932 version of Enemy of the Stars, 
commenting this time:  
 
It has been said that this play, the first of its kind in English, influenced the form to 
some extent of the famous play in the middle of Ulysses. The explosive technique 
employed, together with the economy of statement, is certainly suggestive of the novel 
form of the stage directions in the Walpurgis Nacht fantasia of Mr Joyce. It is obvious 
that there are other factors in the Ulysses play beside that provided by the form of The 
Enemy of the Stars, but the fundamental structure of the two is noticeably similar.56 
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The similarities which Enemy of the Stars and the ‘Circe’ episode are supposed to share 
are most obviously technical, although close examination of the ‘fundamental structure’ 
of Lewis’s Vorticist play also reveals a text which adheres to a ‘mythical method’ every 
bit as much as Joyce’s Ulysses or Eliot’s The Waste Land. I am not aware of any 
sustained consideration of Lewis’s early work in this theoretic context and so it is 
important to clarify how the focus on ‘myth’ in the present study relates to existing 
criticism.  
To date, Lewis’s association with this mythic and primitivist tradition in 
modernist literature has largely been treated in negative terms, with his disparaging 
analysis of D. H. Lawrence’s primitivist sensibilities in Paleface (1929) guiding the 
conclusions of most critics.57 Yet despite the vehement criticism which emerges in 
several of Lewis’s texts it is undeniable that Lewis himself also venerated the primitive 
energies which he criticized others for seeking, styling himself as a ‘primitive’ against 
the mainstream of modernist ‘primitivism’. This is demonstrated by his suggestion that 
‘[t]he Art-instinct is permanently primitive’ in the Vorticist Manifesto and also that ‘the 
artist [is] older than the fish’ in The Caliph’s Design (1919).58 In this thesis I intend to 
reveal in more detail the peculiar nature of Lewis’s own idealized conception of the 
primitive.  
Since this necessarily involves analysis of the mythic structure which he 
presents in early works, in one sense this study is a further application of the ‘myth 
criticism’ which was in vogue in the 1950s and 1960s to a hidden corner of the 
modernist canon.59 Yet while it finds accord with certain of the strategies of the 
modernist myth criticism of the 1950s and 1960s — particularly the technical precedent 
which this provides for the analysis of mythical themes, symbols and motifs of a literary 
work — the present study also shifts focus to the cultural context in which those works 
emerged. Indeed the exposition of Lewis’s ‘myth’ is here designed to serve a discussion 
of a more philosophical nature about the crisis situation of modernism and the lengths to 
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which many modernists would go in order to lay effective foundations for a new kind of 
art.  
An important precedent of my approach can be found in Carrie J. Preston’s 
Modernism’s Mythic Pose: Gender, Genre, Solo Performance (2011). Preston’s 
research has done a great deal to reveal the character of modernist applications to 
mythic sources, focussing particularly on the influence of the French musician and 
choreographic theorist François Delsarte on modernism. She writes:  
 
Delsartism took the antimodern position that modernity had separated the body from the 
soul and that expressive solo performance could reunite a whole person, but it was not 
enclosed in an idealistic realm apart from modern technologies. Delsartism posed myth 
in ambivalent relation to modernity, as a still or pause that could function both as a 
skeptical critique and nostalgic diversion. Mythic posing […] framed questions and 
threats to modernity but also served as a sentimental escape.60 
 
Preston gives voice here to the emancipatory promise which ‘myth’ held for many 
modernists. She provides important evidence of the way in which modernism’s 
nostalgic gaze to the origins of art became transformed into a vision of a new vitalized 
and emancipated form of modernity. In many ways this study begins where Preston’s 
research leaves off, moving from performative to philosophical quarters of the 
modernist canon in order to explore in more detail the underlying motivations and 
consequences of modernism’s turn to myth.  
 
(v) Methodological Notes  
 
I limit my focus here to those of Lewis’s paintings and writings which emerged from 
the earliest phase of his career, which I define as that span of time from his return to 
London in December 1908 — when he achieved a settled working routine, publishing 
for the first time his writings in periodicals and exhibiting his paintings in prominent 
London galleries — until he enlisted in the Royal Artillery in March 1916. This eight-
year period saw Lewis develop an abstract technique in painting, which, although 
highly receptive to developments which were taking place among the continental avant-
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garde, is unique in its expressive style and conceptual schema. The period also saw the 
publication of a series of short stories, essays, and plays and of course the two issues of 
the Vorticist magazine BLAST which would establish Lewis as a creative writer and 
cultural critic at the heart of British modernism.  
While my analysis is attuned to the distinct technical and stylistic criteria of each 
expressive medium in which Lewis worked my principal interest lies in the thematic 
interconnections between his visual and literary works. Throughout the thesis I treat 
both the paintings and writings which Lewis produced during this period as 
‘complementary creation[s]’ which emanate from a shared conceptual schema.61 Guided 
by the desire to understand this schema — what I have described as Lewis’s dualistic 
pattern of thinking — I use Lewis’s ‘two arts’ as alternative perspectives on a shared 
base of ideas and themes.62 The nature of this enquiry into the conceptual unity 
underlying an expressive multiplicity of styles, mediums and genres has caused me to 
seek a style of analysis which remains flexible and responsive to a range of critical 
approaches and analytic methods. 
Lewis’s work is so multifaceted — occurring in distinct expressive mediums 
and genres and exploring phenomena at numerous interlaced levels of analysis — that 
the entrenched perspective of any particular critical approach is ill-equipped to make a 
substantial characterization of his overall pattern of thinking.63 In an attempt to avoid 
the restrictions presented by any specific critical bias my analysis is grounded, at a 
technical level, in close reading and critical interpretation. My critical interpretations 
have been informed throughout by a wide but carefully chosen range of secondary 
critical and philosophical sources from the discrete but interconnected spheres of 
literary and art criticism, cultural and social theory, anthropology and above all 
philosophy. Throughout I also turn to Lewis’s own critical writings from 1916 onwards 
for theoretical support, since the thematic threads which combine to form his early 
pattern of thinking are often clarified in later works which deal with similar or related 
themes. Caution is required in handling Lewis’s later-life commentaries on his early 
works, since these are often underpinned by rhetorical strategies that serve to refract and 
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distort the originals. From the 1930s on Lewis’s reputation suffered greatly largely due 
to his temporary political affiance with National Socialism in Germany and many of his 
subsequent critical writings make an attempt to resurrect his status as a central figure in 
the modernist canon and thereby to escape the marginal position he had acquired in 
British culture. We have already observed one instance of this in Lewis’s suggestion 
that Joyce had borrowed substantially from Enemy of the Stars while writing Ulysses. 
Wherever relevant I have therefore highlighted any surreptitious strategies and possible 
grounds of distortion which might complicate the application of Lewis’s later critical 
works to the paintings and writings of the Vorticist period.  
Overall, this style of analysis has been designed to set Lewis in dialogue with 
his contemporary cultural context and the intellectual sources which gave shape to his 
developing thought so that more can be learned about his contribution to the 
philosophical discourse of modernity. This ambition situates the study within a 
theoretical terrain which was largely defined by a German philosophical tradition of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century which interrogated the concept of ‘modernity’, a 
trajectory of philosophical enquiry which demands terminological clarity. As Peter 
Brooker clarifies, ‘modernity’ is a ‘capacious’ term which has a vast history and 
multiple interrelated senses.64 I here use the term in the sense it is given by late 
twentieth-century cultural theorists to indicate the historical process of a ‘rational’ re-
structuring of society which grew out of the Enlightenment, and which was conceived 
by certain prominent nineteenth-century critics as having thrown art and the creative 
human subject into a crisis situation. 
 Terminological caution must be observed when translating German philosophers 
and cultural theorists into the English literary critical idiom of ‘modernism’ and 
‘modernity’, since as Peter Osborne explains: 
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in translations of German philosophical texts, such as Adorno’s, it is [the] term, der 
Moderne, rather than Modernismus [a more pejorative term], which is usually being 
translated by the English ‘modernism’ […]65 
 
He notes that a similar point applies to ‘some uses of the English “modernity”’, 
highlighting especially the English translation of Habermas’s influential lecture series 
Der Philosophische Diskurs der Moderne: Zwölf Vorlesungen (1985) which has been 
published in English under the title The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Both 
Adorno and Habermas are central to this study of ‘modernism’ and ‘modernity’ and in 
both cases I have followed the English translators of their works in observing a 
terminological distinction between ‘modernism’ and ‘modernity’ which is present in the 
German term ‘der Moderne’. 
 The central argument of the thesis develops through five chapters. In chapter 
one, ‘Wyndham Lewis, the Primitive Against Modernist Primitivism’, I explore in 
detail the precise nature of Lewis’s adherence to a primitive kind of art. This is a task 
which by necessity demands preliminary examination of the broader context of 
modernist primitivism, which highlights both the intellectual roots of the venerated 
conception of the ‘primitive’ in post-Enlightenment philosophy and outlines the way in 
which this discourse passed into modernism. Nietzsche and Henri Bergson in particular 
provided the theoretical parameters for modernism’s idealized conception of the 
primitive and the transcendent aspirations which this entailed, so I focus particularly on 
the elements of their respective philosophies which were distilled by their modernist 
inheritors into the principles of an aesthetic philosophy of ‘primitivism’. Throughout it 
is my aim to observe the way in which Lewis engaged critically with this discourse of 
primitivism and thereby to highlight — by means of a process of theoretic 
disentanglement — not only the grounds of his opposition to primitivism but also the 
unique nature of his own adherence to a primitive vitality in art.  
In chapter two, ‘“Mercenaries” of the European Avant-Garde: Wyndham Lewis 
and the Formation of Vorticist Aesthetics and Theory’, I turn from the theoretic 
formulation of the primitive in Lewis’s works to consider in more precise detail the 
structure of Vorticism’s ‘mercenary’ philosophy. This entails a shift of focus from the 
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broad theoretical context in which modernist primitivism emerged to the narrower 
avant-garde context in which Vorticism emerged. My aim in this chapter is to indicate 
the way in which Lewis and Vorticism assimilated many of the key ideas and aesthetic 
techniques of their avant-garde rivals in their own explosive and often contradictory 
philosophy. More specifically I present a new model with which to understand 
Vorticism’s acquisitive attitude towards its key competitors among the pre-war avant-
garde. I treat Miranda B. Hickman’s suggestion that Cubism, Futurism and Kandinsky 
form the three ‘point[s] of the compass’ in the development of Vorticism’s aesthetic 
programme as a valuable but skewed formulation.66 In place of Hickman’s emphasis on 
the importance of Cubist and Futurist compositional technique especially, I suggest a 
more theoretical way of reading Vorticism’s inheritance in terms of the dualistic 
collision which Lewis observed in Cubism’s material aesthetic and Kandinsky’s 
‘spiritual’ art. In this way Vorticism’s key avant-garde coordinates are re-plotted in a 
way which reveals more about the conceptual narrative which Lewis was developing at 
this time, and especially the conflict which he observed taking place between the two 
opposed metaphysical principles of matter and spirit in the modern world. 
In chapter three, ‘Lewis’s “pattern of thinking” in Words and Images’, I turn my 
focus from the key sources of Lewis’s aesthetic theory to observe in more detail the way 
in which these ideas were developed in Lewis’s creative works in the lead up to 
Vorticism. In particular my aim here is to demonstrate the way in which his paintings 
and writings of the period can be seen to adhere to, and emanate from, the shared 
system of concepts and themes which constitutes Lewis’s early pattern of thinking, 
compelling a critical treatment which unites literary and artistic discourses as elements 
in a more holistic, philosophical analysis of his creative and critical works. I adopt a 
particular two-step method in attempting this, treating first the conceptual narrative in 
his visual works with reference to contemporary writings, before moving on to consider 
how visual, compositional criteria were invested in the typography and writing style in 
BLAST to convey a certain meaning to a reader well-versed in modernist experiments in 
poetry. Here I wish to outline the conceptual narrative which underpinned Lewis’s path 
into abstraction during the period 1912-1914 and to demonstrate the sense in which this 
developed at every stage by means of a complex process of ‘symbolic classification’.67  
																																																								
66 Miranda B. Hickman, The Geometry of Modernism: The Vorticist Idiom in Lewis, Pound, H.D., and 
Yeats (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), p.5. 
67 Rodney Needham, Symbolic Classification (Santa Monica: Goodyear Publishing, 1979). 
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In chapter four, ‘Immoral Theatre: “Savage Worship” in Enemy of the Stars’,  
I gather the themes raised in the earlier chapters and return to the metaphorical mouth of 
the cave where we began the study, exploring the broader significance of this in Lewis’s 
early pattern of thinking. The central claim which I make here is that Enemy of the Stars 
— the first full-length literary work which Lewis published — is a text invested with all 
the themes, symbols and theoretic tensions which he had developed in his paintings and 
writings up to 1914. Close examination of the text can thus clarify and develop the 
themes which were consolidated in the analysis of Lewis’s earlier symbolic 
classifications in chapter three. At the heart of my analysis of Lewis’s Vorticist ‘play’ I 
wish to highlight the conceptual opposition between myth and modernity, mythos and 
logos, which the text elaborates and explore the significance of this with reference to 
other of Lewis’s critical and philosophical writings of the period. Of particular 
relevance here is Lewis’s affirmation of an anthropological rationale in his early 
fictions. The characters of these works are described as ‘carefully selected specimens of 
religious fanaticism’ which are ‘congealed and frozen into logic’.68 In this way Lewis 
evokes the sinister power suggested by anthropological texts in his fictions and draws 
us closer to the precise role which myth played in his early pattern of thinking. 
 In chapter five, ‘Lewis’s Vorticist Myth and the Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity’, the analysis takes a more reflective, theoretical turn as I explore the 
significance of the mythos/logos dualism which runs through Lewis’s early works. In 
the first instance, I explore the possibility which has been raised by Michael Nath that 
Lewis’s work in the end constitutes a genuine instance of myth, though one which is 
consciously adapted to accommodate the new historical situation of humankind in the 
modern world. While entertaining this possibility I also consider the peculiar nature of a 
myth which is not just formed out of modern anthropological knowledge but which is 
also designed to explain the underlying ‘dynamic’ of the modern world.69 The point of 
this is to inquire whether a myth formed in this way can ever share the essential 
attributes of ancient myths. The historical situation and function of Lewis’s mythopoeia 
— as a means by which the claims of rationalism can be exposed and undermined by an 
antagonistic model of thought — leads me to explore the contribution which Lewis’s 
																																																								
68 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Inferior Religions’ (1917), in The Complete Wild Body, ed. by Bernard Lafourcade 
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early thought makes to the philosophical discourse of modernity. I end by treating 
particularly the way in which Lewis departs from the early influence of Nietzsche and 
Bergson while anticipating certain key themes of Critical Theory later in the twentieth 
century, in an attempt to clarify his situation within modernism and the broader cultural 
theoretical debate about modernism.  
 The rationale behind the order of these chapters and the way in which my 
argument develops deserves some clarification. While chapter one raises the central 
theme of my study in broad, introductory terms — namely the philosophical and 
cultural context within which myth came to represent a possible route of escape from 
the excesses of modernity — chapters two and three depart this theoretical terrain in 
order to elaborate with more precision the key elements of Lewis’s developing pattern 
of thinking and the manner in which these were expressed in his Vorticist paintings and 
writings. Although this represents a departure from the central focus of my thesis, it 
serves to clarify in concrete terms the key themes and symbols which run through 
Lewis’s work at this time and thus provides the necessary material for a closer analysis 
of the mythos/logos dualism in his work. With these materials at hand I discuss of the 
conceptual role of ‘myth’ in Lewis’s Vorticist works in chapter four (paying special 
attention to Enemy of the Stars) and address the key issues which this raises in chapter 
five. Sections of my analysis involve detailed discussion of the compositional properties 
of visual works by Lewis and his contemporaries among the European avant-garde. 
Images which have a central relevance to my argument have been reproduced and are 
included in an appendix at the end of the thesis. 
	 30	
Chapter 1 





  [7] The Art-instinct is permanently primitive. […] 
  [9] The artist of the modern movement is a savage  
  
     III. 
  [3] […] we believe that an Art must be organic with its Time […]1 
 
 
In these comments from sections two and three of the Vorticist Manifesto Wyndham 
Lewis exemplifies the ‘general paradox of modernist primitivism’, as Michael Bell 
describes it, ‘that the primitive and the avant-garde can be combined’.2 The suggestion 
being made is that the modern world — the fruition of humankind’s progress to a 
supposedly advanced stage of civilization — was somehow as conducive to savage 
worship as was the natural wilderness of humankind’s deep past. In Lewis’s view, as he 
made clear in BLAST, the central difference between the original wilderness and its 
modern variant lay in the materials of the external world and their formal composition. 
While ‘primitive man’ had explored the labyrinths of the natural world, ‘the modern 
town-dweller of our civilization sees everywhere fraternal moulds for his spirit, and 
interstices of a human world’ (my emphasis).3 For Lewis the modern metropolis was to 
be conceived as a vast and forbidding forest where ‘steel trees’ had reared up ‘where the 
green ones were lacking’.4 While the external structures and the governing logos of the 
world had changed fundamentally the modern world nevertheless remained an enticing, 
though at times hostile, wilderness for the artist to explore. The ‘enormous, jangling, 
																																																								
1 Lewis, ‘Manifesto’, in BLAST, pp. 33, 34. 
2 Michael Bell, ‘Primitivism: Modernism as Anthropology’, in The Oxford Handbook of Modernisms, ed. 
Peter Brooker, Andrzej Gasiorek, Deborah Longworth and Andrew Thacker (Oxford University Press, 
2010), pp.353-367 (p.365). 
3 Lewis, ‘The New Egos’, in BLAST, p.141. 
4 Lewis, ‘Manifesto’, in BLAST, p.36. 
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journalistic fairy desert of modern life’, wrote Lewis in section two of the Vorticist 
Manifesto, ‘serves [the modern artist] as Nature did more technically primitive man’.5  
This blend of modernism and primitivism is typical of numerous theories of the 
pre-war avant-garde. The vital energies of the modern world routinely kindled hopes of 
humankind’s transcendence of material limitations and caused many to perceive in their 
own historic moment the potential for a new beginning to History. To ‘stand on the last 
promontory of the centuries’ was at the same time to gaze boldly towards ‘the very first 
dawn’, as F. T. Marinetti stated in the Futurist Manifesto (1909).6 Entrance into the 
most advanced stage of civilization came to be viewed as heralding a return to 
humankind’s primitive ‘origin’ and a recovery of the absolute freedom associated with 
the state of nature.	It is with the sense of this ‘origin’ and the meaning of ‘primitive’ 
among modernist artists and writers which I concern myself here.  
The aim of this chapter is to clarify the pool of ideas in which Lewis immersed 
himself in the lead up to Vorticism. More specifically, I aim to reveal how Lewis’s early 
thought was heavily influenced by the conception of the primitive which had passed 
into modernism through a significant discourse in post-Enlightenment European 
philosophy. As I hope to demonstrate, however, Lewis’s own adherence to a primitive 
vitality in art was defined in opposition to the main current of modernist primitivism. 
While he was a central participant in this discourse, he was an intellectually isolated 
participant who refused to conform to the ideals and assumptions of his contemporaries.  
Lewis’s position in this discourse is complex and unique. To understand this it 
will be necessary not only to observe the rationale for Lewis’s hostility towards the 
philosophical principles which underpinned modernism’s veneration of the primitive, 
but also to highlight the reasons for his criticism of the ‘techniques of strangeness’ 
which his contemporaries were pioneering in order to attain the aura of the primitive in 
their artworks.7 The nature of this project demands that we observe the negative side of 
Lewis’s early thought; the way in which it is founded in criticism of and disagreement 
with others. But this emphasis on the negative, it should be noted, is only the necessary 
preliminary to our understanding of the positive aspect of Lewis’s theorizing: the highly 
original and carefully worked out vision of a ‘primitive’ art to which he alone adhered 
																																																								
5 Ibid., p.33. 
6 F. T. Marinetti, ‘The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism’ (1909), in Futurist Manifestos, ed. by 
Umbro Apollonio (London: Tate Publishing, 2009), pp.19-24 (pp.21, 20). 
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in the lead up to Vorticism. At the outset, it will be necessary to approach this matter 
from a broad historical perspective, to identify the cultural and philosophical roots of 
modernism’s discussion of a primitive kind of art. Only once modernist primitivism is 
contextualized in this way will it be possible to properly appreciate the complex nature 
of Lewis’s position within this tradition. 
 
(i) The Roots of Modernist Primitivism 
 
The idea of the ‘primitive’ cannot exist apart from the perspective of the ‘civilized’, for 
whom it functions as a tool of ‘self-reflection’.8 First appearing in the English language 
in the fifteenth century — when it signified ‘the “original or ancestor” of animals, 
perhaps of men’ — the word primitive came into wider usage among Enlightenment 
thinkers in the eighteenth century.9 Here, as Marianna Torgovnick points out:  
 
it acquired specialized meanings in many fields, including art, mathematics, and 
grammar – the common element being that primitive always implied ‘original,’ ‘pure,’ 
‘simple’ – as the dictionary says, ‘with implications of either commendation or the 
reverse’.10 
 
A sideways glance at the great work of the Enlightenment — the Encyclopedia of Denis 
Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert (publication started in 1751) — can help to 
demonstrate this ambivalence in the concept. 
In the entry on ‘Humanity’ in Volume Eight of the Encyclopedia, published in 
1765, the word primitive is used twice to refer, on the one hand, to the personal and 
social norms of the ‘ancient’ inhabitants of Tartary and, on the other, to the ‘original’ 
qualities of humankind.11 The connotation implied by each is, however, different. In the 
																																																								
8 Michael Bell writes: ‘[i]t must be almost as old as the capacity for civilised self-reflection for which 
“primitive” is a necessary term. And by the same token it is always a projected attribution dependent on 
the viewpoint of the civilised’ (‘Primitivism: Modernism as Anthropology’, p.353). 
9 Marianna Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives (London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1990), p.18. 
10 Ibid., p.19. 
11 In the first instance it is written that: ‘Tartar blood is mixed on one side with Chinese and on the other 
with the eastern Russians; and this mix has done nothing to efface the traits of this primitive race’. In the 
second: ‘White appears therefore to be the primitive color of nature that climate, food, and custom alters, 
and causes the gradation from yellow and brown to black’. Denis Diderot, ‘Humanity (Type)’, in The 
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first instance the point being made is that inter-racial breeding had done little ‘to efface’ 
the ‘ugliness’ and ‘immorality’ of the Tartars, primitive carrying in this context a 
decidedly negative connotation.12 In the second instance, primitive is used to commend 
the supposedly original and pure white skin-colour of human beings, before it became 
‘tainted’ by environmental factors. From this time on we may observe a significant rift 
developing in the philosophical usage of the word.  
While for the progressive liberals and modernizers of eighteenth and nineteenth-
century philosophy primitive came to signify the ‘crude and undeveloped’ past which 
contrasted with the maturity of modern thought, it came to signify ‘what is unspoiled, a 
pure origin’ among those philosophers who adopted a more critical stance on the 
Enlightenment project of a rationally re-ordered society.13 Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
essay of 1750 ‘Discourse on the Arts and Sciences’ may be taken as an effective start-
point for this tradition. This essay, Rousseau’s first published work, was submitted in 
response to a question proposed by the Academy of Dijon for their annual essay 
competition — ‘Whether the restoration of the arts and the sciences has helped to purify 
morals’ — and won first prize.14 At the height of the French Enlightenment the idea that 
this question should be answered in the negative may have seemed inconceivable, but 
Rousseau used his text to expound a historical critique of civilization, arguing that every 
stage of humankind’s supposed advance had in truth been process of moral 
degeneration.  
By the nineteenth century the view was growing that art would play the decisive 
role in accounting for the moral and spiritual deficit of the modern world, which many 
thinkers — following the implications of Rousseau’s philosophy — had already 
identified as a consequence of humankind’s loss of the mythical home. In his ‘Talk on 
Mythology’, published in 1800, Friedrich Schlegel argued:  
 
Our poetry, I maintain, lacks a focal point, such as mythology was for the ancients; and 
one could summarize all the essentials in which modern poetry is inferior to the ancient 
																																																																																																																																																																		
and Ann Arbor (Michigan Publishing, University of Michigan Library, 2010) 
<http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.did2222.0000.242> [accessed 6 November 2015].  
12 Ibid. The preceding line provides the context of the comment: ‘[t]he women are as ugly as the men. 
They have neither morals nor religion’.  
13 Bell, ‘Primitivism: Modernism as Anthropology’, p.354. 
14 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Arts and Sciences’, in Selected Writings (London: CRW 
Publishing, 2005), p.21. 
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in these words: We have no mythology. But, I add, we are close to obtaining one or, 
rather, it is time that we earnestly work together to create one.15 
 
In Schlegel’s philosophical system, developed a century before the emergence of the 
avant-garde in Europe, we encounter what appears to be the conceptual foundations for 
the abstract art which would emerge in the early twentieth century. The key idea 
emanating from Schlegel’s work, as Habermas puts it, is that: 
 
only poetry that has become autonomous, that has been cleansed of associations with 
theoretical and practical reason, opens wide the door to the world of the primordial 
forces of myth. Modern art alone can communicate with the archaic sources of social 
integration that have been sealed off within modernity. On this reading, the new 
mythology demands of a dirempted modernity that it relate to the ‘primordial chaos’ as 
the other of reason.16 
 
Although European culture would have to wait another century to witness works of art 
that were truly ‘cleansed of associations’ and therefore open to the ‘primordial chaos’ of 
myth, the seeds of modernist primitivism were clearly sown in eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century critiques of modernity.  
The idea of the ‘primitive’ was given its radical edge — as a systematic 
disavowal of reason and the principles of the Enlightenment — in the philosophy of 
Nietzsche. What is significant about Nietzsche in this context is that he was the first 
theorist to turn dissatisfaction with the modern world and the path of reason into a 
wholesale rebellion against the principles of the Enlightenment. In this way Nietzsche 
initiated a path of reasoning which would come to dominate the early twentieth-century 
scene of European thought, as many among the first generation of modernists were 
inspired by the key idea which his works disseminated, that ‘[i]n the forms of a revived 
mythology, art can reacquire the character of a public institution and develop the power 
to regenerate the ethical totality’ of the community.17 	
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At the heart of his critique of Enlightenment modernity, and the counter-
offensive application to myth, lies a concern about the narrowing sphere of agency of 
the human subject in the modern world. As David A. Wragg writes:  
 
[Nietzsche’s] comment that ‘the people itself is the artist of the future’ holds on to the 
idea of a reconstituted social unity, based on the resurgence of mythic consciousness 
delivered by art. For Habermas, Nietzsche appeals to myth as the antidote to 
rationalism, manifested in ‘the forces of social integration consolidated by competitive 
society’.18 
 
Seeking a way out of rational categorization on behalf of the ailing human subject,  
Nietzsche provided a clear model of interpretation in which myth played a conceptual 
role as the ‘antonym’ of science and therefore as a possible antidote to the crisis which 
modernity had initiated in the arts.19 Mythos, a way to knowledge conceptually opposed 
to the rational logos of modernity, in this way came to signify a source of nourishment 
for the modern artist and as a possible conceptual home for modern art.  
The appellation ‘primitive’ thus took on a significant value during the modernist 
period, becoming a term that was not any longer ‘simply bound by temporality’, but 
which entailed ‘a forward and utopian’ vista.20 Andrzej Gasiorek provides a useful 
example of how this was occurring:  
 
Victor Reynolds wrote of the need for modern art to return to ‘primitive’ and ‘Egyptian’ 
sources in The New Age in 1910. He maintained that such art forms offered ‘the seeding 
ground and the hope of future progress’ because their survival was ‘so fragmentary as 
to preclude any possibility of direct imitation’.21  
 
Further evidence of this new evaluative connotation of the primitive can be found in the 
fact that when C. R. W. Nevinson sided with Marinetti and the Futurists against the 
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artists associated with the Rebel Art Centre in the Spring of 1914 his justification was 
based on the claim that the Italian Futurists were ‘the real Primitives, the Primitives of a 
new and modern sensibility’.22 As Gasiorek clarifies, for Nevinson ‘such primitivism 
did not imitate earlier “forms or technique” but rather expressed “the spirit of its 
age”’.23  
 Lewis expressed a strikingly similar idea to this in his statement that modern art 
must be ‘primitive’ in order to be ‘organic with its Time’ in the Vorticist Manifesto, the 
epigraph to this chapter. Whether this was coincidence or duplication is unclear and 
perhaps unimportant, for the idea was widespread among the first generation of 
modernists that modernity was a situation which called for a new primitive aesthetic. 
But Lewis’s position in this tradition is far from simple. While he was evidently 
conversant with the philosophical critiques of modernity which were occurring during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and highly supportive of the revitalizing 
potential of primitive artworks, he maintained a critical detachment from the main 
primitivist current of thought within modernism. It is important to see why this was. 
 
(ii) Lewis’s Opposition to Modernist Primitivism 
 
In later works Lewis was openly critical about the idealization of the primitive which 
was widespread amongst his contemporaries. In The Diabolical Principle (1931) he 
attacked the ‘new nihilism’ of Elliot Paul and the associated belief of Pierre Drieu La 
Rochelle that ‘Man need never have left the forest. He is a degenerate, nostalgic 
animal’.24 In the partner-essay to this, The Dithyrambic Spectator (1931), Lewis 
launched an equally scathing critique of Jane Ellen Harrison’s Ancient Art and Ritual 
(1913), in which she had called for modern art to ‘recross […] the ritual bridge back 
into life’.25 Lewis objected especially to what he described as the ‘emotional confusion’ 
and ‘snobbery’ in Harrison’s thesis, arguing that by appealing so wholeheartedly to 
emotion Harrison had simply conformed ‘to the democratic ideals of her time’.26  
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Behind these nostalgic visions of the primordial ‘forest’ in which humankind 
originally dwelt, the transcendental ideal of Nietzsche’s Dionysian philosophy is only 
thinly concealed. The embrace of a primordial chaos was valued in this sense for the 
escape it provided from modernity and the narrowing sphere of subjectivity which this 
was supposed to have brought upon the human subject. Harrison’s theory is clear about 
this. She applauded the contemporary Expressionist movement and the emphasis which 
it placed on ‘the expression and communication of the artist’s emotion’, since in her 
view it was ‘the business of the modern artist to feel and transmit emotion towards this 
unity of man’.27 This ecstatic or transcendent function of art — conceived as a 
‘removal’ or ‘displacement’ from the natural order of things, ‘a standing outside 
oneself’ to become united with all of humankind — is a key aspect of modernist 
primitivism.28 The primitive, whether in the guise of myth, ritual or an amoral attitude 
in human conduct, was valued as a vehicle of conveyance which could reconnect the 
dislocated individual of modern civilization with the fundamental pulse of Life.    
Lewis’s paintings of around 1912-1913 demonstrate careful engagement with 
this idea and the specific form it was given in Nietzsche’s Dionysian philosophy. In The 
Birth of Tragedy (1872) Nietzsche had described the primitive urges behind Dionysian 
worship as originating in the desire to tear apart ‘the veil of māyā’ and leave it 
‘fluttering in tatters before the mysterious primordial unity’ of life.29 The form of the 
worship had been the dithyramb:  
 
In song and in dance man expresses himself as a member of a higher community; he has 
forgotten how to walk and speak and is on the way toward flying into the air, dancing. 
His very gestures express enchantment. […] he feels himself a god, he himself now 
walks about enchanted, in ecstasy, like the gods he saw walking in his dreams. He is no 
longer an artist, he has become a work of art […].30 
 
This empowered and ecstatic state, which is gained through the medium of dance, was 
the central theme of Lewis’s nine-foot square painting Kermesse, commissioned by 
Frida Strindberg and displayed in her nightclub ‘The Cave of the Golden Calf’ during 
																																																								
27 Harrison, Ancient Art and Ritual, pp.232, 239. 
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Emerald, 2003), p.237. 
29 Nietzsche, ‘The Birth of Tragedy’, p.37.  
30 Ibid., p.37. 
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1912 and 1913.31 The painting consolidated Lewis’s growing reputation as an advanced 
artist, being recognized at the time as ‘the first Modernistic “masterpiece” of British 
painting’.32 Kermesse has been lost since 1930, but we are afforded a glimpse into its 
Dionysian aesthetic in Study for Kermesse (1912; Fig. 9).33 
 In this composition Lewis adopts characteristics of the Cubist style, with all the 
painted elements being rendered in sharp, dissecting lines. Yet Lewis’s use of Cubist 
technique does not result in a static image of condensed material forms. Rather, the 
arcing lines give a sense of movement, the forms appear in a state of transformation, so 
that what is rendered in isolated detail as a condensed unit of matter also becomes 
explicable as the motion of a skirt billowing with air. The garments and anatomical 
features of the human figures appear to fuse with the scenic elements of their 
surrounding in the tumult of the dance, giving the impression of a group of human 
beings who have come loose from their restrictive moldings, shortly to become wholly 
fluid.  
But there is also a sinister undercurrent to the image, not only in the ‘two wicked 
looking eyes’ of the central dancer looking directly at the viewer over the shoulder of 
his companion, but the skeletal features of the visible faces, especially the female figure 
being pirouetted in the right of the picture.34 Her scream of delight looks unnervingly 
expressionless, as if she is really a slack-jawed skeleton. Here then we have an early 
expression of Lewis’s later identification of the ‘dionysiac’ as ‘a relation, a something 
that happens, between two or more opposites, when they meet in their pyrrhic 
encounters’.35 Although the group is gaining in vitality and ‘life’ as the dance gathers 
momentum, the individuals involved appear stripped to the bone.  
While Kermesse may have been applauded by Lewis’s contemporaries for the 
expression which it gave to the Dionysian impulse towards primordial unity through 
dance, Lewis’s own thought was clearly developing beyond Nietzschean parameters at 
this time. A Feast of Overmen from the Timon of Athens Portfolio (1912; Fig. 12) 
further conveys the ‘pyrrhic encounters’ that Lewis believed were entailed in the 
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Dionysian impulse.36 Here Lewis gestures not to the fluidity of dance but rather gives 
visual expression to the swollen egos which might be created by Nietzsche’s philosophy 
of the Übermensch. As Paul Edwards writes:  
 
When Lewis claimed in Rude Assignment to have been ‘reasonably immune’ to 
Nietzsche’s doctrine of the superman, he could have instanced A Feast of Overmen to 
support his claim. The image can be interpreted in the light of Lewis’s later (dated 
1915) Prologue to Tarr: ‘Nietzsche’s books are full of seductions and sugar-plums. 
They have made “aristocrats” of people who would otherwise have been only mild 
snobs or meddlesome prigs … and they have made an Over-man of every vulgarly 
energetic grocer in Europe’.37 
 
As model citizens of the new world, the Overmen in Lewis’s painting gorge themselves 
on food and wine at the expense of their host, Timon in Shakespeare’s play. As they 
carouse they grow in strength and stature and begin to fuse with the inanimate scene 
around them. Here then is another expression of Lewis’s concern about Nietzsche’s 
invitation to reconnect with a more basic aspect of life. Like the skeletal face of the 
pirouetting woman in Study for Kermesse these figures also reveal how the Dionysian 
drive for unity and empowerment may result in the extinction of the individual.  
The clearest articulation of Lewis’s position on this during the earliest phase of 
his career is found in ‘Futurism, Magic and Life’, in which Lewis issued a humorous 
warning to the artist of his day to resist the temptation to return too wholeheartedly to 
the primordial unity of ‘Life’: 
 
The Artist, like Narcissus, gets his nose nearer and nearer the surface of Life. He will 
get it nipped off if he is not careful, by some Pecksniff-shark sunning it’s lean belly 




36 Wyndham Lewis, Portfolio Timon of Athens: A Feast of Overmen, 1913, lithograph on paper, 38.8 × 
27.2 cm, Wyndham Lewis Memorial Trust, G. and V. Lane Collection. 
37 Edwards, Painter and Writer, p.89. 
38 Lewis, ‘Futurism, Magic and Life’, in BLAST, pp.132-135 (pp.134-5). 
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This passage jars with the primitivist idealization of an art which would re-cross the 
ritual bridge back into life.39 In the first instance, Lewis’s metaphorical comparison of 
the artist to Narcissus implants the idea that art’s return to life is really a disguised form 
of self-absorption, modernism’s evocation of myth amounting in the end to an alluring 
pose. Secondly, Lewis instates an elemental distinction between the two realms of art 
and life. The artist, we are led to believe, would not survive in the inhospitable region of 
pure, undiluted life. In the lines which follow this passage we learn more about the 
rationale behind Lewis’s insistence on this separation: 
 
Reality is in the artist, the image only in life, and [the artist] should only approach so 
near as is necessary for a good view. The question of focus depends on the power of his 
eyes, or their quality.40 
 
The ocular bias in this definition of art — a pursuit which depends above all on the 
‘power’ of the artist’s ‘eyes’ — contrasts sharply with the ‘emotional’ theory of art 
which Harrison presented, and indeed the general temper of modernism’s Nietzschean-
inspired ambition to reconnect art with life. This leads us to the crux of Lewis’s 
disagreement with the idea of the primitive that was advanced by his modernist 
contemporaries.  
 The rationale behind most modernist applications to the primitive had been 
derived from Nietzsche’s pessimistic characterization of the situation in which the 
modern individual existed, being notionally closed into an ever-narrowing sphere of 
subjectivity. With this theoretical underpinning, the primitive came to represent a route 
by which the subject could reconnect with the broader stream of social life. For Lewis, 
the logic of this account was not only misguided, but carried potentially catastrophic 
consequences. He later commented in ‘The Perfect Action’ that art is a ‘phenomen[on] 
of separation’ which is ‘identifiable with the arrival on the scene of the individual or 
Subject: and its disappearance is coeval with the death or suppression of the Subject’.41 
Thus for Lewis, the salvation of the modern human subject lay not in its immersion in 
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life, but in individuation. In contrast to the unifying ideals of his contemporaries, 
Lewis’s thought at this time is concerned especially with implementing safeguards 
which would guarantee the subject’s freedom from any encroaching unity which might 
attempt to consume it, whether that is termed ‘object’, ‘Nature’ or indeed ‘Life’.   
Such ‘questions of fusion and separation’ were central to Lewis’s developing 
pattern of thinking during the Vorticist period.42 The issue of transcendence became one 
of the central dilemmas of Lewis’s career, which he expressed eloquently in Time and 
Western Man: 
 
What I am concerned with here, first of all, is […] the very fundamental question of 
whether we should set out to transcend our human condition (as formerly Nietzsche and 
then Bergson claimed that we should); or whether we should translate into human terms 
the whole of our datum.43  
 
As this passage makes clear, Nietzsche and Bergson represented for Lewis two sides of 
one ‘dream of transcendence’ which had entranced the first generation of modernist 
artists and writers.44 The relationship between these two philosophers in the modernist 
psyche is important to understand. While it was Nietzsche who set the theoretical 
parameters for modernism’s idealization of a primitive art, it was Bergson who 
presented the most compelling rationale for the creative human subject’s transcendence 
of material limits.  
Although he may not be classed among the key theorists of modernist 
primitivism, Bergson’s account of evolution as a ‘collision of descending matter and 
ascending spirit’ readily leant itself to a distinction between a modern civilization in the 
throes of entropic collapse and a primitive, mythic counterpart which presented the 
chance for renewal.45 His philosophy provided the European avant-garde with an 
attractive solution to the problem of how to understand the most advanced stage of 
civilization as a new dawn for the species. The evolutionary frontier at which 
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humankind supposedly stood in modernity he conceived as a site of transcendence. 
Bergson’s ‘vision of man at the apex of evolution’ in many ways furnished modernism 
with the missing piece of Nietzsche’s philosophy, providing a more complete image of 
the ‘future “superman,” a man more fully in possession of himself’, than Nietzsche had 
managed.46 It is important to understand the effect Bergson’s vitalist philosophy had on 
modernism and more specifically on Lewis’s early thought, if we are to fully account 
for Lewis’s theoretical opposition to primitivism at this time. 
 
(iii) Henri Bergson’s Vitalism and Modernist Ideas of Transcendence 
 
It is not difficult to understand why the two philosophies of Nietzsche and Bergson may 
have overlapped to such a profound degree in Lewis’s thought. He had first read 
Nietzsche in French translation during his student days in Paris around the same time 
that he attended the lectures of Bergson at the Collège de France. During this time he 
would have observed the correspondences between the Dionysian ‘will to power’ 
presented in the philosophy of Nietzsche and the élan vital of Bergson.47 Charlotte de 
Mille has shown that Bergson’s lectures of 1903 — which Lewis is thought to have 
attended — would have been highly complementary to a student of Nietzsche’s critique 
of modernity given that they too concerned the ‘different methods of thought’ which 
can be distinguished ‘from the ancients to Kant’, highlighting especially a distinction 
between ‘the “method of intuition and the method of analysis, — of absolute knowledge 
and relative knowledge, by signs and concepts”’.48 The Nietzschean distinction between 
‘mythic’ and ‘rational’ worldviews was in this way highlighted and widely 
disseminated in the immensely popular work of Bergson.49 
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A devoted reader of Nietzsche’s philosophy himself, Bergson captured the 
transformative evolutionary possibilities which were widely felt to be stirring in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. In Creative Evolution (1907) he presented a general 
view of ‘life as tension’ in which ‘the “living and concrete self” is always striving to 
slough off the “crust” of rationalization it constantly exteriorizes’.50 Evolution was thus 
explained as a model of interacting forces, of dynamic propulsion encountering a static 
restraining element: though life in-itself is defined as ‘pure mobility’, the ‘particular 
manifestations of life accept this mobility reluctantly, and continually lag behind’.51 At 
a time of dynamic thrust towards the newly transformed modern world Bergson’s 
philosophy guided a generation further along the radical path of reasoning that 
Nietzsche had initiated, providing a further philosophical rationale for transcendence. 
Perhaps Europe’s foremost philosopher of the first decade of the twentieth 
century — certainly the most influential philosopher among modernist artists and 
writers, as Mark Antliff has shown — Bergson expressed the view that the twentieth 
century represented a point of evolutionary departure for humankind, involving the 
passage of evolutionary sovereignty from Nature to humankind:52  
 
[…] consciousness is essentially free; it is freedom itself; but it cannot pass through 
matter without settling on it, without adapting itself to it […] humanity no longer seems 
isolated in the nature that it dominates […] all organized beings, from the humblest to 
the highest, from the first origins of life to the time in which we are, and in all places as 
in all times, do but evidence a single impulsion, the inverse of the movement of matter, 
and in itself indivisible. All the living hold together, and all yield to the same 
tremendous push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and 
the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and 
before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every 
resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death.53 
 
Transcendence — typically the preserve of mythological and religious doctrines — was 
in this way given a philosophical rationale by a leading thinker of the day, the 
metaphysical conflict between spirit and matter having been conceptually aligned with 
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the technological conflict taking place between humankind and material nature. As de 
Mille writes: ‘With the élan vital, Bergson effectively bridged the gap between the 
insecurity engendered by neo-Darwinian theory and the human need for some form of 
spiritual force’.54  
But Bergson’s philosophy left a great deal open to interpretation. For all 
adherents to his interpretive model the task remained to identify which phenomena 
properly belonged to which side of the dualism of spirit and matter; whether, for 
example, nature was to be conceived as inert matter or vital energy, and whether the 
new phenomena of machinery were manifestations of humankind’s vital creative spirit 
or further material limitations on the spirit’s ascent. The most pressing issue for artists 
working in the Bergsonian model of interpretation was to clarify whether art was to be 
aligned with spirit (as in the case of Wassily Kandinsky and the Formalist theory of art) 
or materiality (as in the case of F. T. Marinetti and the Italian Futurists), or whether it 
would play off a conflict between both sides (as in the case of Lewis and the Vorticist 
movement). In all instances, despite the apparent contradictions which arise, the 
energized propulsion of the élan vital was affirmed by Bergson’s modernist inheritors 
as a primitive surge of energy which could break apart the outmoded cultural 
institutions which they had inherited. 
The Bergsonian model was used by Marinetti and the Italian Futurists to justify 
the idea that by populating the world with a new species of machinery, humankind had 
liberated itself from the draconian rule of material Nature. Life’s ascent was identified 
with the vital energies of the machine-age and the aggressive combat which the 
Futurists perceived humankind as having launched against material nature. In this way 
Futurism celebrated the machine-age as the final and decisive stage of Kant’s 
‘Enlightenment’, conceived as ‘man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity’.55 
By unleashing the power of the machine the Futurists argued that humankind was 
effectively overthrowing the authority of natural laws. ‘Time and Space died yesterday’, 
wrote Marinetti, ‘[w]e already live in the absolute, because we have created eternal, 
omnipresent speed’.56  
It is perhaps Jacob Epstein’s sculpture Rock Drill of 1913 (Fig. 14) which most 
forcefully illustrates the new evolutionary possibilities which this moment of historic 
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severance awakened in the modernist psyche.57 As Richard Cork writes: ‘Half human 
and half automaton, the figure [...] appears to be the harbinger of a different, harsher 
and more disturbing world’.58 Certainly the figure is designed to express the aggressive 
vitality of the machine-age. Its phallic positioning, aggressively poised to plumb the 
earth, conveys well the passive conception of nature which we find in these years. Yet 
embedded in the armoured structure of the driller’s ribcage we find the fragile embryo 
of organic life, as yet shapeless and unconscious, the progeny of the new type of 
humanity — presumably a man-machine hybrid — that would populate the new world.   
Futurism and Epstein’s Rock Drill may now be regarded as products of 
Bergson’s transcendental hypothesis and emblems of the belief that humankind was 
nearing its date with destiny in the early years of the twentieth century. But as much as 
the artworks and theories of this time conveyed the heavy influence of Bergson’s idea 
of the élan vital, they were taking a strident step forward within the parameters of 
Nietzsche’s emancipatory hypothesis. The modern world was believed to represent a 
homecoming for the primitive instincts of humankind, a situation in which art would 
once again blossom in ‘the Apollinian and Dionysian duality’ and all the ‘perpetual 
strife’ which that brings.59 Culture, as many modernists deeply felt, would be 
rejuvenated with some of art’s original potency and thus returned to its original cultic 
function. 
 
(iv) ‘Everywhere LIFE is said instead of ART’: Lewis’s Opposition to 
Bergson and his Modernist Disciples  
 
In his review of ‘The London Group’ exhibition in March 1915 Lewis complimented 
Epstein’s Rock Drill as ‘one of the best things he has done’.60 He writes there that ‘The 
nerve-like figure perched on the machinery, with it’s [sic] straining to one purpose, is a 
vivid illustration of the greatest function of life’.61 This apparent celebration of the 
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violent and destructive ‘function’ of life chimes with the idea which Lewis expressed a 
year earlier in the first issue of BLAST:  
 
Killing somebody must be the greatest pleasure in existence: either like killing yourself 
without being interfered with by the instinct of self-preservation – or exterminating the 
instinct of self-preservation itself!62  
 
Read together, but in isolation of the wider context of his writings at this time, these 
statements might lead us to imagine that Lewis developed from Bergson’s concept of 
the élan vital a rationale for the regenerative power of machine-age violence, sharing in 
Futurism’s glorification of war as ‘the world’s only hygiene’.63 Yet while a bellicose 
rhetoric undeniably flavours Lewis’s writings at this time, we ought not to fall into the 
trap of reading this statement as a firm articulation of Lewis’s position. In the first 
instance it is humorously undercut by an additional comment a couple of lines later 
concerning the manner in which most people choose to wrestle with the domineering 
‘instinct of self-preservation’: ‘Some people enjoy best by proxy, some by 
masturbation’.64 
 A closer look at the context in which this apparent celebration of killing (or 
being killed) occurs clarifies its meaning. It is found in that crucial expository essay in 
BLAST ‘Futurism, Magic and Life’ where it follows Lewis’s account of the prevailing 
intellectual tendency among his contemporaries to venerate an idealized conception of 
‘Life’:  
 
In Northern Europe (Germany, Scandinavia and Russia) for the last half century, the 
intellectual world has developed savagely in one direction – that of Life. His war-talk, 
sententious elevation and much besides, Marinetti picked up from Nietzsche. 
Strindberg, with his hysterical and puissant autobiographies, life-long tragic coquetry 
with Magic, extensive probing of female flesh and spirit, is the great Scandinavian 
figure best representing this tendency. Bergson, the philosopher of Impressionism, 
stands for this new prescience in France. Everywhere LIFE is said instead of ART.65  
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It is a situation which Lewis suggests has been aggravated by both sides. As much as he 
perceives a wholesale shift among late nineteenth-century European intellectuals 
towards the concerns of ‘Life’, resulting in a venerated conception of the ‘Wild Body 
and the Primitive Brain’, he alludes to the self-sabotaging role which was played by fin 
de siècle Aestheticism, which, with its mantra of ‘art for art’s sake’, played that ‘selfish 
trick of cutting [art’s] connections’ with life.66 Lewis thus represents the last half of the 
nineteenth century as a period of open warfare, when it became necessary for artists to 
decide which side they belonged to: whether among the ‘immoral’ and decadent coterie 
of pleasure-seeking artists, plunging into sensuous oblivion, or among the plain and 
inconspicuous majority of ‘living’ folk, ‘whose heads were, with an honest Birmingham 
screw, straightly riveted into their bodies’.67  
 Faced with the choice which the late nineteenth century presented them, many 
‘good artists’, Lewis writes, ‘repudiated the self-indulgent, special-privileged, priggish 
and cowardly role of “Artist,” and joined themselves to the Birmingham screws’.68 Thus 
‘England emerged […] about 1900’ with ‘Wilde in prison’ and all ‘Lupinars and 
Satanics’ banished, a land in which Life had conquered Art and the degenerate image of 
hedonistic pleasure-seeking which it had lately come to stand for.69 ‘This’, writes 
Lewis, ‘brings you to the famous age where we are at present gathered, in which 
Humanity’s problem is “[to] live with the minimum of pleasure possible for bare 
existence”’.70  
 It is in this context, as an allusion to the imaginative poverty of his 
contemporary society, that we must read Lewis’s celebration of the ‘pleasure’ of killing. 
The comment is inflected with exasperation at a culture in which ‘Life’ is blithely 
glorified by a mass of people who nevertheless stand to gain very little pleasure from it. 
The suggestion Lewis is making is that life without art provides humanity with little in 
the way of an imaginative solution to, or a diversion from, ‘bare existence’. Killing — 
or to put it more accurately destroying — would be the greatest pleasure left in an 
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existence devoid of creativity. He thus highlights the sense in which life’s triumph over 
art was really a pyrrhic victory, with damaging consequences. Living ‘with the 
minimum of pleasure possible’ had led his contemporaries to seek and find ‘a new 
outside art of their own’, killing becoming explicable in this sense as a new sport or 
pastime.71  
Read within this context, what appeared at first to be a celebration of violence 
actually becomes explicable as a satirical characterization of the masochism of those 
modern artists who seek to reconnect, by violent means, to the primordial pulse of 
existence. Convincing themselves that they are putting art in the service of life, they are 
in fact worshipping death. With the benefit of over a century’s hindsight, we may read 
in this a remarkable diagnosis of the hidden springs Europe’s growing thirst for war. 
There is a grim poignancy in the line: ‘The Wild Body and Primitive Body have found a 
new outside art of their own’, especially when we situate this in the imaginative context 
of its original publication date, a mere four days after the assassination of Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June.72 But Lewis’s prescience is perhaps not as 
impressive as his ability to dissect the complex and interwoven processes which were 
conspiring to bring about art’s demise at the hands of ‘life’ discourses. We may take 
measure of this by observing how closely Lewis’s diagnosis of the situation of modern 
art chimes with the account given over sixty years later by Jürgen Habermas.  
In ‘Modernity versus Postmodernity’ (1981) Habermas described ‘cultural 
modernity’ as the ramification of a ‘unified world concept’ into three autonomous 
spheres of human discourse — science, morality and art — with each ‘fall[ing] under 
specific aspects of validity: truth, normative rightness, authenticity and beauty [and] 
handled as questions of knowledge, or of justice and morality, or of taste’.73 The 
privileged position of science as the sole aspirant to objective truth ought to be 
compared here with the crisis which modernity initiates in morality and art; both 
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discourses which traditionally derive their meaning from participation in a grand 
narrative. Without a super-ordinate telos they are inevitably rendered relative and 
contingent, and ultimately trivial in the main concourse of social life. Habermas’s 
theory translates readily into Lewis’s chosen terminology, echoing the idea that the 
dominance of ‘life’ discourses in the nineteenth and early twentieth century had harried 
‘art’ to the isolated position in which it now exists on the margins of social life.  
It seems remarkable now that Lewis’s cultural criticism was attuned to these 
complex processes as they were unfolding in 1914. Foreseeing the damaging 
consequences which the modern world carried for art, Lewis stood opposed to those of 
his contemporaries who became enamoured with Bergson’s élan vital and the 
possibility which it presented to plunge deeper into Life. The Futurists especially he 
regarded as naively investing confidence in the transcendent possibilities of modern 
technology. In Blasting and Bombardiering (1937) Lewis relates a humorous anecdote 
which demonstrates the grounds of his opposition to Futurism eloquently. Arguing with 
Marinetti after one of his public lectures in London, Lewis claims to have said:  
 
‘you Wops insist too much on the Machine. You’re always on about these driving-belts, 
you are always exploding about internal combustion. We’ve had machines here in 
England for a donkey’s years. They’re no novelty to us’.74 
 
These comments, although undoubtedly glossed by Lewis’s memory, accurately capture 
the tone of condescension which Lewis always tended to adopt in his discussions of 
Futurism. Even in BLAST he explained ‘Futurism, as preached by Marinetti’, as 
‘Automobilism and [the] Nietzsche stunt’: a rather extravagant sideshow in what he 
described as ‘The Melodrama of Modernity’.75  
Despite his admiration for modern machinery — which he described as ‘the 
greatest Earth-medium’ in section six of the Vorticist Manifesto — Lewis remained 
cautious about the benefit this new materialism would have for humankind.76 In 
‘Inferior Religions’ he refers to the muted presence of that great metaphysical other — 
‘the Sovereign force beneath the surface’, ‘the skeleton at the Feast’ — which he 
envisaged lurking at the wings of humankind’s arrogant show of power, awaiting a 
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suitable moment to expose hubris.77 This is a correlative concept of that ‘Pecksniff-
shark’ which suns its ‘lean belly’ just under the ‘surface’ of life and represents the great 
enemy of the human subject, which haunts its ‘pyrrhic encounters’ with the Dionysian 
impulse towards unity.78 It stands for the metaphysical unity of Nature, or the object 
which stands perpetually across from subject, until they are reunited in death. It is an 
altogether more sinister vision of metaphysical unity than that which was espoused by 
Nietzsche and Bergson and adopted by their modernist disciples. By promoting the 
occult, interpenetrative faculty of intuition as a vehicle for the species’ transcendence 
Bergson especially had blithely condemned the human subject, and art itself, to what 
Lewis regarded as a deadly tryst with Life. 
Against this general trend among his contemporaries to amalgamate art and life, 
subject and object, Lewis developed a reactive principle of his own which held firm to a 
‘violent structure of adolescent clearness between two extremes’.79 It is an important 
aspect of his dualistic modus operandi in Vorticism: wherever he picks up the scent of 
monism Lewis reasserts the structure of hallowed binary distinctions which he regarded 
as essential foundations for art, and indeed the freedom of the human subject. As he put 
it in ‘Vortex No. 1 […] Be Thyself’ in the second issue of BLAST: 
 
There is nothing so impressive as the number TWO. You must be a duet in everything. 
[…] There is Yourself: and there is the Exterior World, that fat mass you browse on. 
[…] Do not confuse yourself with it, or weaken the esoteric lines of fine original being. 
Do not marry it, either, to a maiden.80 
 
This passage powerfully conveys the firm dualistic structure which Lewis instated 
against the monistic tendencies of his contemporary culture. It is a vision of creative 
strength through individuation which jars dramatically with a monistic model of 
interpretation.  
We have seen how Lewis stood profoundly opposed to the underlying principles 
of modernist primitivism. But it was not only the principles of this movement which 
Lewis opposed, he objected also to the manner in which his contemporary artists and 
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writers attempted to attain the aura of the primitive in their works, that is to say the 
aesthetic styles and techniques which they pioneered. Again Lewis’s position on this is 
a complex issue to negotiate. On the one hand, he shared in the desire to move art 
beyond the strictures of the mimetic and realist traditions, which had dominated 
Western art since the renaissance. He is in many ways emblematic of the modernist 
desire to create artworks that were savage and abstract, thereby opposing the moribund 
aesthetic criteria of more civilized and settled times. But in his conception of how this 
primitive element was to be invoked in works of modern art we find that Lewis once 
again stands apart from the majority of his modernist contemporaries.   
 
(v) The Abstract Revolution in Modern Art 
 
Pablo Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon (1907, Fig. 2) is arguably the breakthrough 
work of visual art of the avant-garde years of experimentation before the First World 
War, which brings together many of the key modernist fascinations with primitivism 
and vitalism, as well as presenting a model for the more direct, abstract mode of 
expression of the type that Schlegel had imagined a century before.81 Although it was 
not exhibited publicly until 1916, Les Demoiselles d’Avignon serves as an effective 
seismograph of the intellectual climate in which modernist artists like Lewis were 
working during the first decade of the twentieth century. It is a work which breaks 
decisively with the mimetic tradition in Western art, and which offers the observer an 
opportunity to view in more concrete terms precisely how modernist artists attempted to 
realize their primitive visions in technical terms. The central question for our present 
purposes is: where did this new abstract style in art come from and what did it signify?  
 A look at the sources for Picasso’s painting can help us answer these questions 
to a certain extent. One key stylistic influence on the painting was the exhibition of 
African art at the Ethnographic Museum of the Trocadéro in Paris in 1907. X-rays have 
shown how Picasso’s primitive aesthetic was derived directly from his experiences at 
the Trocadéro exhibition. During the spring and early summer of 1907 Picasso had 
painted the five female nudes in the ‘Iberian’ style indicated by the three figures on the 
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left-hand side.82 The ‘primitive masking and hatching features got into Les Demoiselles 
in the autumn of 1907’, as Christopher Butler writes, with Picasso over-painting the two 
figures on the right in the style of the African masks he had seen during his summer 
break.83  
Armed with this primitive aesthetic style, Picasso set out to provide a stark yet 
carefully conceived expression of Charles Baudelaire’s belief that the prostitute ‘is a 
perfect image of the savagery that lurks in the midst of civilization’, thereby presenting 
his own credentials as the archetypal ‘Painter of Modern Life’ in line with Baudelaire’s 
theory.84 Certainly Picasso was much influenced at this time by the Symbolist poets and 
a central motif which is found in their works: that the modern industrialized and 
mechanized world presented itself as a wild and suggestive ‘forest of symbols’ for the 
modern artist.85 But what can Picasso’s painting tell us about modern life, beyond the 
supposed savagery of the women which it depicts? One significant answer to this 
question was provided by the German art historian Wilhelm Worringer a year after 
Picasso painted Les Demoiselles. 
In Abstraktion und Einfühlung (1908) Worringer brought into question the 
emphasis which art history had — since its formulation as a discipline in the nineteenth 
century — placed on the artist’s ability to imitate the organic forms of nature and the 
human body. He argued that works of art, whether mimetic or abstract, were not 
significant principally for the accuracy of their rendition, but rather that their principal 
importance lay in the seismographic measure they took of a society’s psychological or 
spiritual attitude, encoding especially the orientation in which a culture stands towards 
nature. Worringer’s great step, as Hidde Van Ameyden van Duym points out, was in 
suggesting at a moment of great social and cultural upheaval that ‘art was an organism 
independent from nature, and [that] it derived from the same psychological forces as did 
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religion’.86 His analysis of abstract art as a manifestation of ‘an immense spiritual dread 
of space’ — an expressive technique which connotes the collapse of a ‘happy 
pantheistic relationship of confidence between man and the phenomena of the external 
world’ — is highly relevant here, since by extrapolation it provided modern abstract art 
with an anthropological context and the basis of a theoretical rationale.87 Picasso’s Les 
Demoiselles, in light of Worringer’s theory, was a key exhibit of the new psychological 
orientation of humankind in the modern world: the move back to an abstract technique 
heralding the breakdown of humankind’s empathetic relationship with nature.  
At a time when abstraction was fast becoming the locus classicus among 
advanced painters in the pre-war European avant-garde, Worringer’s theory had clear 
relevance. In the art criticism of T. E. Hulme — the theorist who more than anyone else 
was responsible for feeding Worringer’s ideas into English modernism — the 
implications of his theory for modern abstract art were teased out. In ‘Modern Art and 
Its Philosophy’ Hulme explored a comparison of the ‘attitudes’ entailed by modern 
‘geometrical’ art and its archaic antecedents:  
 
The new geometrical art will probably in the end not in the least resemble archaic art, 
nor will the new attitude to the world be very much like the Byzantine […] One can 
only make certain guesses at the new attitude by the use of analogy. Take two other 
attitudes of the past which went with geometrical art: say primitive and Byzantine. […] 
The primitive springs from what we have called a kind of mental space-shyness, which 
is really an attitude of fear before the world; the Byzantine from what may be called, 
inaccurately, a kind of contempt for the world. Though these two attitudes differ very 
much, yet there is a common element in the idea of separation as opposed to the more 
intimate feeling towards the world in classical and renaissance thought. In comparison 
with the flat and insipid optimism of the belief in progress, the new attitude may be in a 
certain sense inhuman, pessimistic. Yet its pessimism will not be world rejecting in the 
sense in which Byzantine was.88 
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Both modern and ancient variants of abstract art were supposed by Hulme to 
communicate a disconnection between humankind and nature. But as this passage 
suggests, the distinction between them lies in the cause of this disconnection, whether it 
is rooted in a sense of fear and inferiority (a ‘world-rejecting’ kind of ‘pessimism’) as 
was the case in Byzantine art, or — if we follow the implication — the world-
embracing form of ‘pessimism’ which Hulme associates with modern geometrical art.  
Hulme’s description of the ‘new attitude’ as a kind of ‘pessimism’ that is not 
‘world-rejecting’ is paradoxical, but nonetheless highly revealing. Hulme wishes to 
describe the attitude exhibited by the new geometric art towards the world as something 
far removed from ‘insipid optimism’ of naturalistic art, so he chooses the opposite term 
‘pessimism’, in spite of the apparent contradiction it leads him into. It is a clear example 
of modernist ‘paradoxy’, indicating ‘a kind of confusion generated by a terminology 
that seems to make clear distinctions where clear distinctions cannot — or should not — 
be made’.89 This, after all, is a kind of ‘pessimism’ from which is extracted all 
connotations of fatalism, gloom and resignation. It is a ‘pessimism [that] will not be 
world-rejecting’: that is to say, a stance of opposition towards the world which is not 
rooted in a sense of ‘dread’ but rather in an active sense of mastery over Nature.  
 In comments which he makes in the concluding section of ‘Modern Art and Its 
Philosophy’, Hulme provides the key to this cryptic description of the attitude entailed 
in the new art: 
 
In conclusion, I might hazard some conjectures as to the probable nature of the specific 
and peculiar quality which will differentiate this new geometrical art from its 
predecessors. As far as one can see, the new ‘tendency towards abstraction’ will 
culminate, not so much in the simple geometrical forms found in archaic art, but in the 
more complicated ones associated in our minds with the idea of machinery.90 
 
Elsewhere in ‘Modern Art and Its Philosophy’ Hulme comments that ‘fear is in no sense 
a necessary presupposition of the tendency to abstraction’ and in his identification of the 
‘idea of machinery’ as the central inspiration for modern abstract art he implies that this 
is a form of abstraction founded in machine-age confidence.91 For Hulme, the bold 
angular machine-forms of modern abstract art had little to do with a passive ‘dread’ of 
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nature found in archaic forms of abstract art, rather it seemed to be born out of a 
celebration of the modern world and the sense of eminence which it had cultivated in 
the modern subject.92  
 The twist which Hulme gave to Worringer’s theory provides an important 
insight into the aesthetic practices of modernist artists exploring a primitive sensibility 
in their works. While he believed that modern abstract art was indeed a recurrence of a 
primitive aesthetic sensibility, he suggested that at its most powerful and expressive this 
sensibility was attuned to the angular, geometric forms of the modern world and not 
aesthetically dependent upon the inherited formulae of ancient or exotic variants of 
primitive art, as Picasso’s breakthrough work had been. This idea draws us closer to the 
peculiar blend of modernism and primitivism which we noticed in Lewis’s aesthetic 
theory at the start of this chapter. The view was shared by both Lewis and Hulme that 
for modern abstract art to be effective it must derive its primitive vitality from the 
spectacle of the modern world and the profound sense of historic severance which this 
entailed, rather than seek among the ruins of a lost or faded exoticism for an abstract 
formal coda to imitate.  
 In the sculptures of Jacob Epstein and Henri Gaudier-Brzeska, and the paintings 
of Wyndham Lewis, Hulme argued that the Weltanschauung of the modern age was 
finding its clearest expression. What impressed him most about the modern art he saw 
emerging in England just before the First World War was, as Gasiorek explains, the 
‘provenance’ which ‘these artists discovered […] in certain kinds of “primitive” art’ and 
their subsequent turn towards ‘what Hulme called “archaic yet permanent formulae”’.93 
The new geometrical art of the Vorticists provided something ‘fixed and necessary’ in 
an unstable world, infused with the ‘Classicist’ spirit of the machine-age.94 Here at last 
was a kind of ‘primitive’ art that was ‘organic with its Time’.95 
 
(vi) Lewis and Hulme: Different Degrees of Abstraction in Modern Art 
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Hulme’s theory in many ways provides the key with which to understand Lewis’s own 
theory of abstraction in modern art and the way in which this stood against the theories 
pioneered by his contemporaries. But the relationship between Lewis and Hulme is a 
complex one, with certain shared elements but also some key distinctions to be 
highlighted. In the first instance we ought to highlight a key similarity between their 
early theories: the shared belief that modern abstract art was an expression of a new and 
different attitude towards the external world. Hulme’s idea that modern abstract art 
demonstrated a shift towards a new Weltanschauung based upon the supremacy of 
modern man over nature was also a key theoretical insight of Lewis’s Vorticism.  
Indeed for Lewis the new worldview of the modern age entailed a new type of 
human being. In BLAST he described how the ‘NEW EGOS’ differed in kind from the 
‘civilized savage’ of an earlier phase of human history. No longer with eyes ‘in the top 
of their head’, ‘full of blank light’, the eyes of this new human species ‘sweep life 
horizontally’ over ‘a world and elements [they] control’.96 These comments imply 
Lewis’s awareness of both Worringer’s analysis of primitive abstraction and the theory 
of modern abstract art which Hulme derived from this. Clearly Lewis agreed with 
Hulme on this point: the vast increase in material control which humankind now exerted 
upon the world was an expression of a changed relationship between humankind and the 
external world. 
In Blasting and Bombardiering (1937) Lewis took care to confirm the affinity 
between his own ideas during Vorticism and Hulme’s art philosophy, highlighting 
especially the way in which they apparently shared a rigorous ideal of abstraction:  
 
All the best things Hulme said about the theory of art were said about my art. […] We 
happened, that is all, to be made for each other, as critic and ‘creator.’ What he said 
should be done, I did. Or it would be more exact to say that I did it, and he said it. 
 In England there was no one else working in consonance with an ‘abstract’ 
theory of art to the same extent as myself. Neither Gaudier nor Epstein would in the end 
have been ‘abstract’ enough to satisfy the requirements of this obstinate abstractionist. 
He would have had to fall back on me.97 
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Andrzej Gasiorek has given good reason for suspicion about this speculative claim.98   
Certainly we should note the rhetorical strategy underlying Lewis’s claims here. 
Writing from the margins of British culture in 1937 Lewis is clearly keen to appropriate 
the ever more widely celebrated Hulme as an early follower and theorizer of his 
Vorticist aesthetic practice in an attempt to re-affirm the central importance of his work 
in the modernist canon. The passage thus tells us a great deal about the desperate 
struggle to gain recognition for his work which Lewis experienced in the 1920s and 
1930s. But equally, as we turn now to consider the precise nature of Lewis’s early ideas 
on abstract technique, this passage enables us to highlight in detail the distinction 
between two degrees of abstraction advocated by Lewis and his contemporaries.  
When we pursue Lewis’s claim that he alone among the pre-war avant-garde 
would ‘have been “abstract” enough to satisfy the requirements’ of Hulme’s theory, 
‘obstinate abstractionist’ that he was, we actually find a crucial distinction between their 
respective theories.99 In the end Lewis turns out to be far too abstract to be effectively 
housed in Hulme’s theory. The issue revolves around the artist’s orientation to ‘reality’. 
The model for this discussion is provided by Hulme in ‘Modern Art II: Preface Note 
and Neo-Realism’: 
 
If you will excuse the pedantry of it, I think I can make the matter clearer by using a 
diagram: 
R ………p (r) ……… a (r) ……… A 
I take (R) to represent reality. As one goes from left to right one gets further and further 
from reality. The first step away being p(r), that is the artist’s interpretation of nature. 
The next step a(r) being an art using abstractions (a), with a certain representative 
element (r). The element (a) owes its significance to, and is dependent on the other end 
(A) of this kind of spectrum – a certain ‘tendency to abstraction’. I assert that these are 
two arts, the one focused round (R), which is moved by a delight in natural forms, and 
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This clear and highly effective interpretative model can help us to understand the 
theoretic distinction between Lewis and Hulme in 1914. In order to observe this it is 
important to observe how it was used by Hulme to provide an account of how modern 
abstract art had emerged. In Paul Cézanne he identified the technical point of departure 
from which Cubism took its inspiration.  
Hulme opposed the belief of the contemporary painter Charles Ginner (his 
theoretical antagonist in ‘Modern Art II: Preface Note and Neo-Realism’) that Cézanne 
‘was a pure realist’, arguing instead that, in the ‘simplification of places’ and the 
‘emphasis on three-dimensional form’ in his paintings, Cézanne consolidated the 
technical ‘elements which quite naturally develop into Cubism’.101 In this discussion 
Cézanne is treated by Hulme as an artist whose works sit halfway between p(r) and a(r) 
in the above diagram, grounding his compositions in real world scenes while gesturing 
towards certain techniques of ‘simplification and abstraction’.102 For Hulme ‘Picasso 
came along and took over these elements isolated by Cézanne, and organised them’, 
presenting an art that was, for the first time in the modern world, clearly expressive of 
the ‘tendency to abstraction’ and thus situated at a(r) on the diagram.103  
The most crucial aspect of Hulme’s theory of abstraction, for our present 
purposes, is that it maintains that ‘whatever he may do theoretically, at any rate 
practically, the artist must keep in continual contact with Nature’, and thus that a pure 
kind of abstraction (A) is unattainable.104 He writes in the concluding paragraphs of 
‘Modern Art II: Preface Note and Neo-Realism’: 
 
There must be just as much contact with nature in an abstract art as in a realistic one; 
without that stimulus the artist could produce nothing. In Picasso, for example, there is 
much greater research into nature, as far as the relation of planes is concerned, than in 
any realist painting; he has isolated and emphasised relations previously not 
emphasised. All art may be said to be realism, then, in that it extracts from nature facts 
which have not been observed before. But in as far as the artist is creative, he is not 
bound down by the accidental relations of the elements actually found in nature, but 
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extracts, distorts, and utilises them as a means of expression, and not as a means of 
interpreting Nature.105 
 
As this passage conveys, for Hulme, all art takes its source material from nature, 
abstraction merely amounting in the end to an aesthetic ‘tendency’ or a technical way of 
working with those original sources. He is clear that no art can begin from the other end 
of the scale, in the isolated realm of pure abstraction.  
This is where we may observe a vital distinction between the theories of Hulme 
and Lewis, for Hulme, on examination, turns out not to be the ‘obstinate abstractionist’ 
that Lewis would like to suggest he is in 1937. Lewis, for his part, presents a far more 
extreme idea of abstraction, one which repositions ‘reality’ in the company of (A) at the 
other end of the scale which Hulme sketched out in ‘Modern Art II: Preface Note and 
Neo-Realism’. In ‘Futurism, Magic and Life’ he wrote that ‘Reality is in the artist, the 
image only in life’, presenting a conception of the artist as a creative force whose talent 
was not primarily receptive and imitative but who could emanate designs of his own 
and ultimately ‘MA[K]E NEW BEINGS’.106 A few lines later the radical nature of this 
abstract schema comes out in detail: 
 
At any period an artist should have been able to remain in his studio, imagining form, 
and provided he could transmit the substance and logic of his inventions to another 
man, could have, without putting brush to canvas, be [sic] the best artist of his day.107 
 
This extraordinary passage comes after Lewis’s criticism of the ‘imitations’ turned out 
by the ‘host of first rate interpreters’ he believed to dominate the European avant-
garde.108 The abstractions of the Cubists he argued were really a disguised form of 
naturalism in which the artist ‘gets caught in [the] machinery’ of the ‘real’ world.109 
Removing art from any dependence on an exterior world — even to the extent that the 
‘invention’ itself need not be manifested in material substance — Lewis presents a 
radically purified notion of artistic creativity which takes its source material from the 
artist’s imagination instead of the external world. 
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We come, therefore, to a distinction between two types, or rather two degrees, of 
abstraction. On the one hand, abstraction may be conceived as a compositional 
procedure which departs from the pictorial conventions of Western art but which 
remains anchored to the given forms of the external world. This was Hulme’s idea of 
abstraction as a technical procedure and according to this the artist would take the 
primary materials of their composition from the world around them and then engage in 
a process of formal manipulation in which the naturalistic logic of the original image is 
recast into a new and unfamiliar constellation of lines and surfaces, its original organic 
integrity being pulled apart or squeezed. The resulting image is a disjointed and 
fragmented equivalent of the original.  
On the other hand, the theory of abstraction to which Lewis adhered in 
Vorticism is an idea of artistic creation that derives its essential materials from the 
reality which is ‘in the artist’ and not from the external world. In Time and Western 
Man Lewis clarified this idea of ‘pure creation’ by expressing his belief that a ‘great 
number of practitioners of art […] do not possess the essential qualifications of the 
artist’ for the reason that ‘[t]he production of a work of art is, I believe, strictly the work 
of a visionary’:110  
 
If you say that creative art is a spell, a talisman, an incantation – that it is magic, in 
short, there, too, I believe you would be correctly describing it. That the artist uses and 
manipulates a supernatural power seems very likely.111 
 
These ideas are given a more specific rationale in Lewis’s letter to Charles Handley-
Read of September 1949, when he describes the technique of his Vorticist compositions 
in purely abstract terms: 
 
The way those things were done is that a mental-emotive impulse — and by this is 
meant subjective intellection, like magic or religion — is let loose upon a lot of blocks 
and lines of various dimensions, and encouraged to push them around and to arrange 
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them as it will. It is of course not an accidental, isolated, mood: but it is recurrent 
groups of emotions and coagulations of thinking, as it were, that is involved.112 
 
From both these passages — in abstract theoretical terms as well as concrete instances 
— we are given a conception of artistic creativity as a magical life-giving and world-
making activity which has no need to negotiate the formal arrangements of the world 
outside, being more a mysterious concentration of energy amassing in the imagination 
and finding its way into formal expression on the canvas. The artist, according to this 
idea, is a magician shuttling between the natural and the supernatural realms, who 
transposes ‘visions from within’ into an exterior reality, which he thereby helps to 
create and control.113  
 
(vii) Wyndham Lewis the Primitive  
 
With his radical theory of abstraction clarified, we may now be in a position to 
understand with more precision the meaning of Lewis’s claim that ‘the Art-instinct is 
permanently primitive’. True artistic creativity, for Lewis, does not start half way 
through an already existing process of material evolution, but goes back to origin. This 
idea is expressed clearly in The Caliph’s Design (1919): 
 
The artist goes back to the fish. The few centuries that separate him from the savage are 
a mere flea-bite to the distance his memory must stretch if it is to strike the fundamental 
slime of creation. And it is the condition, the very first gusto of creation in this scale of 
life which we are set, that he must reach, before he, in his turn, can create!114 
 
This passage clarifies perhaps more than any other the particular sense which the 
appellation ‘primitive’ — so common among modernist artists — had for Lewis. It is a 
conception of the artist as a miniature god, a prime mover, who must start from the 
beginning of the chain of creation.  
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 Despite his evident bugbear with modernist primitivism, Lewis in 1914 arguably 
qualified as the most vociferous advocate of the creative potential associated with 
humankind’s origin. But Lewis’s extreme conception of the creative potential of the 
primitive was out of step with all of his contemporaries. His idea of the primitive was 
not of a ‘degenerate, nostalgic animal’ but of a semi-divine creativity. In this respect he 
was highly attuned to Nietzsche’s philosophical prognosis of the coming Übermensch. 
But Lewis drew different conclusions about the nature of this new human specimen to 
most of Nietzsche’s modernist inheritors, inclining to the view that it would be one step 
removed from the divine, rather than one pace ahead of the animal. Certainly he 
denounced the vanity and optimism of his contemporaries’ assertion that this new 
model human being had arrived with the dawn of the twentieth century.  
As he explained years later in an article for The Architectural Review (1934), 
‘the spoilt child of the Machine-age’ was ‘not an ultimate flower exactly […] not the 
end of a progress’ but rather ‘an embryo […] a foetus, of what should be’.115 For Lewis 
the ‘child of the Machine-age’ had been invested with far too much hope by a 
generation inspired by the vision of transcendence they derived from Nietzsche and 
Bergson, being simply ‘a cave-man who has no art — but only a cave’.116 The analogy 
that he drew between his present epoch and the age of the first cave-art is highly 
informative of his own conception of the primitive:  
 
The marvellous art of the Altamira Caves would be as appropriate in his [the child of 
the machine-age] cave as in those at Altamira, or any others, if he had reached that 
stage of cultivation; but he has not. He is too primitive as yet, so there are no cave-
paintings.117 
 
This passage helps to highlight the great paradox in modernist primitivism as Lewis saw 
it. In this context Lewis uses the word primitive to mean ‘underdeveloped’. This use of 
the term, however, ought to be contrasted with his description of the ‘permanently 
primitive […] Art-instinct’ in BLAST, where it denotes instead a vital surge of creative 
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energy and forward propulsion, the means by which the artist creates works ‘organic’ 
with his own time. 
 As this distinction helps to indicate, opposed concepts fought under the single 
banner of the primitive within modernism. Lewis may be described as the primitive who 
stood against primitivism. His equivocal relationship with the thought of Nietzsche and 
Bergson ought, therefore, to be clarified. On the one hand, Lewis takes the 
transcendental potential of the primitive very much to heart, so much so that he 
develops an almost shamanic conception of artistic creativity as a form of magic. On the 
other hand, he stands virulently opposed to the specific rationales of transcendence that 
both Nietzsche and Bergson present and indeed the view that was widespread amongst 
his contemporaries, that the machine-age marked a significant evolutionary advance for 
the species. Rather, for Lewis, the modern world was a threshold, the future path of 
which had still to be defined. Thus, while it is certainly true that Lewis’s early works 
adopt a ‘Nietzschean symbolic landscape’ by setting up a distinction between mythic 
and modern worldviews, this fact cannot lead to the neat reduction of Lewis’s work to 
Nietzschean counters, nor can it justify the rather extreme idea that ‘the early Lewis [is] 
no more than an acolyte of Nietzsche’.118 He stands rather as a thorn in the side of 
Nietzsche’s modernist inheritors, disrupting the revolutionary ‘ritual’ taking place with 
some rather sober criticism and pointing out especially the degenerate character of the 
specific Übermensch to which they attached their hopes.  
 
w w w 
 
In this chapter we have observed how for many modernists ‘[t]he aesthetic nerves 
quiver[ed] to return to the Stone Age’, as Adorno puts it.119 My purpose in charting this 
terrain of modernist primitivism has been twofold. Firstly, it provides a frame of 
reference which is essential to the later sections of the thesis, where the analysis will 
depend upon detailed knowledge of the intellectual context within which Lewis was 
immersed during the lead up to Vorticism. Secondly, my analysis here has also served 
to indicate the grounds of Lewis’s dissociation from the conception of the primitive that 
was widely venerated by his contemporaries. We now have a clearer image of Lewis as 
																																																								
118 John Carey, The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary Intelligentsia, 
1880–1939 (London: Faber & Faber, 1992), p.184; Weller, ‘Nietzsche Among the Modernists’, p.626.  
119 Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, p.113. 
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a critically detached participant in modernism’s evocation of a primal, mythic energy in 
art. We will continue to observe how Lewis worked with — though always in 
antagonistic terms — the ideas of his contemporaries in the next chapter. This time, 
however, we move from the broad pool of ideas within which Lewis’s early thought 
matured to consider in more precise detail the process of rarefication or distillation by 
which Lewis formed his philosophy and aesthetic technique in Vorticism. In particular, 
we shall observe how Lewis and his Vorticist collaborators formed their aesthetic 
techniques and theory out of a ‘strange synthesis’ of elements derived from Cubism, 
Kandinsky and Futurism.120
																																																								
120 Wyndham Lewis, ‘A World Art and Tradition’ (1929), in Wyndham Lewis on Art: Collected Writings 




 ‘Mercenaries’ of the European Avant-Garde: 
Wyndham Lewis and the Formation of Vorticist 




Vorticism has received numerous, diverse critical treatments over the century since the 
movement was launched with the publication of BLAST in the summer of 1914.1 Most 
scholars agree that the aesthetic and philosophical principles of the movement arise out 
of a combination of elements derived from Vorticism’s major rivals in the avant-garde 
art scene in pre-war Europe. In ‘A Review of Contemporary Art’ in BLAST 2 (1915) 
Lewis himself suggested that Vorticism proposed a ‘new synthesis’ of contemporary art 
practices and theory that sought to ‘CORRECT’ the negative ‘tendencies’ of ‘the other 
various groups’ among the European avant-garde.2 
																																																								
1 The critical terrain indicates the multi-faceted nature of the movement and the sense in which it is 
always open to different, occasionally contradictory readings. In the first instance, Vorticism has most 
frequently been treated as a set of decidedly masculine aesthetic and art-theoretical principles developed 
by Lewis and Pound working almost alone, while more recent criticism has tended to highlight the 
significant role played by other less prominent members and associates, particularly the underappreciated 
work of Vorticist women such as Rebecca West, Jessica Dismorr and Helen Saunders (see especially 
Brigid Peppin, Helen Saunders, 1885-1963 (Oxford: Ashmolean Museum, 1996) and Miranda Hickman, 
‘The Gender of Vorticism: Jessie Dismorr, Helen Saunders, and Vorticist Feminism’, in Vorticism: New 
Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2013) pp.119-135). To list a few other instances of important 
critical distinctions, Vorticism has been read as a movement founded on the ‘exploitation of national 
loyalty’ (Paul Peppis, Literature, Politics, and the English Avant-Garde: Nation and Empire, 1901-1918 
(Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.84) and also as an international movement which extended far 
beyond the art scene in London in 1914 (see Rebecca Beasley, ‘Vortorussophilia’, pp.33-50; Scott W. 
Klein, ‘How German Is It: Vorticism, Nationalism, and the Paradox of Aesthetic Self-Definition’, pp.68-
86; and Anne McCauley, ‘Witch Work, Art Work, and the Spiritual Roots of Abstraction: Ezra Pound, 
Alvin Langdon Coburn, and the Vortographs’, pp.156-174; all in Vorticism: New Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, 2013)); as a movement grounded in and expressing the new marketing strategies of 
promotional culture (Keith Tuma, ‘Lewis, Blast, and Popular Culture’, ELH, 54.2 (1987), pp.403-19 and 
Jodie Greenwood, ‘The Crisis of the System: Blast’s Reception’, in Wyndham Lewis and the Cultures of 
Modernity, ed. by Andrzej Gasiorek, Alice Reeve-Tucker and Nathan Waddell (Farnham: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2011), pp.77-94) and as a more philosophical effort to disclose the material pressures to 
which art was susceptible in the modern world (David A. Wragg, Wyndham Lewis and the Philosophy of 
Art in Early Modernist Britain: Creating a Political Aesthetic (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 
2005)); as the English derivative of Italian Futurism and as an original and significant avant-garde 
movement in itself, ‘the high-water mark that “advanced” painting reached before the First World War’, 
as Paul Edwards puts it (Painter and Writer, p.100).  
2 Lewis, ‘A Review of Contemporary Art’, in BLAST 2, pp.42, 41. 
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Reflecting a general tendency in scholarship, the precise nature of the Vorticist 
‘synthesis’ has been defined by Miranda B. Hickman as a ‘fusion’ primarily of ‘what 
[the Vorticists] regarded as the best elements of both Cubism and Futurism’, with 
Kandinsky’s Expressionism being ‘add[ed] […] as a third “point of the compass”’.3 
Hickman clarifies the way in which these coordinates are supposed to fit together thus: 
 
From Cubism, the Vorticists drew a commitment to a vocabulary of exactly delineated, 
geometric forms, as well as a concomitant refusal of the ‘fluid and imprecise’ approach 
they saw as a characteristic of much Futurist work; from Futurism, a dedication to 
suggesting dynamic motion – which, according to Vorticist rhetoric, Cubist work 
lacked. Steering its course so as to avoid the errors of its contemporaries, Vorticism 
shunned what it read as the ‘deadness’ of Cubism, the unbridled ‘vivacity’ of the 
Futurists, and Kandinsky’s Expressionism, which, Lewis noted, exhibited much the 
same passivity as Cubism and much the same indefiniteness as Futurism.4 
  
Hickman’s account here is entirely valid, yet slightly skewed towards a simplified 
technical analysis of Vorticist aesthetics that affords too great a significance to the 
influence of Futurism and not enough appreciation of the conceptual nature of Lewis’s 
interest in contemporary aesthetic innovations. 
There can be no doubt that Hickman sets the correct coordinates of Vorticism’s 
synthesis in the three compass points of Cubism, Futurism and Kandinsky’s 
Expressionism. But the suggestion I wish to make here is that these coordinates ought to 
be plotted in a different way, more in line with the conceptual schemata of these 
movements than their purely technical and aesthetic qualities. Once the conceptual 
background to Lewis’s aesthetic programme is taken into account it would be more 
accurate to describe Vorticism’s synthesis as a staged theoretical collision between the 
art of matter (Cubism) and that of spirit (Kandinsky), named by Ezra Pound as the 
‘father and mother, classicism and romanticism of the movement’, respectively.5 In this 
sense, Futurism played a rather less productive role in the formation of Vorticism than 
Hickman would grant it. The two movements share the same interests and concerns —
Marinetti’s pugnacious style no doubt helped to determine the rhetorical mode of 
																																																								
3 Hickman, The Geometry of Modernism, p.5. 
4 Ibid., p.5. 
5 Pound, ‘Vortex’, in BLAST, pp.153-154 (p.154). 
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expression in the Vorticist Manifesto — but the greatest gift that Futurism gave 
Vorticism was a clearly defined theoretical and aesthetic enemy.  
Here my aim is to present the case for this new reading of the Vorticist 
synthesis. But before we can assess these opposed conceptual and aesthetic tendencies 
and observe the way in which they come together in Vorticism it is necessary to devote 
some attention to the theoretical model that facilitates their combination. The vortex is a 
highly significant symbol in this respect, which serves a similar function as a prism, 
through which contemporary modernist ideals and practices are refracted; becoming 
strangely altered in form and significance as they emerge in Lewis and Vorticism’s 
theoretical insights and aesthetic practices. Of equal importance is Vorticism’s 
mercenary strategy of entering conflict whilst evading partisan allegiance to either side. 
We shall begin, therefore, with a close examination of the function of these two ideas.  
 
(i) The Formation of Vorticism’s ‘Mercenary’ Philosophy 
 
In Metaphors We Live By (1980) George Lakoff and Mark Johnson present the idea that 
‘[o]ur conceptual system […] plays a central role in defining our everyday realities’ and 
that the surest way to understand the ‘reality’ to which we incline ‘is by looking at 
language’, with an eye particularly on the metaphorical systems which we use in order 
to express ourselves.6 Their first example of this has great relevance to Vorticism, for it 
is the overarching ‘conceptual metaphor’ in Western society that ‘ARGUMENT IS 
WAR’.7 This philosophical analysis of the role which metaphor plays in structuring our 
thought provides a useful backdrop for a reading of BLAST which leads us to the simple 
but important insight that Vorticism is a philosophical and artistic movement saturated 
by metaphors of war.  
What makes BLAST so original and compelling in this respect is the great care 
which Lewis took to shift the ground of metaphorical applications to war from their 
common and everyday uses — in which, for example, arguments can be ‘attacked’, 
‘won’ or ‘demolished’ — to new and original designations.8 The central Vorticist 
metaphors of war are the ‘blast’ which announces the movement’s arrival; the ‘violent 
																																																								
6 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (London: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 
p.3. 
7 Ibid., p.4. 
8 Lakoff and Johnson provide an extensive list of the most common uses of the metaphor that argument is 
war in Metaphors We Live By, p.4. 
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structure of adolescent clearness between two extremes’ which they ‘set up’ as their 
philosophical model; the veneration of the ‘mercenary’ in this context; and the detailed 
analysis of what it means to be an ‘enemy’. It is important to observe how these 
metaphors function within Vorticism for they are the key concepts which Lewis used to 
articulate his philosophical position and situate Vorticism on the map of the pre-war 
European avant-garde.  
In the first instance, Vorticism’s ‘blast’ is most frequently read as a 
straightforward expression of aggressive dynamism, which is of course entirely 
accurate. But we should not fail to observe the word’s particular meaning in cellular 
biology, which is said to have attracted Lewis.9 According to this the ‘unipotent’ but as 
yet undifferentiated ‘blast cell’ facilitates the growth of an organism by cell division.10 
Transposing this from a biological into a cultural idiom, Vorticism’s blast takes the 
connotation of a potent unified structure that contains within itself a seed of renewal and 
thus a vital capacity to generate ‘blueprints for […] a new civilisation’.11 The idea that 
this regeneration is supposed to occur through a process of ‘division’ reflects the 
heterogeneous foundations which the Vorticist movement proudly displayed in the 
colliding styles that are presenting in the various contributions to BLAST. The 
destructive connotation of the blast obviously carries the connotation that regrowth can 
only take place after the decaying remnants of the existing cultural scene have been 
purged.  
The violent structure of opposition which Lewis set up in the Manifesto — one 
of the clearest examples of Vorticism’s debt to the bellicose rhetoric of Futurism — 
provided the movement with its model for self-definition, as a warrior clan which was 
accustomed to conditions of intense adversity. In ‘The Improvement of Life’ Lewis 
clarified this idea, describing particularly the great strengthening power that he believed 
sustained hardship had on artists: 
 
																																																								
9 Paul Edwards writes that ‘Lewis is said to have liked the coincidence of this homonym for the germ cell 
of an organism and for an explosive force, encapsulated in the title of the Vorticist magazine’ (‘“Creation 
Myth”: The Art and Writing of Wyndham Lewis’, note 5, p.33). 
10 Gerd Kempermann, Adult Nuerogenesis: Stem Cells and Neuronal Development in the Adult Brain 
(Oxford University Press, 2006), p.57. 
11 This is taken from a famous passage in Rude Assignment where Lewis writes: ‘It was […] a new 
civilization that I — and a few other people — was making the blueprints for […] It was more than just 
picture-making: one was manufacturing fresh eyes for people, and fresh souls to go with the eyes’ 
(p.135). 
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Adverse climatic conditions — drastic Russian winters, for example — account for 
much thought and profundity. 
England which stands for anti-Art, mediocrity and brainliness among the nations of 
Europe, should be the most likely place for great Art to spring up. 
England is just as unkind and inimical to Art as the Arctic zone is to Life. 
This is the Siberia of the mind. 
If you grant this, you will at once see the source and reason of my very genuine 
optimism.12 
 
In one respect then Vorticism’s warrior code was born out of the modern artist’s 
colossal struggle with external conditions. But this appetite for conflict was further 
sharpened by the constant infighting that raged among the different factions of the 
modern movement. The context in which Vorticism was formed bears witness to this.  
Richard Cork has argued that the disruption of Marinetti and Nevinson’s launch 
of ‘The Manifesto of Vital English Art’ at the Doré Gallery on the 12 June 1914 — in 
which Lewis led a group which included Gaudier-Brzeska, Wadsworth and Epstein — 
was a key event in the unification of the movement.13 Michael H. Levenson supports 
Cork’s interpretation, pointing out that ‘[t]he early press notices for Blast nowhere 
described it as a Vorticist journal’, the manifestoes and the badges of the group’s 
collective identity being added after the ‘Futurist intrusion’ in early June.14 The fact that 
Nevinson referred to the intruders on that evening by the title ‘Vortickist’ — the 
mispronunciation of the hardened ‘c’ being repeatedly corrected by Gaudier-Brzeska 
who ‘stayed resolutely on his feet in the middle of the audience’ throughout Nevinson’s 
lecture — indicates that the movement must already have formed its identity by this 
point.15 But the sense in which the members bonded through shared opposition is 
important to note. Earlier events further convey the sense in which the Vorticist 
movement was largely composed of a battle-hardened group of artists with a keen 
appetite for conflict. We must cast our minds back to Lewis’s break with Roger Fry and 
the Omega Workshop in October 1913 and the subsequent formation of The Rebel Art 
Centre in April 1914 for what is arguably the source of Vorticism’s pugnacity.16  
																																																								
12 Lewis, ‘The Improvement of Life’, in BLAST, p.146. 
13 Cork, Vorticism and Abstract Art in the First Machine Age, pp.214-238. 
14 Michael H. Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism (Cambridge University Press, 1984), p.124. 
15 O’Keeffe, Some Sort of Genius, p.154. 
16 Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism, p.126. 
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Vorticism was thus a movement which was defined at every stage in opposition 
to its rivals amongst the avant-garde as much as the contemporary art world. But 
equally it was a movement which contained within itself an explosive mixture of 
aesthetic practices and a constant tendency towards theoretical and aesthetic paradox, 
contradiction and juxtaposition. Lewis’s later account of Vorticism and especially his 
suggestion in Rude Assignment that in BLAST ‘I wanted a battering ram that was all of 
one metal’ certainly jars with the reality of what was a varied and wilfully contradictory 
movement.17 Michael Hallam suggests that the ‘acute collision of styles’ which 
confronts BLAST’s reader is best exemplified by the stark transition from Lewis’s 
experimental play Enemy of the Stars to the wistful prose of Ford Madox Hueffer’s 
‘The Saddest Story’, with lines like ‘“Mastodons, placid in electric atmosphere, white 
rivers of power” [being] separated from “poor Florence’s broken years” by just a few 
pages’.18 
The lack of any fixed position or style in BLAST guides us towards the most 
significant Vorticist metaphor of war for our present purposes, namely the idea that the 
movement was composed of ‘mercenaries’. Clearly this idea takes a double aspect when 
we appreciate the sense in which Vorticism was in one respect a mercenary-movement 
which notionally traded with enemies among the European avant-garde and, in another 
respect, a movement composed of mercenaries which often allowed itself to fragment 
into a series of conflicting styles and ‘opposite statements’.19 The key significance of 
this adherence to a mercenary status, however, is that Vorticism consciously arrived on 
the discursive battleground of the pre-war avant-garde eager for battle but without a 
definitive position to defend. In an artistic context which was increasingly defined by 
partisan allegiance to the competing aesthetic programmes and art philosophies of 
Futurism, Cubism and Expressionism, Vorticism developed instead a disinterested and 
acquisitive attitude towards its rivals, ‘fight[ing] first on one side, then on the other, but 
always for the SAME cause, which is neither side or both sides and ours’.20 
The lack of any defined position in Vorticism, or any apparent ‘philosophy’ 
whatsoever, was the focus of A. R. Orage’s first review of BLAST for The New Age on 9 
																																																								
17 Rude Assignment, p.138. 
18 Michael Hallam, ‘In the “Enemy” Camp: Wyndham Lewis, Naomi Mitchison and Rebecca West’, in 
Wyndham Lewis and the Cultures of Modernity, ed. by Andrzej Gasiorek, Alice Reeve-Tucker and 
Nathan Waddell (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), pp.57-76 (p.61). 
19 Lewis, ‘Manifesto’, in BLAST, p.30. 
20 Ibid., p.30. 
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July 1914.21 He wrote disapprovingly that ‘its significance will have to be put into it; for 
of its own self it contains none’.22 That it was more the appearance than the substance of 
BLAST which had informed Orage’s initial views is demonstrated by more 
complimentary comments a week later:  
 
When I wrote my note on ‘Blast’ last week I had not read Mr. Wyndham Lewis’ chief 
contribution — ‘Enemy of the Stars.’ It deserves to be called an extraordinary piece of 
work […] [which] contains ideas of an almost grandiose dimension, though felt rather 
than thought.23  
 
Despite being impressed with Lewis’s central literary contribution, Orage maintained a 
critical perspective on the movement. In his second review he argued that Vorticism 
exhibited an anarchic tendency, preferring ‘the feeling of ideas to the clearly thinking of 
them’, and was thus symptomatic of a wider reaction against ‘common sense’ and ‘the 
dry light of rationalism’.24 Having initially stated that it was a movement without 
philosophy, Orage thus changed the grounds of his criticism to the type of philosophy 
which the Vorticist movement presented. In fact his characterization of Vorticism as a 
form of intellectual ‘anarchism’ gets closer to the movement’s mercenary philosophy 
than most of its contemporary reviewers, pointing especially to the sense in which 
Vorticism was founded on a radically alternative idea of ‘significance’ to the one which 
Orage and the old guard of British intellectuals adhered to; rather more as ‘the 
relatedness of things’ than as a definite and coherent position.25 
BLAST was shocking because it could not be read as a coherent series of 
statements which lead towards some carefully defined conclusion. Rather, it exhibited a 
dialogical tendency to set conflicting ideas against each other in conceptual opposition, 
thereby evading the strictures of dogmatic certitude. Paradox and juxtaposition are key 
techniques in Vorticist theorizing. The anarchism which Orage discerned in Vorticism 
and its lack of a coherent philosophy was thus in truth a carefully considered strategy. 
																																																								
21 A. R. Orage (under pseudonym R. H. C.), ‘Readers and Writers’, The New Age, 15.10 (1914), 
<http://library.brown.edu/pdfs/1140814305338554.pdf>  [accessed 23 April 2016], p.229. 
22 Ibid., p.229.  
23 A. R. Orage (under pseudonym R. H. C.), ‘Readers and Writers’, The New Age, 15.11 (1914), 
<http://library.brown.edu/pdfs/1140814306795303.pdf> [accessed 23 April 2016], p.253. 
24 Ibid., p.253. 
25 In ‘The Critical Realists’ folio Lewis quotes the idea which A. N. Whitehead presented in An Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (1919) that ‘“Significance” is the relatedness of things. 
[…] Our perception of natural events and natural objects is a perception from within nature, and is not an 
awareness contemplating all nature impartially from without’ (‘The Critical Realists’, p.24).  
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Lewis, as the theoretical architect of the movement’s mercenary status, sought critical 
detachment from the competing aesthetic programmes and art philosophies of the avant-
garde in order to gain a greater insight into the binary logic to which they adhered. 
While other movements were ‘[s]lave[s] of Commotion’, notionally engaged in a 
furious battle for supremacy, Vorticism adopted a position of detached mastery: ‘[t]he 
Vorticist’, Lewis wrote, ‘is at his maximum point of energy when stillest’.26 
This paradoxical statement lends support to Jodie Greenwood’s view that 
‘dazzle camouflage offers an illuminating metaphor’ for Lewis’s activities in BLAST, 
conveying particularly the dynamic idea of stillness which Lewis had in mind in his 
contradictory characterization of the Vorticist philosophy.27 The Vorticist-inspired 
geometric patterns which were daubed across the hulls of navel vessels during the First 
World War were designed to confuse the enemy and evade the detection of a singular 
position (Fig. 24 and Fig. 25).28 In a military sense dazzle camouflage made detection of 
the vessel’s size, distance and speed of travel more difficult and thus ensured that 
bombardment would be made less effective.  
In an analogous sense, Lewis’s strategic use of paradox in his articulation of 
Vorticism’s key principles prevented the movement from freezing into any stable 
articulation and thus enabled it to maintain a fluid and manoeuvrable position among 
the European avant-garde. There is a practical purpose to this, as Faith Binckes notes:  
 
little magazines compete in a highly volatile field. As such, formalizing their positions 
might not be the best strategy for survival. What constitutes a ‘manifesto’ is also open 
to question29 
 
As a relative latecomer to this competitive and volatile field of new magazines, 
manifestos and movements, Lewis and his Vorticist colleagues took care to adopt 
certain strategies for survival, embracing an expressive style which raised more 
questions than it settled. The question of what actually constitutes a ‘manifesto’ is 
																																																								
26 Lewis, ‘Our Vortex’, in BLAST, pp.147-149 (p.148). 
27 Jodie Greenwood, ‘The Crisis of the System: Blast’s Reception’, in Wyndham Lewis and the Cultures 
of Modernity, ed. by Andrzej Gasiorek, Alice Reeve-Tucker and Nathan Waddell (Farnham: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2011), pp.77-94 (p.77). 
28 Edward Wadsworth worked on these designs during the First World War. Figure 24 shows 
Wadsworth’s woodcut design Dry Docked for Scaling and Painting (1918) and Figure 25 is a photograph 
of HMS Amphitrite painted in dazzle camouflage in the same year. 
29 Faith Binckes, Modernism, Magazines, and the British Avant-Garde: Reading Rhythm, 1910-1914 
(Oxford University Press, 2010), p.44. 
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particularly apt, when we consider what Vorticism actually claimed to stand for. 
Ostensibly ‘a document of an ideology, crafted to convince and convert’, the Vorticist 
Manifesto twists and turns playfully through contradictory avowals and utterances 
precisely in order to carve out a conceptual home at the centre of avant-garde concerns 
which could embrace the discursive conflict taking place.30 The Vorticist movement 
thus built its claims to exclusivity upon foundations which were inclusive of a great deal 
of opposed ideas and principles. With this strategy, Lewis and Pound in 1914 were 
launching their dazzlingly conspicuous brand in an aggressive bid for a market 
takeover.  
 
(ii)  The Branding of Vorticism and the Symbol of the Vortex 
 
Vorticism’s debt to marketing strategies can be most clearly viewed in the bold 
typographical layout of the text in the BLAST/BLESS sections preceding the 
Manifesto. Greenwood has indicated the influence of contemporary newspaper adverts 
on this, citing especially the typographical resemblances that an advertisement for a 
‘SHORT SEA ROUTE TO BELGIUM’ (which ran repeatedly thought the spring of 
1914 in The Manchester Guardian) has with the ‘BLESS ALL PORTS’ section on page 
23.31 As this conveys, Vorticism’s attempt to launch itself as a new aesthetic product in 
an already saturated marketplace took technical inspiration from the linguistic and 
typographical innovations which were being used to market consumer products in these 
years.  
In terms provided by Lawrence Rainey in Institutions of Modernism (1998), 
BLAST is a clear example of a work which ‘invites and solicits its commodification’ and 
becomes in the process ‘a commodity of a special sort’.32 While BLAST utilizes what 
Greenwood describes as the ‘hard sell’ language of consumer marketing — involving a 
‘move away from logical narrative in favour of an emotional rhetorical appeal’ — it is a 
‘commodity’ which ultimately offers a vision of cultural renewal in place of a cheap 
thrill.33 There thus emerges an ‘unstable synthesis’ between the deeply serious, almost 
																																																								
30 Mary Ann Caws, ‘The Poetics of the Manifesto: Nowness and Newness’, in Manifesto: A Century of 
isms, ed. by Mary Ann Caws (University of Nebraska Press, 2001), pp.xix-xxxi (p.xix). 
31 Greenwood, ‘The Crisis of the System’, p.91. 
32 Lawrence Rainey, Institutions of Modernism: Literary Elites & Public Culture (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998), p.3. 
33 Greenwood, ‘The Crisis of the System’, p.89. 
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sacred, conception of art which is being presented and the comparatively debased 
instrumental strategies which are being used to present it.34 One instance of this tension 
can be observed in the Vorticist brand logos of the ‘blast’ and the ‘vortex’, particularly 
when we distinguish the aggressive imagery that they impart from the more complete 
conceptual function they serve in Vorticist philosophy.  
As we have already noted, Vorticism’s blast is a multi-layered concept 
connoting both the indiscriminate destruction of contemporary culture and the process 
of productive division through which the new civilisation is to be generated. The vortex 
is a symbol which similarly communicates a conception of unity-in-diversity, yet one 
which has a centripetal rather than a centrifugal connotation; absorbing and containing 
the plurality which the blast had initially released. This aspect of the vortex is widely 
appreciated within Lewis scholarship, although the precise nature of its contained 
tension is given different characterizations.35  
For Pound — who coined the movement’s name — the value of the vortex as a 
figure of unity-in-diversity is found primarily in the relation which it can establish 
between the past and the future in the artist’s psyche. ‘The vortex is the point of 
maximum energy’, he writes, a ‘turbine’ into which ‘[a]ll experience rushes’ and out of 
which ‘[t]he DESIGN of the future’ will emerge.36 Pound is here raising a key 
distinction between receptivity and productivity of the artist, as the following passage 
makes clear: 
 
You may think of man as that toward which perception moves. You may think of him 
as the TOY of circumstances, as the plastic substance RECEIVING impressions. 
OR you may think of him as DIRECTING a certain fluid force against circumstance, as 
CONCEIVING instead of merely observing and reflecting.37 
 
According to this, artistic productivity cannot take shape without a certain degree of 
receptivity to a wider scene of art, both historic and contemporary. This was Pound’s 
																																																								
34 Rainey, Institutions of Modernism, p.3. 
35 For Reed Way Dasenbrock the key virtue of the ‘image of the vortex’ is that it ‘offers one 
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conception of the point of maximum energy at which the Vorticist artist notionally 
stood. Claiming a distinctive and exclusive situation among its rivals, Vorticism thus 
gains its uniqueness and originality by appropriating and claiming proper ownership of 
all that it affirms amongst its rivals, cohering ‘all the past that is living and worthy to 
live’ into its own vision of the future.38 It is an explicit attempt to absorb the opposition 
within its own inclusive and often contradictory philosophy, the symbol of the vortex 
serving the movement as a skeleton key which can access and appropriate the key 
insights of the competing artistic prophets among the European avant-garde.  
In one instance Pound demonstrates this programme of contradiction by 
deliberately mixing metaphors in his definition of the vortex. On the one hand, he uses 
an industrial metaphor to describe his idea of the vortex as a ‘turbine’, a creative input-
output machine which gives form to substance and which generates energy out of 
‘flacid’ [sic] materials.39 A page later he applies a biological metaphor, describing the 
vortex as a womb in which ‘all the past that is capable of living into the future, is 
pregnant’.40 The distinction between natural and artificial modes of creation is no 
accident, it is a careful expression of the dualistic strategy at the heart of the Vorticist 
programme and a pure expression of the urge to discharge itself on both sides of a 
culture/nature dualism, in this instance evoking the mixed strains of ‘classicism and 
romanticism’ out of which the movement was formed.41  
As Richard Humphreys makes clear, Pound was initially attracted to the image 
of the vortex for the conceptual synthesis which it facilitated between mechanical power 
and ‘mystical thought’.42 Pound’s vortex was both a conscious application of 
‘mechanical and scientific imagery’ (of ‘maximum energy’ and ‘mechanic[al] 
efficiency’) to the creative prowess of modern artists and the power manifested in their 
designs, and a subtle reference to the artist’s God-like arrangement of ‘order […] out of 
chaos, of the mind organizing form and of a perpetual “pulse” within the macro- and 
microcosms’.43  
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Pound’s poem ‘Plotinus’ of 1905 indicates that the vortex had been on his mind 
for some years already as a symbol of transcendence.44 There he had explored the 
emanationist cosmology of Plotinus from the alienated perspective of a lost soul in the 
material world, degraded through long separation from the One.45 The poem elaborates 
a moment of clarity, though not quite enlightenment, during which a human soul — 
becoming aware that it has been ‘[o]bliviate of cycles’ wanderings’ — reaffirms its 
essential orientation towards the One and plants the seed of its return: ‘As one that 
would draw thru the node of things, | Back sweeping to the vortex of the cone’.46 It is 
conceivable that some productive exchange of ideas relating to Pound’s ‘vortex of the 
cone’ motivated Lewis’s design of the Vorticist Cone which appears seven times in 
BLAST (Fig. 21), but the letters between Pound and Lewis are silent about this.47  
Described in a contemporary review of BLAST in The New York Times as 
‘something like an extinguisher and something like a dunce cap’, Lewis’s geometric 
figure of the vortex as a cone communicates a symbolic narrative in line with the theme 
of transcendence which was presented in Pound’s earlier poem.48 In the relation of the 
cone to the pole that dissects it we may observe both the centrifugal descent of the 
emanations and the centripetal ascent of the transcendent soul on its return to the 
metaphysical One. The cone is thus an important example of what Miranda Hickman 
has described as the ‘geometric idiom’ within which Pound and Lewis worked during 
Vorticism; their ‘shared investment in geometric figures’ reflecting the way in which 
‘they imagine and figure ideals’ and frame their abiding ‘philosophical attitudes’.49 The 
Vorticist, occupying ‘the point of maximum energy’, is figuratively placed at the vertex 
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of the cone, having ‘mastered the elements’ through ‘knowledge of their civilisation’ as 
Gaudier-Brzeska writes, suspended on the verge of drawing through the node of 
things.50 Lewis’s cone design thus serves as a symbolic map of Vorticism’s conceptual 
situation: holding the high ground in a certain sense — the site of maximum energy — 
and resisting both downward and upward pressures.  
 Henri Bergson clearly exerted a heavy influence on the metaphysical dualism 
which lay at the heart of the developing Vorticist philosophy. There is even a possibility 
that the particular sense which Lewis and Pound attached to the vortex was derived 
directly from their reading of Bergson. Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass go as far 
as to suggest that ‘[t]he ingenuity of Bergson’s vitalism, a philosophy of freedom, owes 
directly to his profound awareness of the “vortex”’.51	Proof of this can be found in the 
early commentary on Lucretius’s On the Nature of Things which Bergson published in 
1884, in which he states his admiration of Lucretius’s ability to ‘grasp outright the two-
sided nature of things’ and to recognize the truth that mankind seems doomed ‘to act 
and not achieve, struggle and not succeed, and be unwillingly drawn into the vortex of 
things’.52  
In Creative Evolution (1907) Bergson further developed his own conception of 
the vortex as an effective symbol for the ‘two-sided nature of things’, writing at one 
point:  
 
Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that thrust it into the world, will appear as a 
wave which rises, and which is opposed by the descending movement of matter. On the 
greater part of its surface, at different heights, the current is converted by matter into a 
vortex.53 
 
This idea of the vortex as a symbol of the eternal conflict between spirit and matter was 
consolidated in modernist thought by Bergson and appears to have been picked up intact 
by Pound and Lewis in 1914. However, in Vorticist ‘doctrine’, as it is tempting to call 
it, it was not transcendence but rather a state of suspension — holding ground at the still 
point which is also the point of maximum energy, on the verge of drawing through the 
node of things — which was sought. But in a way which has clear resemblance to 
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Bergson’s theory, this depended on the artist’s ability to synthesize or sublate the 
conflict between spirit and matter, subject and object, the conflicting currents out of 
which the vortex is formed.54 
For the visually inclined Pound (an Imagist poet) and Lewis (a painter who 
professed to think in patterns) Bergson’s account also evidently provided an effective 
lens through which to perceive the abstract revolution that was taking place in modern 
art. As a symbol of unity-in-diversity, the vortex served as a tool which enabled them 
‘to systematize or to find a common language’ and ‘to link different types of art and 
artists’ in their own aesthetic programme, as Michael Hallam notes.55 Positioning 
himself at the confluence of two distinct movements in modern art championed by 
Picasso and Kandinsky respectively, Lewis’s visual works emerged as the aesthetic 
offspring of two mutually opposed schools in modern art defined by their allegiance to 
the subjects and techniques pertaining to the domains of matter and spirit respectively. 
As we have seen, the symbol of the vortex stood for a conceptual synthesis or sublation 
of precisely this dualism and in Lewis’s paintings of the period leading up to Vorticism 
we may recognize the way in which this synthesis was given an aesthetic rationale.  
 
(iii) Picasso, ‘father […] of the movement’ 
 
Arguably the greatest influence on Lewis’s painting style in the developing phase of 
Vorticism was the Cubist abstraction of Georges Braque and Pablo Picasso. It is unclear 
when and in what context Lewis first viewed the early works of analytic Cubism by 
Braque and Picasso — these works were not on public display until much later — but it 
is obvious that ‘a form of Cubism entered his work’ at an early stage.56 Richard 
Humphreys suggests that by the time Lewis had settled for good in London in 1908 ‘he 
had […] seen Cubist and Expressionist art at first hand and had also imbibed much of 
the literary, political and philosophical culture out of which they had grown’.57 
Exhibition timings around the time of Lewis’s departure from Paris may provide some 
clues.  
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Braque’s Houses at L’Estaque (Fig. 3) — considered by many to be the 
breakthrough work of Cubist abstraction — was painted in August 1908 and first 
exhibited at Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler’s gallery in Paris in November, a month before 
Lewis embarked for London in December of that year.58 Evidence of Cubist technique 
in Lewis’s work emerges as early as The Celibate (1909), albeit in a noticeably 
‘rudimentary’ form at this stage.59 Evidence of a more considered approach in Lewis’s 
adoption of Cubist technique can be found in Girl Asleep (1911) and Smiling Woman 
Ascending a Stair (1912; Fig. 6).60 These visual works demonstrate that Lewis’s interest 
in Cubism was primarily aesthetic and expressive and that he had little interest in 
assimilating the Cubist style wholesale, preferring to borrow those elements which 
helped him work out his own conceptual treatment of the subject/object dualism, which 
was fundamentally opposed to that of Cubism.  
In Figure Holding a Flower (1912, Fig. 8) it is possible to observe how Lewis 
was connecting Cubist techniques with the constraining effect of matter in Bergson’s 
vitalist philosophy.61 The work voices ‘Bergson’s warning in Creative Evolution that 
“evolution is not only a movement forward; in many cases we observe a marking time, 
and still more often a deviation or turning back”’, as Charlotte de Mille has recently 
pointed out.62 The figure is bisected by two opposed elements, sinking down to become 
at one with formless matter with only its head and hand protruding above the horizon. 
The flower, possessing a medium ‘amount of freedom in recalcitrant matter’, is situated 
above the mineral strata in Bergson’s evolutionary system but below the animal and 
human.63 But as Edwards suggests this figure ‘seems barely able to sustain [its] position 
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on the human side of the vegetable-human border’, wistfully slipping down the scale of 
evolution, longing even for the level of freedom possessed by plants.64  
As a meditation on the regressive counter-tendency to the forward propulsion of 
evolution, the picture has a curious relation with the following lines in August 
Strindberg’s ‘The Dream Play’ (1901):  
 
THE DAUGHTER: […] father, why do flowers grow out of dirt?  
THE GLAZIER [simply]: Because they do not feel at home in the dirt, and so they 
make haste to get up into the light in order to blossom and die.65  
 
Lewis knew Frida Strindberg, the second wife of the Swedish playwright, and was 
engaged in decorating her London nightclub ‘The Cave of the Golden Calf’ in the 
spring of 1912 around the time that Edwin Björkman’s translation of Strindberg’s plays 
went on sale in London. Figure Holding a Flower was produced in the same period, so 
it is entirely possible that this passage could have had a direct influence Lewis’s 
composition.66 Whether or not Lewis actually knew Strindberg’s play at this time, the 
affinity between the two works provides an indication of how deeply ingrained in the 
modernist psyche the idea of evolutionary counter-tendencies had become, readily 
providing the structure for a tragic tension between the ascent of the spirit and the 
descent of matter.  
As the art of a purely material dimension, Cubism implicitly presented an array 
of aesthetic techniques with which to approach this tension and Lewis was quick to 
develop his own conceptual narrative out of these. Smiling Woman Ascending a Stair 
(Fig. 6) demonstrates the strategy behind Lewis’s manipulation of Cubist techniques. 
One of the key characteristics of the Cubist painter, as Butler clarifies, is that he ‘no 
longer respects the identities of the separate objects before which he stands, but 
“materializes” the space between’.67 In Smiling Woman, however, no attempt has been 
made to invade the spatial integrity of the figure and dispense with the third dimension, 
as would be proper to a work of analytic Cubism. Rather Lewis ‘is content to allow 
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these arbitrary planes to coincide spatially pretty exactly with the forms of a naturalistic 
rendition’.68 In epistemological terms, subject and object coexist in naturalistic 
harmony, and yet Cubist technique is being used to highlight a dissonance in the 
relationship between organic life and inorganic structure. Angular planes and 
mechanical divisions between surfaces are being used to show the human body, in every 
way real and accurate, as an assemblage of mechanical parts.  
Paul Edwards has described this as one of Lewis’s ‘most characteristic artistic 
strategies: producing figures we respond to as though they were “living” even though 
essential attributes of life have been denied them’.69 It is a strategy which Lewis also 
invested in his early fictions, in which his characters — what he describes in ‘Inferior 
Religions’ as ‘carefully selected specimens of religious fanaticism’ — are brutally 
‘congealed and frozen into logic’.70 The petrification of the human spirit in the ‘Wild 
Body’ stories correlates quite closely with the rough treatment of the human form which 
we can observe in his visual works of the period and encourages closer analysis of 
Lewis’s purpose.  
This purpose can be clarified by observing the critique of Bergsonian 
philosophy which is encoded in the design of Smiling Woman. The incongruity of the 
grim smile which the female figure parades in this painting is an important indication of 
his developing thought at this time, as Michael North suggests.71 Indeed, the painting — 
which Lewis described as ‘a Laugh’ in a contemporary interview —illustrates his 
theoretic reversal of Bergson’s philosophy of humour.72 In Laughter: An Essay on the 
Meaning of the Comic (1901) Bergson had applied his interpretation of the élan vital of 
human nature in an analysis of the social function of comedy, arguing that ‘laughter, by 
checking the outer manifestations of certain failings, thus causes the person laughed at 
to correct these failings and thereby improve himself inwardly’.73 This conception of 
laughter as a corrective measure designed to bolster the vital spirit and thus prevent the 
human being from sliding into the monotonous rhythm of a mechanism is deliberately 
contradicted by Lewis. 
In ‘The Meaning of the Wild Body’ — a text written as a foreword to The Wild 
Body collection of short stories in 1927 but derived from ideas which were active in 
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much earlier works — Lewis argued that ‘[t]he root of the Comic is to be sought in the 
sensations resulting from the observations of a thing behaving like a person’.74 This 
‘radical rewriting’ of Bergson’s theory is a further application of Lewis’s dualistic 
schema, which reasserts ‘the dichotomy of mind and body’ that Bergson’s vitalism had 
sought to collapse.75 The resulting tension is clearly present in Lewis’s works as far 
back as Smiling Woman, in which ‘the Comic’ is displaced far from mirth, being treated 
rather as a technical procedure of dissection. As North puts it, Smiling Woman 
‘announces comedy […] as an important source of the artistic techniques that were to 
make Lewis the most significant abstract painter in England’.76 It is the product of 
Lewis’s early aesthetic application of his anti-Bergsonian comic theorem, revealing how 
‘abstract art dissolves the figure into the ground, subjecting it to circumstance as 
comedy traditionally drags the overweening individual down to ground’.77 
Smiling Woman seems to have been carefully designed to question the 
prevailing assumptions about human life amongst his contemporaries, emphasizing the 
existence of the material body, the ‘thing’, over that of the ‘person’. The figure’s direct 
mechanical gaze sows the seeds of an unsettling series of questions in the mind of the 
viewer. Is the human being a mere ‘MACHINE OF LIFE’?78 Is the distinction between 
organic life and inorganic matter finer than we imagine, or perhaps non-existent? Or, to 
phrase it in terms provided by Jean-François Lyotard: ‘what if what is “proper” to 
humankind were to be inhabited by the inhuman’?79 By provoking this kind of 
intellectual engagement in the mind of the viewer Lewis’s painting enacts an 
imaginative departure from the Cubist aesthetic technique which it utilizes. It is 
important to see how this occurs. 
The subject/object relation presented in the early works of analytic Cubism had 
been framed in essentially epistemological terms. Works like Picasso’s The Aficionado 
(Fig. 7) and Braque’s Still Life with a Violin involve ‘the combination of several views 
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of an object in a single image’, as John Golding writes.80 Dissecting an object into the 
multiple perspectives from which it may be viewed, the Cubist artist then presents these 
multiple viewpoints all at once, as a multiplicity of overlapping structures. The dynamic 
subject’s circumnavigation of the object of perception is thereby concentrated into a 
single viewpoint causing the naturalistic integrity of the object and the third dimension 
to be figuratively lost. Implicitly then, such works reflect the supposedly dynamic 
agency of the modern subject and the corresponding passivity of the object-world, but 
they also inevitably comment upon the psychological experience of the modern city-
dweller. Instead of viewing objects from the outside, the modern eye — by moving 
through the objective structures of the metropolitan landscape — becomes absorbed 
within those structures, observing their planes overlap and intersect, and the open space 
between separate objects disappear with the perpetual expansion of material forms, 
reflecting also the sense in which no space remains empty for long in the modern city.  
 In BLAST Lewis expressed a similar view about the way in which the modern 
city had altered human life, revealing that, in prognostic terms at least, he was at one 
with the Cubists:  
 
the modern town-dweller of our civilization sees everywhere fraternal moulds for his 
spirit, and interstices of a human world […] We all to-day (possibly with a coldness 
reminiscent of the insect-world) are in each other’s vitals — overlap, intersect, and are 
Siamese to any extent.81 
 
But however much Lewis might have agreed with Cubism’s insight into the altered 
epistemological situation of the modern subject, he had little interest in turning out what 
he viewed as ‘natures-morte of modern life’.82 In his critical articles in BLAST Lewis 
expressed the view that Cubism’s epistemological bias rendered it ‘naturalistic’, 
enslaving the artist to the already existing forms of the material world, the experience of 
which the Cubists sought to ‘imitate’.83 In Smiling Woman Lewis utilizes Cubist 
technique not to give an impression of the concrete phenomena of modern the world, 
but rather to tap into the sinister process of dehumanization which was occurring in 
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modernity. The design thus takes its principal inspiration from the artist’s imagination 
and not from the external world. 
As we have already seen in chapter one, from Lewis’s perspective, the failure of 
Cubism rested upon its inability to recognise the sense in which ‘Reality is in the artist, 
the image only in life’.84 This interior spring of subjective ‘Reality’ he contrasted with 
‘[t]he “Real Thing”’ in the objective or phenomenal world, which ‘is always Nothing’, 
and warned that ‘[o]nce an Artist gets caught in that machinery, he is soon cut in half’.85 
Viewed with these rigorous principles in mind, works of analytic Cubism communicate 
the restricted sphere of agency in which the modern subject was existing, agency 
ultimately revolving around the subject’s supposedly ‘dynamic’ ability to watch a 
fluctuating phenomenal world which is no longer within its control. The static forms of 
Cubist painting come to reflect the passivity of a subject withdrawing further into an 
interiorized perception of the expanding material world, becoming caught in the 
machinery in the process. For Lewis, Cubism was thus figuratively allowing the object 
world to invade and dominate the subject. He likened Cubism to a restful cul-de-sac in 
modern art, considering Braque and Picasso as technically gifted artists who were, 
however, content to watch modernity unfold as passive onlookers. In his own art theory, 
as we have seen, Lewis attempted to reinstate a balance in the subject/object dualism by 
advancing a conception of artistic creativity as ‘subjective intellection, like magic or 
religion’, to account for the deficit in Cubism’s naturalistic bias.86  
Lewis’s critique of Cubism is highly significant and its implications ought to be 
clarified. Harold Rosenberg may be correct to suggest that the ‘modern situation of art 
[…] began with Cubism’ but the ‘link’ which, according to Christopher Butler, Cubism 
first made ‘between art and its critical-theoretic appreciation’ is taken a stage further by 
Lewis.87 Lewis’s own path to abstraction, as we shall see in more detail in the following 
chapter, is guided particularly by the conceptual content which he observed in Cubist 
aesthetic technique and the expressive possibilities which he associated with this. The 
lesson which Lewis learnt from Cubism was thus technical and theoretical. He became 
fascinated with the aesthetic possibilities and conceptual implications raised by 
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Cubism’s surgical dissection of organic form and used Cubist technique to highlight the 
inert and mechanical structures which constitute the living human form.  
But he stood opposed to the fusion of subject and object which was entailed by 
Cubism’s naturalistic bias. In Lewis’s developing schema the role of the artist took on a 
far more dynamic creative significance. ‘The first reason for not imitating Nature’, as 
Lewis wrote in BLAST 2, ‘is that you cannot convey the emotion you receive at the 
contact of Nature by imitating her, but only by becoming her’.88 For Lewis, the artist 
was a dynamic creator of new life forms, productive of and not merely receptive to the 
new world, a sort of midwife of the future guiding ‘visions from within’ into reality.89 
This conception of art as a creative enterprise of world-changing potential was in part 
derived from his reading of Wassily Kandinsky’s influential text of 1910 Concerning 
the Spiritual in Art, first translated into English by Michael Sadler in early 1914 and 
reviewed by Edward Wadsworth in BLAST. Certainly, in Lewis’s developing pattern of 
thinking at this time Kandinsky’s emphasis on the imaginative basis of artistic creation 
— as an activity which is grounded in subjective intellection — seems to have 
presented a viable palliative with which to counteract Cubism’s fatal tryst with the 
object of perception. 
 
(iv) ‘Kandinski, […] mother of the movement’ 
 
In his philosophical critique of art’s essential function Kandinsky defined the task of the 
modern artist in decidedly mystical terms, as humankind’s guide in the ‘spiritual 
revolution’, who would help the initiate to ‘turn away from the soulless life of the 
present’ in order to ‘give free scope to the non-material strivings of the soul’:90 
 
The nightmare of materialism, which has turned the life of the universe into an evil, 
useless game, is not past yet; it holds the awakening soul still in its grip. Only a feeble 
light glimmers like a tiny star in a vast gulf of darkness. This feeble light is but a 
presentiment, and the soul, when it sees it, trembles in doubt whether the light is not a 
dream, and the gulf of darkness a reality.91 
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The spiritual life, to which art belongs and of which she is one of the mightiest 
elements, is a complicated but definite and easily definable movement forwards and 
upwards.92 
 
With heavy dependence on the religious imagery of darkness and light, and their moral 
equation with material evil and spiritual goodness, Kandinsky viewed modern art as the 
herald of a spiritual ascent, implicitly referring to the same mystical return which Pound 
had written about in ‘Plotinus’.  
 The Vorticists praised Kandinsky for his theoretic integrity, with Wadsworth 
acknowledging his ‘important contribution to the psychology of modern art’ in his 
review of Kandinsky’s 1910 text in BLAST.93 Their respect for ‘Herr Kandinsky’ was 
derived from a shared belief in the ‘eternally objective’ truths which art was capable of 
expressing and a feeling that they were similarly hunting big game: more interested in 
art’s ‘relation to the universe and the soul of man’ than ‘its relation to the drawing-room 
or the modern exhibition’ as Wadsworth put it.94 The Vorticists approved especially of 
the concept of ‘inner need’, by which Kandinsky ‘means primarily the impulse felt by 
the artist for spiritual expression’, as Michael Sadler comments.95 This pseudo-
shamanic conception of the artistic process marries well with Lewis’s ideas in BLAST. 
Both Lewis and Kandinsky conceived the responsibility of the artist as possessing a 
regenerative responsibility for nothing less than the birth of ‘NEW BEINGS’ and the 
expansion of ‘Life’s possibilities’.96 Similarly both believed that to achieve his task the 
artist must be purified of any desire to imitate the external forms of the world, appealing 
instead to the reality which is in the artist.  
In a similar way that Lewis had appropriated Cubist technique for his own 
purposes, it seems that he drew strength from Kandinsky’s art theory without 
supporting his technical strategies. In ‘Orchestra of Media’ Lewis expressed support for 
Kandinsky’s emphasis on ‘the possibilities of colour’ as a key advance in the expressive 
‘media […] in contemporary painting’.97 He writes also that ‘Kandinsky at his best is 
much more original and bitter [than Matisse]. But there are fields of discord 
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untouched’.98 It is important to clarify the significance of these comments, for Lewis is 
elaborating a comparative scale between the ‘harmony’ conveyed in the fluid 
compositions of Henri Matisse and the programmatic ‘discord’ presented by analytic 
Cubism, positioning Kandinsky somewhere between the two extremes. 
Always keen to scrutinize both sides of a dualistic tension, Lewis himself 
explored both strategies in early works. Courtship (1912) demonstrates how keen Lewis 
was to understand ‘the primitivist pastoral idyll found in the work of Henri Matisse’, 
which he treats as the aesthetic counterpoint to his Cubist-influenced works like The 
Celibate and Smiling Woman.99 In this drawing Lewis experimented with the precise 
opposite technique to that which he used in Smiling Woman, opting instead for the 
inside of life and trying especially to give a ‘sense of the internal “feel” of the body in 
movement’.100 Courtship provides a valuable demonstration of just how receptive 
Lewis was to the various tendencies and techniques that were being developed in 
modern art. But in the end the visual harmonies sought by Matisse and Kandinsky were 
far from Lewis’s ambitions. As he consolidated his own technique and theory discord 
became the key aesthetic principle in Lewis’s Vorticist works. A closer look at 
Kandinsky’s Composition VII of 1913 (Fig. 11) may help to clarify the sense in which 
Kandinsky and Lewis were being shepherded to very different aesthetic practices by 
their respective ideas about the function of abstract art.101  
 In this painting Kandinsky ostensibly presents a swirling vortex of his own, yet 
in aesthetic terms which are far removed from Lewis’s at this time. As the title suggests, 
Composition VII exemplifies Kandinsky’s effort to create a visual equivalent to musical 
harmony, breaking all ties with the phenomenal world in order to attain a fusion of 
subject matter and form. In this sense it is a work which illustrates Kandinsky’s theory 
of ‘inner need’. The work grows directly out of Arthur Schopenhauer’s theory of the 
transcendental significance of music, inviting discussion in the critical language of 
‘tones’, ‘rhythms’ and ‘harmonies’. Colour and form are here treated as the primary 
elements — the visual equivalents to musical notes and harmonies — which are cast 
upon the canvas according to the ‘inner necessity’ of their relations.  
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 The influence of Matisse is important to note. In ‘On the Question of Form’ 
Kandinsky described Matisse’s La Danse (1909-10; Fig. 4) as a ‘rhythmic composition’ 
which had ‘an internal life and consequently a sound’.102 The significance of this 
musical analogy in Kandinsky’s theory of art is outlined in detail in Concerning the 
Spiritual in Art where Kandinsky writes: 
 
Colour is the keyboard, the eyes are the hammers, the soul is the piano with many 
strings. The artist is the hand which plays, touching one key or another, to cause 
vibrations in the soul.103 
 
As this passage clarifies, Kandinsky’s attempt to aspire to the ‘condition of music’ in 
painting has a religious connotation, being essentially concerned with finding ‘a new 
home, a new community and a new source of transcendence’ for a spiritually bankrupt 
humankind.104 Kandinsky’s abstract paintings were an attempt to ‘tune up the soul’, as 
Butler writes.105  
 Lewis was clearly impressed by the purity of Kandinsky’s abstract technique, 
identifying in his works a ‘visionary’ ability to depart decisively from the mimetic 
tradition and engage instead with the ‘supernatural power’ which is used and 
manipulated by the artist.106 In BLAST Lewis gave Kandinsky the revered titled of ‘the 
only PURELY abstract painter in Europe’, a striking compliment when we appreciate 
the extreme conception of abstraction to which he adhered in 1914.107 But while the two 
shared a semi-mystical conception of the artist, there is a fundamental distinction to be 
made in the purpose which each attached to this. While for Kandinsky this entailed a 
conception of art as a vehicle of conveyance from the evils of the material world to the 
perfect realm of spirit, for Lewis the artist was regarded as a liminal figure who existed 
on the boundary of the common world and the Absolute. According to this, the essential 
role of the artist was as an intermediary with a responsibility to return and transform the 
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limited and degenerate material world with the ‘magic’ he had acquired in his 
encounters with ‘a supernatural power’.108 
 In Kandinsky’s aspiration to attain the conditions of music in painting we can 
highlight with more precision the grounds of this disagreement. In Time and Western 
Man (1927) Lewis decried what he described as the ‘barbaric clumsiness’ of those 
theorists who identified music as a model for the plastic arts.109 It is a one-way process 
for Lewis, by which ‘Music eats up the Plastic, dissolves it’ in the ceaseless drive 
towards ‘unity in everything’.110 Oswald Spengler, Walter Pater and Richard Wagner 
are treated as the most dangerous advocates of this idea, cast by Lewis as the cultural 
officers in a catastrophic ‘Destiny-theory of history’: ‘destiny’ signifying in this 
instance ‘a musical, dematerializing, body-squandering orgasm’.111 The same sentiment 
appears to be present in Vorticism, which — in stark opposition to the transcendent 
aspirations of Kandinsky’s ethereal, ‘musical’ paintings — presented an aesthetic 
philosophy which was rooted in the material world and paintings which had ‘the 
qualities of sculpture’.112 In BLAST 2 Lewis wrote that Kandinsky’s tendency ‘to be 
passive and medium-like [and] to avoid almost all powerful and definite forms’ made 
his works ‘wandering and slack’.113 Underpinning this criticism is a distrust of what 
Lewis perceived as a ‘dematerializing, body-squandering’ inclination in Kandinsky’s 
spiritual art. 
From Lewis’s perspective Kandinsky’s art was thus a dangerous sort of ‘spell’ 
which offered no benefit for the living, but which rather ushered humankind towards a 
dissipating and deadly union with the Absolute. While he acknowledged the 
supernatural power of art he believed that the proper function of this was to reaffirm a 
separation, rather than instigate a union, between the human and the divine realms. As 
Edwards writes, Lewis at this time exhibits a ‘growing tendency to regard art as an 
exploration of the complexities of our limited human condition rather than as a vehicle 
for transcendence of that condition’.114 This idea is elaborated in his ‘Essay on the 
Objective of Plastic Art in Our Time’, in an analogous comparison of art and games: 
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The game of cricket or billiards is an ingenious test of our relative, but indeed quite 
clumsy and laughable, prowess. These games depend for their motive on the physical 
difficulties that our circumscribed extension and capacities entail. It is out of the 
discrepancy between absolute equilibrium, power, and so on, of which our mind is 
conscious, and the pitiable reality, that the stuff of these games is made. Art is cut out of 
a similar substance. […] the ‘sporting’ attitude […] is nothing but a humorous (an 
artistic or a philosophic) acknowledgment of our grotesque and prodigious limitation.115 
 
The description of art as ‘an acknowledgement’ of human ‘limitations’ echoes the idea 
expressed by Lewis in ‘The Perfect Action’ that art, like religion, was essentially a 
‘phenomen[on] of separation’ — ‘the expression of a cleavage between an inside and 
an outside, a Self and a Not-self’ — and not a mode of transcendence.116 The idea of the 
artist which this develops is, as previously mentioned, of a mediating consciousness 
who stands halfway between the divine and material realms, forcefully holding them 
apart. In comparison, Kandinsky’s art theory signified an irresponsible and naïve 
departure from the practical, material reality of human life, an imaginative flight of 
fancy into the supernatural territory of the divine.  
Lewis’s criticism of Kandinsky, we ought to note, was thus phrased in the 
precise opposite terms that his criticism of Picasso had been. While the Cubist painter 
was enslaved to the outward forms of the material world, Kandinsky was too enraptured 
with visions of the beyond to present any vital contribution to modern art. Once again 
we can notice the synthesizing tendency within Lewis’s developing philosophy to set up 
a violent structure between two extremes to serve as scaffold for his own mercenary 
exploits.117 At the heart of Lewis’s developing philosophy of art is the perception that 
the modern world compelled a response from the modern artist, though in a subtle and 
carefully worked out way. It would not do to simply flee from the material world, nor to 
become aesthetically enslaved to the materiality of the modern world. In BLAST Lewis 
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advocated an ‘Art that is an organism of this new Order and Will of Man’, but one 
which does not ‘get caught’ in the ‘machinery’ of the modern world.118  
In his own formulation of Vorticism Lewis opposed both extremes represented 
by Kandinsky and Picasso, but used the two in combination to cover the inadequacy 
which he discerned in each. Picasso’s perceived dependence upon materiality served to 
alleviate the trenchant subjectivism of Kandinsky, while Kandinsky’s emphasis on the 
spiritual purpose of art served as an effective palliative for the soulless natures-mortes 
of Picasso’s work. But neither, taken alone, provided suitable foundations for the ‘new 
civilisation’ which Lewis had in mind.119 In situating his own art philosophy between 
Picasso’s Cubism and Kandinsky’s Expressionism Lewis provides one of the clearest 
examples of his dualistic modus operandi: rejecting partisan allegiance to either side in 
a conflict, he carves his own theoretic niche in the site of their collision. Denouncing 
both Kandinsky’s spiritualism and Cubism’s naturalism he finds in their combination a 
workable rationale for his own art.  
Lewis’s Vorticist art is thus founded at the confluence of inner and outer 
necessity: the reality which is in the artist coming into creative collision with the reality 
which has exploded in useful growths in the material world. Evading both extremes, 
Lewis sets his stall on the battlefield where subject meets object. Sharing this middle 
ground we find Italian Futurism, albeit in a way which also served to collapse the 
subject/object dualism by glorifying the liberating potential of machine-age violence. 
Although it serves, in my treatment, as the third ‘point of the compass’ in Vorticism’s 
aesthetic philosophy after the synthesis of Cubism and Kandinksy’s Expressionism, 
Futurism also played an important role in the development of Lewis’s early thought and 
work, and so it is important to attend to this if we are to fully understand the developing 
pattern of thinking within Lewis’s Vorticist paintings and writings.    
 
(v) Vorticism and Futurism 
 
Futurism ushers us, as Marjorie Perloff writes, back to ‘what we might call the 
“science-fiction” world of the early century, which contains so many seeds of our own 
																																																								
118 Lewis, ‘Manifesto’, in BLAST, p.39 and Lewis, ‘Relativism and Picasso’s Latest Work’, in BLAST, 
p.139. 
119 Rude Assignment, p.135. 
	 92	
mythologies’.120 There exists in Marinetti’s definition of the Futurist movement such an 
incongruous blend of technological obsession and transcendent aspirations, a 
thoroughgoing materialism expressed in spiritual motifs, that most commentators have 
felt — in common with Kandinsky’s close ally in Der Blaue Reiter movement Franz 
Marc — that the greatest attraction of Futurism is ‘the strange contradiction’ to be 
found in their ideas.121 In ‘The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism’ Marinetti declared 
that ‘Mythology and the Mystic Ideal are defeated at last’ while simultaneously 
claiming that, by virtue of the modern phenomena of electricity, speed and mechanical 
force, he and his disciples were ‘already liv[ing] in the absolute’.122  
The Vorticists’ admiration for the outward forms of the modern world and the 
apparently unconquerable ‘Will’ of machine-age vitality led many contemporary 
commentators to suggest that the movement was simply the English section of a pan-
European Futurist movement under the directorship of Marinetti.123 It was an 
association which Lewis took care to distance himself from, explaining in ‘The 
Melodrama of Modernity’ that the general application of the tag ‘Futurist’ to modern 
painters in England was rooted in the ignorance of the public concerning the 
development of modern art.124 He offers the clarification that ‘Futurism, as preached by 
Marinetti, is largely Impressionism up-to-date. To this is added his Automobilism and 
Nietzsche stunt’.125 
  The basis of Lewis’s opposition to Marinetti’s Futurism is brought out well in a 
section of Blasting and Bombardiering (1937) in which Lewis relates an early 
encounter with Marinetti as the two ‘were passing into a lavabo together’ after one of 
Marinetti’s public lectures.126 Marinetti called out ‘You are a futurist, Lewis!’ and was 
coldly rebuked.127 The theoretical jostling which ensued helps to clarify Lewis’s own 
position and is worth quoting in full. Marinetti begins: 
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‘You have never understood your machines! You have never known the ivresse of 
travelling at a kilometre a minute. Have you ever travelled at a kilometre a minute?’ 
‘Never.’ I shook my head energetically. ‘Never. I loathe anything that goes too quickly, 
it is not there.’ 
‘It is not there!’ he thundered for this had touched him on the raw. ‘It is only when it 
goes quickly that it is there!’ 
‘That is nonsense,’ I said. ‘I cannot see a thing that is going too quickly.’ 
‘See it — see it! Why should you want to see?’ he exclaimed. ‘But you do see it. You 
see it multiplied a thousand times. You see a thousand things instead of one thing.’ 
I shrugged my shoulders — this was not the first time I had had this argument.  
‘That’s just what I don’t want to see. I am not a futurist,’ I said. ‘I prefer one thing.’ 
‘There is no such thing as one thing.’ 
‘There is if I wish to have it so. And I wish to have it so.’ 
‘You are a monist!’ he said at this, with a contemptuous glance, curling his lip.  
‘All right. I am not a futurist anyway. Je hais le mouvement qui déplace les lignes.’ 
At this quotation he broke into a hundred angry pieces.128 
 
Being so one-sided an account and removed from the event itself by over twenty years, 
this passage should not be taken as an accurate representation of their interaction. In 
truth it expresses nothing so much as Lewis’s talent for dramatic dialogue and 
characterization. But nevertheless the exchange does provide a useful indication of the 
grounds of Lewis’s opposition to Marinetti during Vorticism.  
 It is worth focussing particularly on the quotation which caused Marinetti to 
break ‘into a hundred angry pieces’. The line is from Baudelaire’s poem ‘Beauty’ 
(1857), translated into English it reads ‘I detest any movement displacing still lines’.129 
It is well chosen — no doubt in retrospect — for the significance which it has in the 
context of the dispute. Baudelaire was a cult hero of the avant-garde who was frequently 
cited in support of their aesthetic theories and thus merely by demonstrating his own 
accord with the theories of Baudelaire, Lewis could claim to be the truer heir to his 
philosophy of ‘The Painter of Modern Life’ than the Futurists.130 But in a deeper sense 
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this line is used by Lewis to refer to the physical object of perception and the moving 
‘lines of force’ in Futurist aesthetic technique. As Richard Humphreys explains, Lewis 
valued the ‘line’ for very different reasons to the Futurists: ‘[t]he dynamism he [Lewis] 
sought would be in the rigorous organisation of line and form, rather than in the 
repetition of lines suggestive of perceived movement’.131  
This aspect of Lewis’s opposition to the Futurist aesthetic programme is 
expressed well in the ‘Essay on the Objective of Plastic Art in Our Time’, where he 
adopts Schopenhauer's view as it was expressed in The World as Will and 
Representation that art ‘“pauses at this particular thing: the course of time stops: the 
relations vanish for it: only the essential, the idea, is its object”’.132 For Lewis this idea 
provided the antidote to Futurist aesthetics, carrying a rationale for an art which 
depended on the static rather than the dynamic object: 
 
A sort of immortality descends upon these objects. It is an immortality, which, in the 
case of the painting, they have to pay for with death, or at least with its coldness and 
immobility.133 
 
This passage helps to bring out the deeper aesthetic and philosophical rationale behind 
Lewis’s preference for ‘one thing’ and gives further support to his claim that anything 
which ‘goes too quickly, […] is not there’, for it communicates a notion of perfected 
being (‘immortality’) which is gained through spatial stillness rather than temporal 
movement. 
 Lewis’s theory thus contrasts sharply with Miranda Hickman’s claim that ‘from 
Futurism’ the Vorticists drew ‘a dedication to suggesting dynamic motion’.134 It is 
perhaps unfair to pick out Hickman here, as the view is relatively widespread in Lewis 
criticism. A similar idea is present in David A. Wragg’s suggestion, for example, that 
Lewis practised the aesthetic ‘admixture of Futurism and “analytical” Cubism’ in order 
to ‘represent modernity from a position of detachment’.135 These readings of Vorticist 
designs as marking out an aesthetic mid-point between the static forms of Cubism and 
the dynamic motion suggested by Futurist lines of forces misrepresents the aesthetic 
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strategies of Vorticism. As Lewis expressed it in the first issue of BLAST, Vorticism 
was ‘fed up with […] dispersals’ of energy, desiring instead ‘the immobile rhythm of 
[…] swiftness’, seeking the ‘energy’ in ‘stillness’ and finding form in an aesthetic 
programme of ‘clearness and restraint’.136  
The matter must ultimately be resolved with reference to the Vorticist designs in 
BLAST, which testify to this programme of stillness and solidity. Even in earlier works 
like Study for Kermesse (Fig. 9) and Lovers (both of 1912) in which a suggestion of 
poised dynamism is decipherable it seems ‘to be stopped short by some form of limit’, 
the ‘energy of creation’ being ‘arrested by its material vehicle’, as Edwards suggests.137 
By the time of the mature Vorticist works like Timon of Athens (Fig. 18) and Portrait of 
an Englishwoman — both painted in 1913 and reproduced in BLAST — we can see 
clearly Lewis’s adherence to an aesthetic of coldness and immobility.138 Certainly these 
designs contain no overt technical inheritance of the Futurist lines of force of the sort 
which Hickman implies. 
 That is not to say, however, that Vorticism is free from any Futurist influence. 
Yet the clearest evidence of this influence is not to be found in aesthetic technique but 
in the new ‘narrative possibilities’ which Futurism perceived in the altered condition of 
humankind in the modern world, as Richard Humphreys comments:  
 
Lewis admired the Futurists’ inventive and often iconoclastic attitude and their ambition 
to extend the subject matter and narrative possibilities of art in the modern world; 
however, for him, ‘modernity’ did not simply mean mechanisation and speed, cities and 
radical politics.139  
 
As Humphreys suggests, Futurism presented Lewis with the model for a more dynamic 
engagement with the phenomena of the modern world than was found in Cubism, which 
explored the significance of humankind’s new relationship with machinery and not 
merely its epistemological basis. But modernity, for Lewis, was a complex process 
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encompassing every aspect of the human condition, which required careful analytic 
treatment. The central problem with Futurism as Lewis saw it was its blind optimism 
and glorification of technological advance.  
If Lewis had discerned in Cubism a passive and epistemologically bloated 
subjectivity in the throes of collapse, then he saw in Futurism a potentially catastrophic 
reconciliation of the subject/object dualism which entailed the total dissolution of the 
creative subject and consequently the abolition of art. It is telling, in Lewis’s 
dramatization of their interaction, that while Marinetti adopts an ontological level of 
discourse with the claim ‘[t]here is no such thing as one thing’, Lewis counters with a 
response which emphasises the artist’s agency: ‘There is if I wish to have it so. And I 
wish to have it so’. This comment subtly serves to bolster and reaffirm the subject as a 
creative force who remained independent from the dizzying spectacle of the modern 
world. It remains implicit that for Marinetti the inevitable destiny of the subject was to 
become ecstatically submerged within the dynamic processes of technological advance. 
Confirmation of this aspect of the Futurist philosophy is found in the 
correspondence of Umberto Boccioni. In a letter to his mistress of July 1916, written a 
few days before he was killed during a cavalry drill, Boccioni wrote: ‘War is a 
beautiful, marvellous and terrible thing! In the mountains it even seems like a battle 
with the infinite. Grandiosity, immensity, life and death! I am happy!’140 Four years 
prior to this, in the ‘Technical Manifesto of Futurist Sculpture’ of 1912, Boccioni had 
described idealized aesthetic perception as a disorientating receptivity to the chaos of 
the plastic world: ‘We want the entire visible world to tumble down on top of us, 
merging and creating a harmony on purely intuitive grounds’.141 His sculpture of 1913, 
Synthesis of Human Dynamism (Fig. 16), may be regarded as a demonstration of his 
wish to ‘SPLIT OPEN OUR FIGURES AND PLACE THE ENVIRONMENT INSIDE 
THEM’, and we might conclude that his experience of war on the Veronese front during 
the First World War consummated his aesthetic vision.142  
Synthesis of Human Dynamism is a work which communicates a conflict 
between the inner and outer worlds, and the fragmentation which the human figure 
undergoes as a result of the subject’s collision with the expansion of the material object-
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world; being ultimately broken up into an assemblage of material signifiers which 
cohere in a radically de-structured human form. Boccioni’s figure is intelligible both as 
a grim prophesy of the destruction of the human form in warfare, and as a vision of the 
subject’s confrontation with ‘the infinite’. To the Futurist psyche divine visitations took 
the form of incendiary bombs ‘tumbling down’: the irrepressible expansion of matter 
enveloping and fracturing subjectivity — indeed severing the umbilical cord in all 
subject-object relations — until the artist’s ‘pulse is […] at one with the pulse of the 
universe’.143 The point of the soul’s union with the absolute is also the site of the body’s 
destruction, all subject/object distinctions effectively collapsing in a moment of 
visionary fragmentation.  
At the heart of Lewis’s opposition to Futurism was thus a similar concern about 
the dissipating consequence of transcendence as that which we observed in his critique 
of Kandinsky. The central difference here is that while Kandinsky’s transcendence had 
led the subject out of the evil clutches of the material world, Futurism attempted to 
assimilate the subject within the pulsing dynamism of the machine-world. But Lewis 
also expressed annoyance that Marinetti and his entourage had appropriated the ‘future’ 
as the central slogan of their movement. In the ‘Essay on the Objective of Plastic Art in 
Our Time’ he complained about a particular ‘sort of artist (of which the Italian Futurist, 
now deceased, is an excellent specimen) who should really be called a Presentist’: 
 
He pretends to live, and really succeeds sometimes, a sort of spiritual hand-to-mouth 
existence. He has tried with frenzy to identify himself with matter—with the whizzing, 
shrieking body, the smooth rolling machine, the leaping gun. […] A space must be 
cleared, all said and done, round the hurly-burly of the present. No man can reflect or 
create, in the intellectual sense, while he is acting—fighting, playing tennis, or making 
love. The present man in all of us is the machine. The farther away from the present, 
though not too far, the more free. So the choice must be between the past and the future. 
Every man has to choose, or rather the choice is early made for each of us.144 
 
As this passage conveys, the Futurist movement was for Lewis a mere symptom of the 
age, which unconsciously reflected the tendencies of the ‘present’ without ever 
exhibiting the creative power to remodel the world as he believed art should. Yet 
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144 ‘Essay on the Objective of Plastic Art in Our Time’, p.35.  
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‘[t]here are […] some men’, he writes on the same page, ‘who seem to contain the 
future as others contain the past’, they are ‘the hosts of the unlived thing’.145 This 
comment chimes closely with Pound’s idea of the vortex as a ‘turbine’ into which ‘[a]ll 
experience rushes’, and out of which ‘The DESIGN of the future’ will emerge.146 It 
communicates the sense in which Lewis’s own artistic ambition to sketch the blueprints 
for a new civilization and to make new beings with which to populate it might itself be 
termed ‘futurist’. The Futurist movement was thus truly ‘Presentist’ in its outlook and 
ambitions; the key to the ‘future’ lay, figuratively at least, with the Vorticists.  
 
(vi) The Theoretic Situation of Vorticism in 1914 
 
With Cubism, Kandinsky and Futurism as the three points of their compass Lewis and 
the Vorticists launched their new avant-garde brand in the summer of 1914. Vorticism’s 
synthesis, as I hope I have indicated, did not simply result in a derivative aesthetic style 
or technique, but actually became the basis for a new and important aesthetic 
philosophy, which highlighted the changing relationship between subject and object in 
the modern world. It is important to appreciate the sense in which Vorticism’s 
synthesizing strategy enabled Lewis to combine those aesthetic and theoretical elements 
of the other avant-garde movements which he believed best palliated their individual 
excesses, and thereby to re-instate a degree of conceptual balance. Cubism’s focus on 
matter and Kandinsky’s on spirit are brought together in one of modern art’s most 
intelligent narrative responses to its own altered situation in the modern world. 
By attaining a position of command over their rivals in this way Vorticism is 
figuratively propelled to the vertex of the cone, just as the mercenary factions in 
medieval European wars were raised to positions of power; gaining strength through a 
containment of the conflicting currents within themselves and exploiting the partisan 
allegiance of others for their own visionary end. The symbolic site of the Vorticist artist 
is thus the vertex of the vortex: the site of extraordinary experience or perception and 
the point at which the creative artist stands on the verge of ‘union with the absolute’, 
while forestalling any definite resolution.147 By ‘discharging’ themselves ‘on both 
																																																								
145 Ibid., p.35. 
146 Pound, ‘Vortex’, in BLAST, p.153. 
147 The Vorticist artist thus stands on the brink of a kind of mysticism, which the OED defines as the 
‘belief that union with or absorption into the Deity or the absolute […] may be attained through 
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sides’ of the dualism, establishing a post ‘Beyond Action and Reaction’, Lewis and the 
Vorticists could lay claim to a higher vision than their rivals.148 In this way, Pound and 
Lewis understood their movement as achieving a form of aesthetic sublation of the 
conceptual antithesis between Picasso’s Cubism and Kandinsky’s spiritual art, as much 
as a straightforward defeat of the Futurist camp. 
In all these movements Lewis discerned the same potentially catastrophic 
impulse towards unity. Cubism was guilty of pacifying the creative subject in the face 
of an expanding object-world, Futurism of destroying the subject in a frenzied and 
ungratifying ritual of machine violence, while Kandinsky had initiated an ascetic 
withdrawal into the inner recesses of the subject, seeking spiritual liberation from the 
material world. They had all tacitly further weakened the already ailing human subject 
by so wilfully ‘cutting the connections’ between subject and object, and, implicitly, art 
and life.149 For Lewis, the inward turn of art at this pivotal moment had played directly 
into the hands of a technologically advanced society, which was increasingly defining 
human life in the fixed terms of object-relations. When in 1926 he wrote ‘[w]e are all 
slipping back into machinery, because we all have tried to be free’ he seems to capture 
the sense in which the celebration of a creative and dynamic human subject had 
obscured the reality of the situation during those visionary pre-war years of modernist 
art.150 Certainly by 1914 Lewis’s own critical position had become more refined, as he 
began to see the structures in which humankind had become immersed more clearly as 
cages. This idea can be seen clearly in The Crowd (1914-1915; Fig. 20).151 
Here modernity is shown as the herald of a more collective and automatic kind 
of humanity than ever previously existed. The crowd of ‘reddish-brown humanoid 
cyphers’ is harried into an ‘enclo[sure]’ and figuratively merged with the background 
scene of modernity, their ‘progress through the picture space culminat[ing] in their 
working, or being worked by, the treadmill in the top right-hand corner’, as David A. 
Wragg comments.152 The French and Communist flags, ironic banners of freedom, 
represent the ideological ‘religions’ which have shaped and which are in the process of 
																																																																																																																																																																		
contemplation and self-surrender’ (New Oxford English Dictionary, ed. by Judy Pearsall (Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p.1225). Though crucially the Vorticist reaffirms the individuated self as it 
stands figuratively at the point of union.  
148 Lewis, ‘Manifesto’, in BLAST, p.30. 
149 Lewis, ‘Futurism, Magic and Life’, in BLAST, p.133. 
150 Wyndham Lewis, The Art of Being Ruled, ed. by Reed Way Dasenbrock (Santa Rosa: Black Sparrow 
Press, 1989), p.125. 
151 Wyndham Lewis, The Crowd, 1914-15, oil and pencil on canvas, 200.7 × 153.7 cm, Tate Galleries.  
152 Wragg, ‘Aggression, aesthetics, modernity’, p.203. 
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shaping the modern world, providing humanity with ‘a world in a corner of the world, 
full of rest and security’.153   
For Richard Humphreys the painting ‘is a grand statement of the political 
realities of the time’ showing how ‘massed groups of human units are […] trapped in an 
urban landscape of diagrammatic terror’.154 In one sense then The Crowd serves as ‘a 
full-scale map’ of the forces which Lewis ‘saw shaping future civilisation: an 
anonymous, uniform crowd controlled by equally anonymous powers signified by 
robotic figures in the foreground’.155 But equally the painting calls to mind the ambition 
which Lewis stated in ‘Inferior Religions’, to sketch out a ‘new human mathematic’ and 
assemble ‘a book of forty propositions’ collating his ‘creaking men-machines’.156 The 
canvas in this sense behaves rather like an ethnographer’s cabinet filled with ‘specimens 
of religious fanaticism’.157 Humankind is shown here at the end of a complex process of 
dehumanization, treated en masse as just as many ‘intricately moving bobbins’ as can 
be packed into structural grid.158 Elsewhere Lewis would comment that in modernity 
humankind was attaining a degree of mass-organization comparable with the 
rationalized societies of the insect world.159  
 
w w w 
 
The Crowd is the final visual development in a rigorous process of symbolic 
classification taking place in Lewis’s paintings and writings during this period, which 
will occupy the central focus of the next chapter. We have seen here how receptive 
Lewis was to the wider discourses and expressive strategies within modernist art and we 
turn next to examine more closely his productivity in generating ideas and interpretative 
outcomes of his own. I focus especially upon the development of Lewis’s ‘two arts’ in 
the period leading up to 1914 and the unique path into abstraction which he pioneered in 
																																																								
153 ‘Inferior Religions’ (1917), p.316. 
154 Humphreys, ‘“A Strange Synthesis”’, p.40. 
155 Ibid., p.40. 
156 ‘Inferior Religions’ (1917), p.315. 
157 Ibid., p.315. 
158 Ibid., p.315. 
159 In The Caliph’s Design (1919) Lewis suggests that one of the great dangers facing humankind in 
modernity is ‘that we should become overpowered by our creation, and become as mechanical as a 
tremendous insect world, all our awakened reason entirely disappeared’ (p.76). In ‘The Meaning of the 
Wild Body’ Lewis also suggests that without ‘self-observation […] men sink to the level of insects’ 
(p.158).  
	 101	
his paintings.160 Lewis took great care in this period of his career to translate the 
conceptual implications of aesthetic principles into a literary discourse, and vice versa, 
to apply philosophical principles in his own visual works. In this way Lewis gained 
awareness of the linguistic potential of abstract art to facilitate a symbolic mode of 
expression.
																																																								
160 ‘Beginning’, p.266. 
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Chapter 3  
Wyndham Lewis’s ‘pattern of thinking’ in  




In this chapter I approach the ‘strange synthesis’ which Lewis’s Vorticism attained from 
a different perspective.1 We have already seen how Lewis derived and synthesized the 
materials for a conceptual dualism between spirit and matter from two of his major 
rivals among the pre-war avant-garde, Kandinsky and Picasso. Here my focus is on the 
synthesis which Lewis attained personally in his commitment to two distinct modes of 
artistic expression: the visual and the literary. My analysis thus involves a shift of focus 
away from the context in which Lewis’s thought developed towards a closer 
consideration of his own creative output during the Vorticist period, which is essentially 
split between these two artistic mediums.  
The central claim I wish to make here is that the thematic overlaps between 
Lewis’s paintings and writings of the Vorticist period are so numerous and significant 
that they compel a critical treatment which does not isolate them into the discrete 
spheres of artistic and literary discourses, but which treats them as distinct but 
complementary emanations of Lewis’s philosophical pattern of thinking. That is to say, 
the boundaries which critical disciplines set up between different mediums of artistic 
expression, although useful in highlighting the distinct criteria and technical demands of 
those mediums, should not restrict our appreciation of thematic or conceptual ground 
which they often share. In the case of Lewis, this shared ground can be elaborated with 
reference to his philosophical conception of language. 
In a lecture given at the BBC in 1951, ‘The Essential Purposes of Art’, Lewis 
provided a rationale with which to understand his paintings and writings as participating 
in a shared system of linguistic signs:  
 
Being a writer and painter I am I dare say especially conscious of the extent to which 
the visual arts are a language. [...]  Everything that we see that is not nature but man's 
																																																								
1 ‘A World Art and Tradition’ (1929), p.259. 
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handiwork also belongs to the realm of visual expression, every cigarette kiosk, water 
cart, policeman’s helmet, or lamp post is expressing something as clearly as do the 
words upon a printed page, almost they are an ideographic language.2 
 
As an utterance in a visual ‘language’ a drawing or painting is, according to this idea, 
necessarily composed of signifiers which may be translated into more common terms of 
our everyday verbal language. In ‘Beginning’ Lewis informs us that there occurred no 
overt ‘mixing of the genres’ among his creative products, but he lends support to the 
idea of a deeper level of accord when he comments that originally ‘[t]he “short story” 
[…] imposed itself upon me as a complementary creation’, and that ‘the two arts, with 
me, have co-existed in peculiar harmony’.3 Thus, while his paintings and writings did 
not mix in any overt way, remaining responsive to the technical demands of their 
respective mediums, they may be seen to participate in a shared system of signs and 
symbols. In other words, they both adhere to, and emanate from, a particular pattern of 
thinking. 
 It is curious to note how this phrase — which Lewis used in Rude Assignment to 
refer to the thread of continuity which ran through all his books — serves to affirm the 
connection I am suggesting between Lewis’s visual and literary works, by enticing us to 
visualize the relation between ideas. It is Lewis’s own stand-in phrase for the more 
conventional ‘system of thought’ prevalent among traditional philosophers. In place of 
the reassuring tone of finality and durability conveyed by ‘system’ Lewis prefers the 
comparatively more malleable, visual notion of a ‘pattern’. The fabric of this pattern is 
‘thinking’, the present progressive verb form being preferred to the objectified noun 
‘thought’ with its connotation of completion. The vocabulary which Lewis applied to 
ideas and concepts was frequently visual in nature, indicating that a certain degree of 
mingling occurred between visual and linguistic criteria in Lewis’s creative works 
																																																								
2 Wyndham Lewis, ‘The Essential Purposes of Art’ (1951), The Enemy Speaks (LTM 2411) [CD]. 
3 ‘Beginning’, p.266. There are good reasons to be dubious about Lewis’s claim that there occurred no 
overt ‘mixing of the genres’ among his creative products. In the first instance, Lewis’s illustrations in The 
Apes of God (1930) and Michael Ayrton’s character sketches in the books of The Human Age (1955-
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speaking, ‘mixed’ in these instances. However, clear examples of ‘mixing’ are to be found in BLAST, 
where an image entitled ‘The Enemy of the Stars’ with thematic relation to Lewis’s play is situated a page 
before the text opens; in the unfinished manuscript of ‘Hoodopip’ which appears to have developed in 
line with Lewis’s Tyro paintings in the early 1920s (Edwards, Painter and Writer pp.256-259); and in 
Lewis’s collaboration with Naomi Mitchison on Beyond This Limit (1935), with ‘each of them taking 
turns to invent the story through words (Mitchison) and drawings (Lewis)’ (Janet Montefiore, Men and 
Women Writers of the 1930s: The Dangerous Flood of History (London: Routledge, 1996), p.115). 
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across both mediums. It is thus possible to speak of the coherence of Lewis’s ideas as 
compositional rather than logical in nature and the designs of his visual works as 
conceptual to a certain degree.  
 To tap into this deeper level of accord which exists between Lewis’s Vorticist 
paintings and writings I have adopted a particular method. I trace the developing 
interactions between Lewis’s visual and literary works over the period which led up to 
the launch of Vorticism in the summer of 1914, fixing attention particularly upon the 
shared structural characteristics and symbolic arrangements which populate and 
energize Lewis’s various creative activities and holding focus until the ‘central pattern 
of thinking’ from which the various products of his creative consciousness emanate can 
be discerned.4 I use the term ‘emanate’ here in full consciousness of Fredric Jameson’s 
recent suggestion that the Timon of Athens portfolio of 1912-13 is the ‘point [...] on 
which all of Lewis’s multiple activities converge, or better still, from which we can 
observe them all to emanate’ (see especially Figs. 12 and 13).5 While it is no doubt true 
that Lewis’s Timon of Athens portfolio marks a significant point of development in his 
creative achievements, it is important to bear in mind that this point resides within what 
was a continuous process of what I am calling ‘symbolic classification’ here.6 I have 
structured my analysis here to give equal weight to the visual and the literary: we begin 
by exploring the conceptual content of Lewis’s visual works with close reference to his 
writings of the period and we then turn to consider the visual aspect of Lewis’s writings 
in BLAST.  
 
(i) From The Vorticist to Vorticism 
 
The Vorticist (Fig. 10) was completed by Lewis in 1912.7 It was given this title 
retrospectively by Edward Wadsworth who clearly perceived certain qualities which 
made it exemplary of the aesthetic principles of the movement with the benefit of 
hindsight, and it is not difficult to see why. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
																																																								
4 Rude Assignment, p.238. 
5 Fredric Jameson, ‘Wyndham Lewis’s Timon: The War of Forms’, in Vorticism: New Perspectives, ed. 
by Mark Antliff and Scott W. Klein (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp.15-30 (p.17). 
6 The term is taken from Rodney Needham’s Symbolic Classification (Santa Monica: Goodyear 
Publishing, 1979). The broader relevance of this terminology will be clarified towards the end of this 
chapter.  
7 Wyndham Lewis, The Vorticist, 1912, watercolour on paper, 42.2 × 32.2 cm, Southampton City Art 
Gallery.  
	 105	
Vorticism can be conceived (following Pound) as the offspring of two mutually 
opposed schools in modern art, championed by Picasso and Kandinsky, which 
developed aesthetic techniques pertaining to the domains of matter and spirit 
respectively. The Vorticist demonstrates Lewis’s early attempt to set these two worlds 
against each other aesthetically and conceptually.  
The material signs of the painting are composed of interpenetrating surfaces and 
overlapping layers which lock the figure into a material dimension, and illustrate clearly 
Vorticism’s debt to the Cubist aesthetics of condensed materiality. At the same time, 
however, we can observe in the figure’s closed eyes a traumatized withdrawal from the 
dominion of pure matter into the inner recesses of the self. Penned-in on all sides by the 
irrepressible expansion of material planes, the figure seeks ‘for the road which is to lead 
us away from the outer to the inner’ as Kandinsky wrote in Concerning the Spiritual in 
Art.8 Here we can begin to observe the sense in which Lewis’s aesthetic manoeuvres in 
painting accord with certain ideas expressed in his writings of the period, although it is 
important to stress that at this stage he remained reliant upon mimetic detail in painting 
in order to achieve this.  
 The painting depicts a crude human form emitting an agonized cry as it is all but 
torn asunder by two opposed forces which hold dominion over human life: self and 
world. The painted elements of the picture represent the domain of pure matter which 
comes to consume and dissect the figure, personhood ultimately being broken up into a 
collection of material signs. The stains of rust which are visible at the fringes of the 
body subtly indicate that biological nature has come to condemn this metallic figure to 
the scrapheap, enacting the same symbolic function as does the ‘RED OF STAINED 
COPPER’ which dominates the scene in Enemy of the Stars.9 In the triangular apex 
which dissects the figure’s cranium (aglow with the fires of industry?) we may observe 
a metallic implement (the figure’s own piston-like paw?) pounding on what the figure’s 
closed eyes imply is a hermetically sealed subjectivity.  
The pressure to which this figure is being subjected appears unbearable. Caught 
between two mutually opposed forces, being pulled inside out in a metaphysical tug-of-
war between self and world, the figure’s head appears as a turbine, its slight retraction 
between the shoulders indicating perhaps the beginning of a spin. Here then, is a figure 
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9 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.60. 
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which dwells at ‘the point of maximum energy’.10 The requisite conditions for a vortex 
are in the process of forming as the outer world attempts to invade the inner: the subject 
is forced to withdraw from the expansion of the object world at the same time that the 
‘theatre’ of selfhood, as Lewis phrased it in ‘Breton Journal’, is ‘outflowing’.11  
 By staging a conflict between the aesthetic principles of Vorticism’s two parent-
movements, the compositional elements of The Vorticist open a conceptual narrative in 
which two opposed principles (self and world) occupy the lead roles. Lewis’s painting 
magnifies the dual metaphysical principles which underpin and animate his subject, 
revealing the human being as a fragile surface-dwelling split-creature. We find 
‘questions of fusion and separation’, both metaphysical and epistemological, arise when 
we consider the human being as suspended between two mutually opposed principles: 
to which side do we properly belong, and from which will we finally be banished?12 Or 
indeed, is the dualism ‘absolute’; are these ‘two independent coeternal principles, 
irreducibly set against each other from eternity’?13 Such questions must be held to one 
side for a full treatment, but at the present stage of our investigation they provide 
invaluable preliminary parameters for our consideration of the process of dual symbolic 
classification which underpins Lewis’s creative work of this period. 
 In one respect we can already glimpse, in the conceptual arrangements which are 
taking shape here, a certain degree of continuity among Lewis’s paintings and writings 
of the period. In ‘Beginning’ Lewis had described how his literary creations emerged as 
‘the crystallization of what I had to keep out of my consciousness while painting’, that 
‘[t]he waste product of every painting […] makes the most highly selective and ideal 
material for the pure writer’.14 If we follow this idea, Enemy of the Stars would 
immediately appear to qualify as an example of literary reinvestment of the discarded 
matter from Lewis’s painterly consciousness. After all the ‘CONDEMNED 
PROTAGONIST’ of his Vorticist play is similarly suspended between two mutually 
opposed metaphysical principles.15 Arghol is the representative of ‘Self [...] the ancient 
race’ whose futile opposition to ‘Mankind’, ‘the universe’, ‘God and Fate’, leaves him 
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braced on ‘the world’s brink’ against ‘thought heavy as a meteorite’.16 The Vorticist 
could almost be a depiction of Arghol receiving one of his nightly beatings from his 
‘uncle’.17  
 But there are certain significant reasons why the drawing of 1912 ought to be 
marked off from the subsequent phase of Lewis’s Vorticist painting. Firstly, as already 
mentioned, such comprehensive mimetic detail in the depiction of the figure is 
altogether lacking in a work like Composition of 1913 (Fig. 17), where the human form 
is entirely reduced to an abstract code of material signifiers (the arching mantis-like 
inclination of torso and arms is topped with a single bulging metallic eye).18 In The 
Vorticist, despite its traumatic submission to a dehumanizing pressure, the figure 
remains recognizably human. Secondly, whereas the figure in The Vorticist occupies an 
indeterminate space, a blank void, Lewis’s later Vorticist figurations are contained on 
all sides by the warm-toned interior planes of the cubic forms among which they find 
their proper niche of existence.  
 The process which instigated Lewis’s move from The Vorticist to Vorticism thus 
involves a shift of focus from human subject to the external process and condition of 
life, but crucially it also involves a new vocabulary in which to express this. The 
distinction between these two points in his development is really one between an 
intermediate and an advanced user of a language, in this case a personally conceived 
abstract language. What occurs in the mature paintings and writings of Lewis’s Vorticist 
period is heightened proficiency in expression and articulation. The 1912 painting 
shows Vorticist aesthetic and conceptual arrangements in a comparatively superficial 
aspect, for here Lewis was heavily reliant upon mimetic detail to demonstrate the 
conceptual background to his paintings. The result is an explicit image, which uses 
literal depiction to convey its meaning. What occurs next is a process of abstract 
refinement in the visual vocabulary of his paintings, which become subtler and for that 
reason capable of expressing more.  
 The matter has recently been addressed by Fredric Jameson, who identifies ‘the 
warring intersection — the mortal struggle — of the square and the round’ in Lewis’s 
Timon of Athens series of 1912-13 as a sort of geometric shorthand with which Lewis’s 
painterly consciousness was able to interrogate the changed ‘ontology of being’ which 
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paper, 34.3 × 26.7 cm, Tate Galleries.  
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modern life had fostered in human beings.19 The geometric figures of the square and the 
circle are infused with symbolic significance in Jameson’s analysis of Lewis’s proto-
Vorticist works, in a way which demands clarification. His distinction between these 
forms would seem to tie in with the spirit/matter dualism we have been discussing in 
Lewis’s visual works. In this sense the circle, without beginning or end, suggests the 
complete, indivisible realm of the spirit while the square connotes the endeavour of 
rationality to control material form by dividing it into uniform, linear arrangements.  
One significant implication which is raised by Jameson’s distinction is therefore 
that Lewis’s paintings participate in some way within the philosophical tradition which 
sought to attain rational control over the occult processes of God’s creation by ‘squaring 
the circle’. The mathematical ‘compass’ is identified as the key instrument of this effort, 
which enables the user ‘to discriminate the original chaotic unity, or prima materia, into 
four opposing elements that […] could be recombined into a more integrated whole’.20 
This idea is illustrated in William Blake’s famous depiction of the ‘law-making 
demiurge’ Urizen at the moment of creation, leaning out of the realm of pure spirit 
(symbolized by the circle) to enact material creation (symbolized by the right-angled 
corner of the square) (Fig. 1).21 The hand of God in this image undertakes the creation 
of the material world by wielding the compass. Geometrical mastery of the compass in 
this way heralds the possibility of human mastery over the material conditions of 
existence and a way of attaining, by rational means, the creative power of God.  
In one respect then, Jameson’s identification of a ‘warring intersection […] of 
the square and the round’ in Lewis’s paintings serves to extend the narrative of dualistic 
conflict which we have already observed in Lewis’s proto-Vorticist works, indicating 
the sense in which the new geometric art which Lewis was pioneering might be viewed 
as an attempt to rationally master the chaotic unity at the heart of existence. This is an 
important symbolic background to Jameson’s application of the square/circle distinction 
to Lewis’s works, although it is not an association which he explicitly draws attention to 
in his analysis. Rather the particular meanings which Jameson assigns to these 
geometric figures in Lewis’s paintings appears to be derived specifically from T. E. 
Hulme’s distinction between ‘geometric’ and ‘vital’ art in ‘Modern Art and Its 
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Philosophy’.22 The geometric forms of the square and the circle would in this case 
connote a primarily aesthetic distinction between the inorganic forms which proliferate 
the geometric style of abstraction in modern art and the organic and vital forms 
associated with the mimetic tradition in post-renaissance European art.   
For Jameson, Lewis’s Timon paintings of 1912-13 demonstrate conscious 
engagement with ‘a fundamental task in the history of art’: to conceive how ‘to fit this 
round peg [the living body] into the square hole of the frame [the inanimate scene]’.23 In 
Lewis’s case, the traditional mimetic answer to this question no longer held any 
aesthetic or conceptual integrity. There could be no ground gained by ‘imitating’ the 
outward forms of life any longer, this would amount to a misrepresentation of the 
reality of contemporary life.24 ‘Dehumanization is the chief diagnostic of the Modern 
World’, Lewis wrote in ‘The New Egos’, and the task beholden to the modern artist was 
to ‘MAKE NEW BEINGS’ in order to demonstrate this.25 According to Jameson, 
Lewis’s solution, in the Timon series at least, was to stage an aesthetic battle between 
the signifiers of vital organic life (the round principle) and the signifiers of the inert, 
inorganic scene (the square principle).  
 The metaphysical tension between self and world which had frozen the figure of 
The Vorticist into a traumatized lethargy is recast, in the Timon series, into a Bergsonian 
conflict between the dynamic thrust of organic life and the ‘descending movement of 
matter’.26 Jameson’s reading of A Feast of the Overmen (Fig. 12) clarifies this. This 
painting, he writes: 
 
marks a relative predominance of the round or circular principle [...]  The body and its 
appetites are the source of this organic and voluptuous rotundity, which scarcely 
however affords us mortals much of the visual luxury of the old-fashioned Flemish 
kermesses. Its couplings are ominous and metamorphic, the spade-shaped principle has 
already taken hold on the heads, the circular movements, although rising vertically, go 
nowhere and promise little in the way of development.27  
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These semi-organic forms are beginning to merge with the inorganic structures around 
them. They correspond with ‘the modern town-dweller[s] of our civilisation [who] see 
everywhere fraternal moulds for [their] spirit[s]’.28 The relation of Lewis’s Timon 
designs to the play from which they take their inspiration is not difficult to see, for the 
implied supremacy of the square principle expresses Timon’s tragic realization that 
mankind’s insatiable hunger for material wealth will always win out against the levity 
characteristic of kindness and compassion. These paintings are really Lewis’s attempt to 
translate the conceptual dynamic which drives Shakespeare’s play into a visual format. 
The viewer is shown the world refracted through the enlightened, though embittered, 
consciousness of Timon, observing ‘nature as it grows again toward earth | Is fashioned 
for the journey dull and heavy’.29 By gorging themselves upon food and wine and 
adorning themselves in ‘diamonds’, the Overmen at the Feast effectively load 
themselves with ‘stones’ weighted to sink further into the material dimension by which 
they are contained.30  
 The identification of a symbolic interaction between the geometric principles of 
the square and the round in Lewis’s early Vorticist paintings inevitably provokes ‘an 
allegorical reading in which two opposing forces are locked in combat’, as Jameson 
suggests.31 Applying terms which Pound provides in his ‘Affirmations’ in The New Age 
on 28 January 1915, we might suggest that the square and circle are basic and repeated 
‘pattern-units, or units of design’ which qualify as the primary visual building blocks of 
his early pattern of thinking.32 Certainly the dualistic tension between squared and the 
circular forms evidently helped Lewis formulate compositions which developed his 
philosophical interest at this time. This being so, we are confronted with a significant 
interpretative problem when we approach works in which the round principle is 
noticeably absent, such as Composition and Timon of Athens (Figs. 17 and 18). How 
then are we to apply Jameson’s model to these mature abstract works?  
 
(ii)  Symbolic Classification in Lewis’s Vorticist Paintings 
 
																																																								
28 Lewis, ‘The New Egos’, in BLAST, p.141. 
29 William Shakespeare, Timon of Athens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.224. 
30 Shakespeare, Timon, p.259. 
31 Jameson, ‘Wyndham Lewis’s Timon: The War of Forms’, p.27. 
32 Ezra Pound ‘Affirmations IV. As for Imagisme’, in The New Age, 16.13 (1915), pp.349-350 
<http://library.brown.edu/pdfs/1140814350421165.pdf> [accessed 19 May 2015], p.349. 
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Where the human form is present in these works it is broken up into an abstract 
assemblage of material signifiers, the vital spark of organic life having effectively been 
‘banished from matter’.33 Following the geometric symbolism we have observed in 
Jameson’s interpretation, one possible rationale for this is provided by the Jungian 
analyst Aniela Jaffé:  
 
In most modern art, the connection between these two primary forms [the circle and the 
square] is either nonexistent, or loose and casual. Their separation is another symbolic 
expression of the psychic state of 20th-century man: His soul has lost its roots and he is 
threatened by dissociation.34  
 
If we follow Jaffé’s interpretation we are invited to conclude that the process of 
dehumanization is being shown at a stage nearing completion in Lewis’s later Vorticist 
abstractions. No longer dignified as vital living organisms, human beings feature in 
Lewis’s fully abstract works as ‘men-machines’ being operated by the vast and 
indifferent mechanism of the modern city.35 Little wonder then that these later Vorticist 
works tend to place their conceptual emphasis on the collective aspect of humankind, as 
in The Crowd, and the functional context of collective participation, as in Workshop, of 
1914-15.36 As Lewis’s focus shifts further towards the external conditions of life and 
the logical end of this process of dehumanization, the category ‘man’ is absorbed 
entirely in the inorganic structures which underpin and surround the sphere of human 
life, eventually making humankind itself the truest referent of the square principle.  
What happens then to the round principle in Lewis’s Vorticist paintings?  Is it 
simply banished from these later works? If so, the predominance of the inorganic, 
square principle would presumably imply a conceptual monism. But isn’t it ‘[a]lways a 
deux’?37 We are forced to look deeper into these works for the presence of a war of 
forms, or conflict of symbols, but not without reward. Visual signifiers of the round 
principle survive in a ghostly aspect, in certain gestures towards the compositional 
technique of naturalistic art.  
																																																								
33 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.84. 
34 Aniela Jaffé, ‘Symbolism in the Visual Arts’, in Man and His Symbols, ed. by Carl G. Jung (London: 
Dell Publishing, 1964), pp.255-322 (p.284).  
35 ‘Inferior Religions’, p.315. 
36 Wyndham Lewis, Workshop, 1915, oil on canvas, 76.5 × 61 cm, Tate Galleries.  
37 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.80. 
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 Lewis’s Vorticist abstractions, as we know, were the products of a concern not 
to imitate the outward forms of life, but to make new beings in order to capture the truth 
that ‘dehumanization is the chief diagnostic of the modern world’. As a classically 
trained painter of the Slade School of Art, this required Lewis to break out of the 
naturalistic conventions of mimetic art in which he had been versed, and to consolidate 
a new style more in keeping with the temper of the modern world. This resulted in a 
shift of focus away from organic forms captured with mimetic detail towards the 
abstract cubic forms of the inorganic realm. But even the fully abstract works, in 
characteristic Lewisian fashion, are Janus-faced; gesturing towards naturalistic 
compositional technique at the same time that they render all forms inorganic, albeit in a 
few spectral lines. To understand this more clearly we must withdraw ourselves from 
the finished canvas and look further into the compositional procedure which Lewis 
used.  
 The procedure of Lewis’s Vorticist abstraction involved the retrieval and 
subsequent segregation of cubic form from certain strategic compositional arcs and 
circles (a technique associated with naturalistic art, particularly portraiture) which 
determine their structural parameters. These compositional arcs are highlighted by 
Antonella Abatilli in Fig. 19, taking Timon of Athens (1913) as her model.38 Here we 
can see that a similar tussle between the square and round principles which Jameson 
observed in the Timon series is present in Lewis’s later Vorticist abstractions. The round 
principle is identifiable in the hidden naturalistic architecture which enabled Lewis to 
create the geometric forms which populate his Vorticist abstractions. But in these fully 
abstract works the symbolic designations of the square and the round are altered, 
provoking an interpretation which mirrors certain of Lewis’s ideas about the new 
relationship which existed between humankind and Nature in the modern world. The 
round principle, no longer associated with the ‘vital’ human form, is at this stage 
aligned with the indivisible and all-encompassing metaphysical unity of Nature.  
 The greatest interpretive difficulty which we face is that the square and the 
round principles function as double, or rather two-faced, signifiers in Lewis’s Vorticist 
works; the transition from the Timon series of 1912-13 to the abstract works of 1913-14 
actually involving a reversal of their symbolic designations. It was observed that in The 
Vorticist and the Timon of Athens series the round principle functions as a signifier of 
																																																								
38 These visual studies are from Antonella Abatilli’s unpublished research into Wyndham Lewis’s 
compositional practice during the Vorticist period.  
	 113	
human life at the same time that the square signifies the inanimate structures of the 
external world. In Timon of Athens (1913), with the process of dehumanization now 
complete, the square principle stands for humankind which, having populated the world 
with a new species of machine-forms, stands now triumphant over Nature; the self-
proclaimed master of creation. Or, to put it in terms which Lewis himself provides in 
the Vorticist Manifesto: 
 
our industries, and the Will that determined face to face with its needs, the direction of 
the modern world, has reared up steel trees where the green ones were lacking; has 
exploded in useful growths, and found wilder intricacies than those of Nature.39  
 
Jameson’s model is reversed here, as the inorganic creations of the machine-age herald 
humankind’s triumphant liberation from the laws of Nature. This narrative is mirrored 
in Lewis’s own compositional procedure where the decidedly artificial forms which 
occupy the canvas appear to have broken free of compositional conventions associated 
with the mimetic tradition in painting; Lewis effectively composing a new symbolic 
vocabulary with which to articulate the changed conditions of modern life. It is crucial, 
if we are to complete this symbolic narrative, to remind ourselves that the compositional 
arcs and circles (a technical trait of a naturalistic painter) remain visible in the finished 
drawing, gesturing towards the constant, albeit temporarily muted, presence of the 
organic realm of life and death. In a sense then, these surrounding arcs reveal the 
presence of what Lewis described in ‘Inferior Religions’ as the ‘Sovereign force 
beneath the surface’.40 There is thus an ever-present memento mori in these celebrations 
of the modern world. 
 His paintings and writings of the Vorticist period indicate that Lewis was 
inclining towards a particular interpretative position concerning ‘the direction of the 
modern world’. Humankind’s apparent triumph over Nature, about which the Italian 
Futurists had rhapsodized, is deftly undercut in Lewis’s works of the period up to the 
publication of BLAST by a pessimistic strain. We are led to wonder whether the 
technological controls placed by humankind over wild Nature may in fact amount to a 
relatively insignificant symptom of a broader process which was driving the 
materialization of world, in which case material Nature would be the inevitable victor. 
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The idea which Lewis communicates is reminiscent of Samuel Butler’s mock-
Darwinian vision in Erewhon (1872) of a world in which machines use humankind in 
order to evolve: what appears like bold independence from Nature is in fact a disguised 
submission to ‘Her’ programme of materialization.  
 The First World War seemed to confirm this idea for Lewis, which he expressed 
most eloquently in his short-story of 1917 ‘Cantelman’s Spring-Mate’. Cantelman’s 
imperious attitude and confused belief that by mating and murdering he was somehow 
‘outwitting Nature’ resonates with the message conveyed by Lewis’s Vorticist 
abstractions, which also communicate the prowess of a new invulnerable type of human 
being, ‘fashioned for its journey dull and heavy’ in a manner befitting a liveried servant 
of the inorganic realm.41 Lewis understood humankind at this time to be wilfully 
entering servitude enamoured with the material equipment of its own bondage. It is 
tempting to suggest that Lewis’s articulation of humankind’s complacent attitude 
towards Nature was modelled on Goethe’s prescient comments in ‘Nature: A 
Fragment’: 
 
Nature! We are surrounded by and entangled in it, incapable of escaping from it, and 
incapable of penetrating deeper inside it. Without being asked and without warning, it 
draws us into the vortex of its dance and sweeps us away, until we are exhausted and 
drop from its arms. [...] We act on it continuously, yet have no sway over it. It seems to 
have staked everything on individuality, yet does not know what to do with individuals. 
It always builds and always destroys, its forge is inaccessible. It lives through its 
children; but where is the mother? [...] Each of its works has its own essence, each of its 
appearances the most singular characterization, yet it makes out of everything a unity. 
[...] Even the most unnatural thing is Nature […] He who does not see it everywhere 
does not see it correctly anywhere […] We obey its laws even when we go against 
them; we work with it even when we want to work against it.42   
    
																																																								
41 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Cantelman’s Spring-Mate’, The Little Review 4.6 (1917), pp.8-14 
<http://library.brown.edu/pdfs/1297800529375003.pdf> [accessed 5 June 2015], p.14; Shakespeare, 
Timon of Athens, p.224. 
42 This is an exert from Alan N. Shapiro’s translation of Johann Wolfgang von Geothe’s ‘Die Natur: 
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fragment-by-johann-wolfgang-goethe/> [accessed 7 April 2014]. I have chosen this translation for the use 
which Shapiro makes of the word ‘vortex’ in translating the German word ‘kreislauf’ (an act of 
encircling), where other translators use ‘circle’ or ‘whirl’, as in Charles Sherrington’s Goethe On Nature 
and On Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949), p.37. It is a fortuitous use of 
terminology in the present context.  
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The delight with which Goethe communicates the paradoxical and elusive workings of 
metaphysical Nature provides an effective coda with which to understand Lewis’s 
developing pattern of thinking in this period. Certainly, Lewis remained acutely aware 
that humankind’s apparent mastery over creation may turn out to be a pyrrhic victory 
after all. Despite the fact that the modern world had manifested ‘wilder intricacies than 
those of Nature’ Lewis registered this not as a resounding victory for humankind, but 
rather as an aesthetically prodigious sleight of hand on the part of ‘Anglo-Saxon 
genius’.43 He remained dubious about the scale of humankind’s triumph: the 
surrounding arc of Nature had been hidden from view, but not erased entirely. The 
pessimistic strain which breaks through his works of this period suggests that Lewis 
believed, with Goethe, that Nature would come ‘without being asked and without 
warning’, to ‘draw us into the vortex of its dance and sweep us away’; the apparently 
impregnable structures of modern civilization vanishing in an instant. 
 The key point to observe at this point in our examination is that, in the apparent 
war of independence which was supposed to be raging between humankind and Nature 
Lewis evaded partisan allegiance. It is difficult to over-emphasize the role which the 
symbol of the vortex played in Lewis’s articulation of this idea: as both image and 
concept the vortex provided Lewis with a unique symbolic vehicle for his dualistic 
pattern of thinking. But it is also true to say that the image of the vortex itself — 
conceived as a whirlpool of energy converging on a central point — actually 
conditioned the outcome this pattern. The process of symbolic classification which was 
evolving in Lewis’s paintings and writings between 1912 and 1914 is as receptive of the 
language of symbols as it is productive, the vortex effectively providing him with an 
interpretive model with which to explore the outcome of the various dualistic tensions 
which were preoccupying him at this time.  
 But as much as Lewis applied the literary to the visual, investing philosophical 
ideas in his paintings, he applied his compositional aesthetic to language itself in both 
its visual aspect and its conceptual and referential meaning. Observance of the 
symbiotic relation existing between the paintings and writings of Lewis’s Vorticist 
creations has so far led us to observe how Lewis invested literary and philosophical 
concepts in the formal, symbolic arrangements of his paintings. We have seen clearly 
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the sense in which the visual arts are a language for Lewis. Now we turn our attention to 
the sense in which language may itself be submitted to the logic of visual composition.  
 
(iii) The Context of BLAST: The Philosophical Rationale for a Mobile 
Language and the ‘Image’ in Modernist Poetry 
 
The composition and printing of BLAST is an event, which, like Lewis’s own abstract 
technique in painting, cannot be properly understood without taking into account the 
wider context in which it emerged. The creative potential associated with language in 
the minds of writers, printers and philosophers at this time is important to clarify. In the 
first instance, the visual aspect of the written word was already a well-established field 
of creative experimentation among printers and typesetters, originating in what Jerome 
McGann has described as ‘the late nineteenth-century’s Renaissance of Printing’.44 
Competitive printing presses in all major European cities at this time were attuned to the 
increasing emphasis which writers, readers and, crucially, advances in technology 
placed on the formal qualities of a text.45 The late nineteenth-century renaissance in 
printing constitutes a ‘threshold event’, as McGann describes it, when text and word 
cease to be conceived as secure and fixed carriers of meaning, when the formal, visual 
aspect of the writing comes to be treated as alive with signifying possibilities.46 
McGann in this way affirms Foucault’s notion of an epistemic break, arguing ‘that 
literature crossed a threshold when it began to be read not as a set of works but as a 
scene of writing’.47  
 This idea guides us towards a more philosophical aspect of the creative 
engagement with printing which was occurring in the early twentieth century. The 
‘problem of poetry’s relation to its material encoding’ grows out of a deeper problem 
which was then widely perceived to exist within language itself.48 In ‘On Truth and 
																																																								
44 Jerome McGann, Black Riders: The Visible Language of Modernism (Princeton University Press, 
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Bodley Head books’ (p.12). 
45 Ibid., p.12. 
46 Ibid., p.40. 
47 Ibid., p.40. 
48 Ibid., p.45. 
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Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense’ (1873) Nietzsche had expressed suspicion of the idea 
that an objectively verifiable and truth-apt ‘natural’ language was attainable, arguing 
instead that the categorical terms which ‘the investigator’ treats scientifically as ‘pure 
objects’ are really ‘metaphors’: ‘[h]e thus forgets that the original intuitive metaphors 
[of the language he has inherited for use] are indeed metaphors and takes them for 
things themselves’.49 In this way Nietzsche highlighted the arbitrary nature of linguistic 
references and sketched out an understanding of language as a fluid pattern of 
metaphors rather than a fixed system of facts. This conception of language as an 
equivocal realm of human experience, half way ‘between observation and wish-
fulfilling dream’, opened the door not only to Saussure’s ‘movement from a substantive 
way of thinking to a relational one’ but to a radical new conception of the evolutionary 
significance and creative potential of language in the philosophy of Bergson.50 
In Creative Evolution Bergson argued that the evolutionary function of language 
was to facilitate ‘community of action’, but he distinguished between the static and the 
dynamic potential of such organization.51 The language of insect societies, for which 
there is undoubtedly community of action, he imagines to be ‘based on instinct, and 
consequently […] more or less dependent on the forms of the organs’, whereas human 
language is not determined or fixed by biological or material limits:52 
 
In human society, on the contrary, fabrication and action are of variable form, and, 
moreover, each individual must learn his part, because he is not preordained to it by his 
structure. So a language is required which makes it possible to be always passing from 
what is known to what is yet to be known. There must be a language whose signs — 
which cannot be infinite in number — are extensible to an infinity of things […] what 
characterizes the signs of human language is not so much their generality as their 
mobility. The instinctive sign is adherent, the intelligent sign is mobile.53 
 
For Bergson, as this passage clarifies, language is an evolutionary tool which may lock 
a species further into its fixed biological niche of existence, but which may also, under 
certain circumstances, become a vehicle for a community’s renewal and a species’ 
																																																								
49 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense’, in Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric 
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Press, 1989), pp.245-258 (p.253). 
50 Jameson, The Prison-House of Language, p.13 
51 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p.157.	
52 Ibid., p.157. 
53 Ibid., p.158. 
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transcendence of all previous limits placed upon it by nature. The nature of language is 
determined by the extent to which its system of signs are closed or open, and the extent 
to which it reflects the community’s orientation to the business of living.  
What sets humankind apart from the animal world in Bergson’s view is an 
aspirational impulse to break continually through evolutionary categories so that new 
heights may be reached. While insect and animal languages need only reflect a 
relatively simple range of instinctive operations in the service of mere preservation, 
human language may facilitate a continual passage from ‘what is known to what is yet 
to be known’.54 He writes: 
 
 The collision of descending matter and ascending spirit is one short step away: 
[…] in the animal, invention is never anything but a variation on the theme of routine. 
Shut up in the habits of the species, it succeeds, no doubt, in enlarging them by its 
individual initiative; but it escapes automatism only for an instant […] The gates of its 
prison close as soon as they are opened […] With man, consciousness breaks the chain. 
In man, and in man alone, it sets itself free. The whole history of life until man has been 
that of the effort of consciousness to raise matter, and of the more or less complete 
overwhelming of consciousness by the matter which has fallen back on it. The 
enterprise was paradoxical […] It was to create with matter, which is necessity itself, an 
instrument of freedom, to make a machine which should triumph over mechanism, and 
to use the determinism of nature to pass through the meshes of the net which this very 
determinism had spread.55 
 
As this passage clarifies, language took on a double aspect and paradoxical status in 
Bergson’s philosophical appraisal, as a medium of both material restraint and 
emancipation. To use T. S. Eliot’s terminology in The Waste Land it is both the ‘prison’ 
and the ‘key’, analogous to a cell or cage which a prisoner may push in certain ways to 
achieve mobility, though which can never be entirely escaped.56 Nevertheless, the 
transcendental potential which Bergson attached to language — the idea that the word 
can be made ‘transferable and free’ — inspired a generation of poets already steeped in 
the Symbolist philosophy of art and freshly equipped with new typographical 
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56 I have adopted this terminology from the line: ‘Thinking of the key, each confirms a prison’ (Eliot, 
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possibilities in printing.57 As Henri Brémond commented in La Poésie Pure (1926), the 
philosophy of Bergson had helped a generation ‘to identify pure poetry — (la poésie 
pure) — that poetry which goes further than the word which expresses it’.58  
In his Calligrammes (1913-16) Guillaume Apollinaire made perhaps the most 
explicit attempt to create a kind of poetry which goes further than words (see Fig. 22). 
In these works, Apollinaire sought to loosen linguistic signs from their conventional 
structural grammar and thus make poetic language more mobile and suggestive. By 
assembling the typography of the poem into a visualization of its subject matter 
Apollinaire intended to create a kind of poetry which married form with content and 
thus depended as much on its visual aspect for meaning as it did the linguistic units of 
which it was composed. In this sense Apollinaire harks back to the formal and technical 
poetic innovations of Stéphane Mallarmé, whose ‘wide-spaced typographical 
distribution of the words’ in the poem ‘Un Coup de Dés Jamais N'Abolira Le Hasard’ 
were designed ‘to secure “une vision simultanée de la page”’, and thereby to challenge 
the reader to engage with ‘the poem on different spatial and conceptual levels’.59  
 ‘Eyes on the Half-Shell’ (Fig. 23), written by Apollinaire’s American disciple 
Robert Carlton Brown and published by Marcel Duchamp’s journal The Blind Man in 
1917, offers a further glimpse into the way the image was being used in modernist 
poetry around this time. In this example of Brown’s ‘optical poetry’ the eyeballs which 
punctuate the text function as visual signposts which guide the reader towards opposed 
orientations within the text, entangling the ego or ‘I’ in (or perhaps disentangling it 
from) a vertical relation with God. The sketched eyeballs are not decorative elements; 
they are to be read as linguistic signs on the same level as the words of the poem. In 
later life Brown described this early experiment as a break-through moment: 
 
I have since taken this for a symbol of what I have been trying to do in writing, off and 
on for fifteen years…I like to look at it, merely sit and look at it, take it all in without 
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moving an eye. It gives me more than rhymed poetry. It rhymes in my eyes. Here are 
Black Riders for me at last galloping across a blank page.60 
 
Nietszche’s idea of ‘truth’ as ‘a mobile army of metaphors’ looms large in Brown’s 
explanation here.61 Words ‘gallop’ free of fixed significations, impressing an array of 
‘relational’ meanings on the mind of the reader without ever conquering entirely the 
indeterminate and equivocal region symbolized by the blank page.  
The key insight which Brown derived from Apollinaire’s work on the 
Calligrammes was that the heightened communicability of the visual aspect of a poem 
‘does not at all require figural decorative ornaments’, but rather the ‘physical medium 
of any kind of textuality […] can be manipulated to the same effect’, as McGann 
comments.62 This is a subtle point, but one which is important to consider in relation to 
Lewis’s work across two arts, for at the heart of the avant-garde experiment with visual 
language as it was conceived by both Apollinaire and Brown was a determination to 
move beyond the ekphrastic relation of two artistic mediums towards a new hybrid art, 
the essence of which would be a synthesis of the literary and the visual. 
Imagism is arguably the most sophisticated attempt which modernist poetry 
made to attain a purer expressive language by means of a visual aesthetic programme. 
‘Les Imagistes’ — the French form being used in early announcements of the group ‘to 
underline a comparison with contemporary French post-symbolist movements, such as 
unanimisme and impulsionnisme’, as Rebecca Beasley clarifies — appear to have 
formed around the spring of 1912 following T. E. Hulme’s attendance at a philosophical 
conference in Bologna, at which he heard Bergson lecture on the relevance of ‘the 
image’ to modern ontology.63 This aspect of Bergson’s philosophy is given its most 
comprehensive discussion in Matter and Memory (1896), in which the image is treated 
in a similar way as the vortex, as a synthesizing device, which unites the percipient with 
the object of perception. In the image Bergson claimed to identify the ‘common 
frontier’ between realism and idealism, which he described in terms of ‘an extended 
continuum’ that is at one and the same time a ‘virtual action of things upon our body 
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and of our body upon [the] things [of] our perception’.64 It should be noted that the 
synthesizing manoeuvre which the image facilitated in Bergson’s philosophy is 
indicative of a wider philosophical trend in the modernist period to resolve dualistic 
tensions by blending opposed concepts or indicating their point of convergence, so that 
the traditional philosophical dualisms of spirit/matter, mind/body, subject/object, 
percipient/object of perception, could be overcome.65  
Bergson’s influence is readily observed in Imagist theory. His synthesized 
treatment of the ‘real’ and the ‘ideal’ became the first principle for Imagist poetry, as 
articulated by F. S. Flint: ‘1. Direct treatment of the “thing,” whether subjective or 
objective’.66 In ‘A Few Don’ts By An Imagiste’ Pound further described the key 
concept of the movement in decidedly Bergsonian terms: ‘[a]n “Image” is that which 
presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time’.67 The precise way 
in which this idea was supposed to be invoked in poetry can be clarified with reference 
to Pound’s poem ‘In a Station of the Metro’ (1913), which can be seen in its original 
typography in Fig. 15.68	The success of the poem, as Rebecca Beasley suggests, 
depends ‘on a central metaphor: […] faces seen as petals’.69 She makes the point that 
the effect of the poem ‘is not cumulative, but sudden’, occurring ‘outside the words 
themselves’, in the fusion of the poem’s two central images which occurs in the reader’s 
mind.70 	
To clarify the way the poem functions it is important to note the sense in which 
these two images originate in different ontological quarters of the poetic psyche, the 
faces entering the percipient’s consciousness from the external world, while the petals 
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emanate from the mind as it searches for some recognizable pattern in the scene with 
which it is presented. In a certain sense then, the two images move at variance to one 
another until, that is, they cross paths to become united in one ‘intellectual and 
emotional complex’, or ‘continuum’ as Bergson would have put it. In this way Pound’s 
poem is an eloquent expression of Bergson’s idea, which uses the image as the common 
frontier of the percipient and the object of perception, the point at which a dynamic, 
creative subject organizes the impingements of the real world into meaningful patterns. 	
By the time he began editing the papers of the American philosopher Ernest 
Fenollosa in December 1913 Pound had one foot in the Imagist movement and the other 
tentatively planted in the group of artists who would become the Vorticists.71 At this 
point Pound’s interest in the image shifted from Bergson’s theory towards the 
logographic system of Chinese and its visual vocabulary of pictograms, which 
Fenollosa had advocated as an effective medium for pure poetry. In 1919 Pound 
published Fenollosa’s notes on ‘The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for 
Poetry’, in which the rationale for a purer imagistic dialect for expression clearly 
emerges: 
 
In reading Chinese we do not seem to be juggling mental counters, but to be watching 
things work out their own fate […] these ideographic roots carry in them a verbal idea 
of action […] examination shows that a large number of the primitive Chinese 
characters, even the so-called radicals, are shorthand pictures of actions and 
processes.72 
 
As this important passage helps to indicate, part of the fascination with a mobile and 
active language in Pound’s thought was associated with a desire to reunite the word and 
the thing in the world which the word denotes, and thus to reactivate the force of a 
mythic notion that the name was identical with the thing it named.73 The image in this 
sense fuses the object’s appearance with its essence and thus allows the poetic psyche 
closer access to a primordial unity.  
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When Pound turned away from Imagism ‘toward the brighter sun’ of Vorticism 
in 1914 he thus brought with him a philosophical conception of language which would 
certainly have challenged the stanchly dualistic Lewis.74 Nevertheless, despite Lewis’s 
distrust of the quest for unity which Pound had picked up from Bergson, some form of 
mutual exchange between the two clearly occurred, which had a lasting impact on the 
way literary modernism would come to be defined. In the first instance, Pound was 
confronted with a pressure to establish an artistic programme for the literary activities of 
what Lewis later described as ‘purely a painters’ affair’.75  ‘The critical terminology 
Pound developed during this time’, as Rebecca Beasley comments:  
 
was immensely influential in placing a technical vocabulary deeply indebted to early 
twentieth-century art criticism at the heart of twentieth-century literary criticism. 
Without Pound’s translation of terms between artistic fields, the most familiar 
characterisations of modernism, as, for example, ‘a new era […] in which art turns from 
realism and humanistic representation towards style, technique, and spatial form’, 
would have been literally unthinkable.76 
 
An example of Pound’s translation of terms can be found in his essay ‘Vorticism’ of 
September 1914. ‘The image is the poet’s pigment’, he wrote, ‘with that in mind you 
can go ahead and apply Kandinsky, you can transpose his chapter on the language of 
form and colour and apply it to the writing of verse’.77 Pound’s most obvious attempt to 
achieve this is his poem ‘Dogmatic Statement on the Game and Play of Chess’, 
published in BLAST 2.78 In a letter to Harriet Monroe he wrote that ‘The pictures 
proposed in the verse are pure vorticism’.79 
Lewis, for his part, gained from his collaboration with Pound a crucial precedent 
for his own desire to attain some visual force in writing. The writing style which he 
adopted in Vorticism bears certain of the hallmark poetic innovations of Imagism. 
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Indeed, the principle underpinning Lewis’s ‘jagged prose’ — the intention being ‘to 
eliminate anything less essential than a noun or a verb’, as Lewis commented in a letter 
to Hugh Kenner in 1953 — is obviously borrowed from the Imagist code: ‘[t]o use 
absolutely no word that did not contribute to the presentation’ (Flint) and to ‘[u]se no 
superfluous word, no adjective, which does not reveal something’ (Pound).80 But in 
other respects we may discern that Lewis’s use of language in BLAST is a clear theoretic 
departure from Imagism. 
 
(iv)  ‘White and Black are two elements’: The Typography of BLAST and 
the Visual Language of Vorticism 
 
While Pound had inherited from Fenollosa’s theory of poetry ‘the basis for a 
metaphysic’ of ‘things in motion, motion in things’, Lewis preferred an aesthetic of 
stillness expressed in solid forms.81 This can be viewed in the typography and layout of 
the text in BLAST, which is programmed to evoke a range of thoughts and associations 
in the mind of a reader well versed in the wider scene of avant-garde literary 
experiments.82 But Lewis deployed a visual layout of text far removed from the fluidity 
of Symbolist typography and the modernist experiments of Apollinaire, Brown and 
Pound. The dense lettering of ‘Grotesque 9’ occupies the page in a way quite unlike 
other fonts that were popular at this time.83 The text in the BLAST/BLESS sections and 
the Manifesto especially explode on the page in short volleys of discrete aphoristic units 
as if each expression of a thought in language were an immense strain requiring force 
and volume (conveyed by the frequent capitalization of words) to overcome the 
resistant silence of the white page. The units of text have the solidity of engravings on a 
stone tablet, reflecting the characteristic ‘qualities of sculpture’ of Vorticist design.84  
Lewis’s technique of solidity can also be found in the prose style which he 
developed in Enemy of the Stars, which, as Dasenbrock comments, is counterposed to 
Pound’s celebration of the moving image, being essentially a style which ‘cannot move 
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at all’.85 With sentences built out of ‘a series of ambiguously connected phrases’ Lewis 
presents a language which ‘is static and immobile’.86 Enemy demonstrates particularly 
Lewis’s scorn for Pound’s advice to ‘[g]o in fear of abstractions’.87 As he comments in 
Rude Assignment, his Vorticist play was precisely an attempt to transform ‘words and 
syntax […] into abstract terms’ along similar lines to his paintings of this time, and 
thereby to show his literary contemporaries — whom he ‘looked upon as too bookish 
and not keeping pace with the visual revolution’ — the way.88 In Enemy, as Edwards 
writes,   
 
Lewis’s sentences, or assemblages of non-finite phrases, are reluctant to transmit the 
messages they are charged with, and the experience of reading the text is a frustrating 
accumulation of blocks of resistant ideas and imagery, all finally discharged in 
unsatisfying violence as the play reaches its climax of murder and suicide.89  
 
Certainly the complexity of the piece cannot link it in any way to the guiding principles 
of Imagism, and the care which Imagist poets had for clarity. We ought to spare a 
thought for the ‘puzzled and bewildered typist’ with whom Lewis and Jessica Dismorr 
spent mornings during the spring of 1914 at the Rebel Art Centre ‘trying to translate 
Blast’.90  
 For Dasenbrock, Lewis adopts the ‘same attributes’ of ‘deadness and 
immobility’ in Enemy that he criticized in Cubist painting.91 Dasenbrock goes as far as 
to suggest that Lewis ‘deliberately botched’ the narrative, his sole interest in writing 
Enemy being to ‘gesture’ towards the possibility of abstraction in prose.92 It certainly 
appears to have been a deliberate attempt ‘to identify the feature of writing that was 
equivalent to representation in painting’ and eliminate it, making the text inevitably 
immobile and disjointed.93 But there is a deeper strategy behind this ‘botched’ attempt 
at literary abstraction which ought to be acknowledged. The lack of mobility in Lewis’s 
use of language is clearly designed to reflect an alternative to Bergson’s theory, being 
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more suggestive of the restrictive mechanism in which human beings are tangled than 
the possibility of expressive emancipation.  
But more specifically Lewis’s discordant text renounces Pound’s Imagistic 
ideals, programmatically mixing ‘abstraction[s] with the concrete’, as in the description 
of Arghol as he ‘LIES LIKE HUMAN STRATA OF INFERNAL BIOLOGIES’ and 
then ‘SITS LIKE A GOD BUILT BY AN ARCHITECTURAL STREAM, 
FECUNDED BY MAD BLASTS [of] SUNLIGHT’.94 In the language of Enemy Lewis 
opposes Pound’s idea that ‘the natural object is always the adequate symbol’, 
communicating instead the sense in which the symbol is ‘an expression of man’s urge to 
speculate in metaphysical terms’ which points ‘past the physical world to “something 
that moves beyond the senses”’.95 Lewis takes care to wrench his symbols apart from 
nature, offering an arbitrary and artificial use of language with which to oppose the 
naturalism implied in Pound’s Imagist principles. As Fredric Jameson writes: ‘the 
doctrine of the arbitrariness of the sign eliminates the myth of a natural language’.96  
The idea that Lewis was adhering to a doctrine of arbitrariness in his use of 
language in BLAST is highly revealing. While this is clearly an active element in his 
expressive prose style in Enemy it can also, once again, be observed in the 
typographical design of BLAST. Jodie Greenwood has shown how the ‘lack of 
conventional syntax and explanatory diction’ coupled with the overall ‘sensationalism’ 
of the language ‘has parallels with the language of advertising, which also relies on 
provoking a powerful and sometimes ambiguous response with an economy of 
words’.97 She makes the important point that ‘the advertisers’ use of typography was 
relatively arbitrary, working primarily to attract the eye and to engage the emotions’ and 
contrasted sharply with the experimental ‘employment of typography’ of Lewis’s 
contemporaries which ‘was very much tied up with content; italics and bold type 
[being] used in the suggestion of meaning’.98 Thus Lewis’s adoption of the ‘arbitrary’ 
typographical designs deployed in advertising perhaps becomes explicable as an attempt 
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to evade the kind of fusion of form and content which was present in many modernist 
experiments in poetry. 
It may, in light of this, appear ironic that by attaining an aesthetic of solidity and 
adhering closely to a doctrine of arbitrariness in both the formal layout of the text and 
his prose style, Lewis does marry form with content to a compelling degree. But we 
should note that this occurs in a way which stands fundamentally opposed to the 
tendency towards naturalism which he perceived among his contemporaries: far from 
wishing his language to connect with any natural image and thus to lure the reader 
towards the ‘common frontier’ which it shares with the external world, Lewis used both 
form and content — the outside and the inside of a text — to reinstate a separation 
between language and nature, subject and object. ‘White and Black are two elements’ 
he wrote in ‘Notes on Some German Woodcuts’, giving voice to the sense in which 
language and culture (represented by the black ink of the printed text or image) is a 
human imposition on the blank, white void of nature.99  
In BLAST the stark, mechanical units of black text as much as the complex and 
artificial symbolism of Enemy serve ultimately to wrench language apart from nature, 
placing it firmly back in the domain of the creative human subject, who thereby exerts 
the power to manipulate linguistic forms and meanings. While Apollinaire, Brown and 
Pound had offered their poetry as a sort of devotion to the natural image, Lewis refused 
to give any hand outs to nature. As he explained in ‘Prevalent Design’: ‘Work done 
“from Nature,” and work done “out of your head”: those are the extreme rough figures 
of this conflict’.100 In his textual experiments as well as his paintings during the 
Vorticist period Lewis leaves us in no doubt that he worshipped at the ‘altar’ of ‘the 
‘Monster of Design’, while his contemporaries crowded towards the cult of ‘Monster 
Nature’.101 
His quest for a more abstract and arbitrary kind of language in which to 
communicate ultimately reflects Lewis’s conception of the artist as a visionary creative 
force. His textual experiments in BLAST place emphasis on the artist’s dynamic ‘power 
to create signs’ above the more passive kind of ‘specialized skill or endowment which is 
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the power to speak’ within a natural language.102 Lewis’s distinction between the ‘man 
of his word’ and the ‘man of words’ in ‘Physics of the Not-Self’ demonstrates a certain 
degree of reflection on this idea:  
 
The former man is the man you respect — whose ‘word,’ you know, is worthy of 
credence, and probably ‘as good as his bond.’ He is the ‘man of his word.’ His word is 
his own word. The other man’s ‘word’ might be anybody’s! 
The latter man, you would say, is a ‘man of words.’ But the former securely possesses, 
as a lightly-held property, the tame word, which obediently represents the man and his 
interests. The latter (the ‘man of words’) is a slave, the former (the ‘man of his word’) is 
a free-man. The latter is afraid of a ‘word’: the former is not afraid of any ‘word.’ One 
would sacrifice himself to a mere ‘word,’ the other would see any ‘word’ hanged first. 
The latter is the man you will instinctively trust.103 
 
The conception of language which Lewis presents here bears a striking affinity with 
Bergson’s description of language as a ‘paradoxical enterprise’ in Creative Evolution: 
‘an instrument of freedom’ which may be used to ‘triumph over mechanism’, yet one 
which is itself a ‘machine’, the overall procedure being ‘to use the determinism of 
nature to pass through the meshes of the net which this very determinism had spread’.104 
The passage communicates the idea that each instance in which language is used is a 
battle for control between the ‘man’ and the ‘word’. The implied conclusion to which 
this passage leads us is in tune with Bergson: freedom is attainable by means of a kind 
linguistic mastery through which the self imposes its intention on language, displaying 
the creative power to create signs which convey the desired meaning. The man of his 
word is the master of language, the man of words a mere slave.  
Yet we must not overlook the heavy irony with which this passage is laden. The 
man of his word may appear at once ‘the truthfuller of the two’ in a court of law, giving 
‘frankly and freely’ his answer ‘without hesitation’, but this is because he is enslaved to 
an over-simplistic and inept relationship with language, believing it to be a stable and 
coherent system of signs.105 He is — in his confident assumption that there exists an 
essential connection between the linguistic sign and the ‘real thing’ to which it refers — 
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a naïve adherent to linguistic naturalism. His mistake, as Nietzsche tells us, is ‘to hold 
man up as the measure of all things’.106 The man of words, on the other hand, reflects 
the ‘slippery, metaphorical characterization of language’ in Nietzsche’s philosophy.107 
He is far more cautious in his conduct with words, knowing only too well the caprice of 
a language formed out of ‘metaphors’ which have been mistaken ‘for things 
themselves’.108  
Thus the man of his word is truly a fool, for he believes himself to be free; the 
man of words is wise, on the other hand, for he knows only too well the danger of 
enslavement to language and must start all his activities in acceptance of this fact. With 
reference to the epigraph which I have used for this thesis, the distinction may be put 
another way: one type of human being lives in the knowledge ‘[t]hat we are eternal 
miners, lashed in the clumsy process of learning by the retribution that awaits our 
mistakes’ while another is found perpetually ‘dreaming, steeped in transcendental 
values that transform the mechanical basis of our life into a fairyland’.109 For Lewis — 
who commented elsewhere that ‘we are surface-creatures only and […] committed to a 
plurality of being’ — the creative freedom of the human subject is found within the 
mechanism of language, not, as Bergson and his modernist disciples would suggest, in 
the transcendence of this mechanism.110  
Nevertheless, the influence of Bergson on Lewis’s conception of language in 
BLAST is important to observe. Certainly Lewis appears to have focused more heavily 
on the Bergsonian paradox of language than his contemporaries. In the first instance 
Lewis appears to dramatize the Bergsonian dualism, with the expressive surge of vital 
ideas encountering the resistance of the printed word in which meaning is habitually 
caged. The typography and page-layout of BLAST is designed to represent the battle 
which rages between ‘man’ and ‘words’ for control over meaning, the solid word-units 
representing the downward motion of matter which at every stage of its descent 
constrains the intended meaning of the subject’s expression. In BLAST we encounter no 
‘Black Riders galloping across the page’, but rather something more akin to a 
detachment of jet-black tanks approaching across an arctic waste. 
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As Paul Edwards has shown, Lewis made use of Bergson’s theory of language 
in ‘The Death of the Ankou’ to highlight a distinction between the ‘one-dimensional 
world of Ludo […] and the multi-dimensional world of Ker-Orr’.111 Ker-Orr thus 
represents an important aspect of Bergson’s theory of a mobile language, namely ‘the 
ability of the totally emancipated person to escape from the determinism of customary 
sign-systems, to live what Ker-Orr calls a “joke-life”’, setting himself up — in 
Edwards’ view — as a ‘trickster’ who manipulates the sign-systems to which others are 
adherent.112 Thus, though he may have disagreed strongly with the transcendent 
evolutionary possibilities which Bergson attached to a language of mobile signs, Lewis 
certainly entertained the idea that a certain amount of power could be gained by those 
who are emancipated from a naturalistic, deterministic conception of sign-systems.  
The figure of the trickster is highly relevant to Lewis’s activities in BLAST. In 
Enemy — a work which extends the dialogue which we have observed between Lewis’s 
paintings and writings — this sinister aspect to linguistic control which is found in the 
relationship between Ludo and Ker-Orr once again comes into focus, as the play-text 
forms a horizon in which human life goes on, but a horizon which actively surrounds 
and imprisons its ‘condemned protagonist’.113 Language is here made to function as a 
deterministic net in which the speaker is trapped. The paradoxical attributes of language 
which Lewis discussed in ‘Physics of the Not-Self’ — an essay which he described as a 
‘metaphysical commentary’ on his 1914 play — come out in a startling detail in Enemy 
of the Stars in the form of a dynamic conflict.114 The empowered man of words, 
loosening himself from the deterministic mechanism of language with the knowledge 
that it is a mechanism, comes to hold a magical, ‘authorial’ power over language. He is 
shown to determine the reality of others, forcing the naïve man of his word to submit to 
the narrative mechanism within which he exists, shutting his victim into ‘the prison-
house of language’, to borrow a phrase from Jameson’s reading of Nietzsche’s aphorism 
522 in The Will to Power.115 Lewis’s formal use of language in BLAST is thus tied to the 
central theme of his 1914 play, as we shall observe in more detail in the next chapter.116 
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In this chapter we have observed how the move into abstraction was for Lewis a process 
guided at every stage by the symbolic classifications which his creative experiments 
generated, the earlier consolidation of certain ‘pattern-units’ gradually being invested 
into the larger scale pattern of thinking which runs through his mature Vorticist 
paintings and writings.117 My use of the term ‘symbolic classification’ here deserves 
some clarification, for it serves to clarify the central claim of the thesis: that myth plays 
an important role in Lewis’s Vorticist pattern of thinking. ‘Symbolic classification’ is a 
term coined by the British anthropologist Rodney Needham, which he derived from his 
reading of Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss’s Primitive Classification (1903).118 It 
originates in a distinction between ‘practical schemes of distinctions’ which pertain to 
the easily categorizable aspects of reality which are susceptible to human control (these 
Durkheim and Mauss termed ‘technological’) and the realm of classifications which 
serve to extend human knowledge into the ineffable aspects of reality (these are moral 
or religious in nature and termed ‘symbolic’ by Durkheim and Mauss).119 
 The application of this anthropological concept to the creative products of 
Lewis’s Vorticist period has a twofold function here. On the one hand, it provides a 
concrete demonstration of Lewis’s idea of the artist as a visionary go-between, with one 
foot in the natural and the other in supernatural realm. In Lewis’s case the traditional 
mythical and religious dualism of spirit and matter is used to map the uncharted 
metaphysical regions of the world far beyond the surface of human existence, yielding, 
in the end, a mythical narrative concerning the altered situation of humankind in the 
modern world. The first function of analysing his early works as pertaining to a process 
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of symbolic classification is thus to indicate how Lewis was engaged in mythopoeia in 
his Vorticist paintings and writings. 
 On the other hand, by using anthropological concepts to inform my method of 
analysis here I do not simply want to suggest that Lewis created a myth. I also wish to 
highlight the paradoxical sense in which this is a myth which itself grew out of 
anthropological sources: a myth formed out its own rational disclosure, in a certain 
sense. It is important to recognize the sense in which modernism and the emerging 
discipline of anthropology grew up together during the first two decades of the 
twentieth century to clarify this point. Anthropological texts were widely read among 
modernist artists and writers, providing them with a rich source of exotic narratives and 
themes derived from myth and ritual.120 ‘The mutually influential relations of literature 
and anthropology’ during this time, as Michael Bell has suggested, ‘provided ways of 
reading literature which suggested that its most profound level of significance was as a 
form of myth’.121 In Lewis’s early pattern of thinking we find one clear instance of the 
way in which modernism deployed anthropological sources in order to attain the themes 
and structures of myth in their own creative works.  
It is unclear how far Lewis’s research at this stage in his career took him into the 
emerging field of anthropology. Numerous anthropological texts published during or 
before Vorticism can be found in Lewis’s library and in the index of The Art of Being 
Ruled (1926).122 Bernard Lafourcade has suggested that at the time of writing ‘Les 
Saltimbanques’ (at some point between August 1908 and August 1909) Lewis ‘must 
have been acquainted in some way or other with the work of Durkheim and Frazer, and 
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possibly with that of Levy-Bruhl and Van Gennep, all part and parcel of the new 
Zeitgeist’.123 Victor Barac (2008) has extended this claim to suggest that Lewis’s oft-
quoted comment in Rude Assignment that ‘[w]hat I started to do in Brittany I have been 
developing ever since’ may be linked to the ethnographical strain of thinking which 
seems to have propelled his writings from first to last.124  
Certainly Lewis’s creative works in the five or so years leading up to Vorticism 
indicate the development of a complex and sophisticated process of dualistic symbolic 
classification which reflects the influence of anthropological research. But with Lewis 
this appropriation of mythic themes from anthropological texts did not occur 
unreflectively. One of the central concerns in his works at this time is to understand the 
ironic status which myth has in the modernist psyche. Few other modernists at this time 
acknowledged that the ‘myth’ which they had pinned all their hopes on, as a vehicle of 
liberation from the rational excesses of the modern world, possessed only the residue of 
its original force, after passing through the logical dissections of anthropology. We shall 
observe this in more detail in the following chapter.
																																																								
123 Lafourcade, Introduction to ‘Les Saltimbanques’, p.236. ‘Les Saltimbanques’ is set in the Bretton 
town of Quimperlé, where Lewis stayed with his mother in August 1908 (O’Keeffe, Some Sort of Genius, 
p.88). It was published a year later in the August issue of The English Review (1909), so must have been 
written at some point between these dates (Lafourcade in his introductory note to ‘Les Saltimbanques’, 
p.236).  
124 Barac, ‘The Anthropology of Wyndham Lewis’, pp.36-43. 
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Chapter 4  
Immoral Theatre:  




Enemy of the Stars emerged in 1914 as the earliest work of Expressionist drama in 
Britain and arguably the first to be written in the English language. Paul Edwards has 
suggested that ‘the closest equivalent […] is to be found in such proto-Expressionist 
works as [Oskar] Kokoschka’s 1907 Murder, Hope of Women’ and we ought not to 
discount the further possibility that Lewis wrote Enemy with some knowledge of 
August Strindberg’s ‘The Dream Play’ (1901), a work widely acknowledged as the first 
Expressionist drama.1 Most obviously the play’s theme developed as a riposte to 
Marinetti’s narrative poem of 1902 The Conquest of the Stars, and his bold declaration 
in ‘The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism’ that:  
 
An immense pride was buoying us up, because we felt ourselves alone at that hour, 
alone, awake, and on our feet, like proud beacons or forward sentries against an army of 
hostile stars glaring down at us from their celestial encampments.2 
 
In Enemy the same Gnostic-inspired conflict between the human soul (the ‘pneuma’) 
and the guardians of the material universe (the ‘Archons’, associated in Gnostic thought 
with the stars) is used to characterize the human condition in the modern world, with 
Marinetti’s optimism being reversed by a strain of pessimism about the human 
																																																								
1 Edwards, Painter and Writer, p.142. Strindberg’s play was published in Sweden in 1901, first 
performed in Stockholm in 1907 and published in English translation by Edwin Björkman in 1912, 
becoming available in London around the same time Lewis was decorating the nightclub of Strindberg’s 
second wife Frida, ‘The Cave of the Golden Calf’ just off Regent Street (Meyers, The Enemy, p.334). 
There is thus a strong possibility that Lewis became aware of Strindberg’s play around this time. 
Certainly by the time of writing BLAST Lewis had a comprehensive knowledge of Strindberg’s life and 
works, commenting particularly on ‘his hysterical and puissant autobiographies, life-long tragic coquetry 
with Magic, [and] extensive probing of female flesh and spirit’ (‘Futurism, Magic and Life’, BLAST, 
p.132). 
2 Marinetti, ‘The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism’, p.19. 
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condition which Lewis derived particularly from Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens, a 
work which lies at the heart of much of Lewis’s thinking during this period.3 
  As much as the style and central theme of Enemy grow out of historic and 
contemporary literary sources, however, the play clearly also grows more directly out of 
Lewis’s own earlier works. Certainly the text appears to have been used as a test bed for 
ideas put forward in his critical and philosophical prose. It is also highly expressive of 
the conceptual tensions which we have observed in Lewis’s paintings of this period. My 
central claim here is that, during the intense period of creativity which resulted in the 
publication of BLAST, Enemy is the key text, which functions rather as the central 
scripture to which Lewis’s paintings relate as mandalas or talismanic images; a text in 
which Lewis gathered all the symbols, themes and theoretic tensions which his works 
had gathered over the years and recast them for the first time into a comprehensive 
narrative. In this sense Enemy represents Lewis’s deepest engagement with myth during 
the Vorticist period, which elaborates a more complete vision of the human situation in 
the modern world than we have so far discovered in Lewis’s works. 
This chapter thus brings together a series of themes which have grown out of the 
earlier chapters and returns us to the mouth of the cave where we began the study. In 
Enemy we once again witness a ‘paradoxical encounter’ between two opposed 
worldviews.4 The text is built around the dualistic distinction between mythos and logos 
that Lewis inherited from Nietzsche; setting the transcendent mythical consciousness in 
conflict with its rational, modern counterpart; constructing and derailing myth in equal 
measure. In this chapter I aim to analyse this complex and revealing conflict in more 
detail than before, observing the sense in which Enemy qualifies both as Lewis’s 
deepest engagement with myth and as a key critical reflection upon the inability of 
modern art to attain its longed-for mythical home. I shall begin by observing the way in 
which Enemy joins up with the ‘pattern-units’ which were being developed in earlier 
works. Only then will we be in a position to characterize and treat the full mythic 




3 It is relevant to note that the English Vorticists and the Russian Futurists each presented a dramatic 
response to Marinetti’s Gnostic rebellion, with the pessimism of Enemy of the Stars (1914) finding a 
significant thematic mirror in Victory Over the Sun (1913), a play that extends Marinetti’s optimism 
about machine-age man’s possibilities of transcendence. These connections are laid out by Edwards in 
Painter and Writer, p.144. 
4 Lafourcade, in his brief introduction to ‘The Death of the Ankou’, p.106. 
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(i) Tracing the Thematic Elements of Enemy of the Stars in Lewis’s Earlier 
Works  
 
Our observation of the development of Lewis’s visual and literary works up to the 
publication of BLAST in 1914 has led us to a vantage point from which certain thematic 
elements of Enemy can immediately be understood. The text, we discover, is in constant 
dialogue with Lewis’s other works, allowing us to analyse the overall pattern of 
thinking which Lewis’s Vorticist works elaborate for the first time. Here I’d like to 
focus particularly on the way in which the text develops the existing narrative 
concerning the overlapping dualistic conflicts between subject and object, self and 
world, spirit and matter, which we have observed in earlier works. The way in which 
the scene is set is highly revealing of the text’s activities in this respect.  
The dramatic action of Enemy takes place where ‘[t]he Earth has burst, a granite 
flower, and disclosed the scene’.5 This line appears to refer directly to Figure Holding a 
Flower (1912; Fig. 8) and identifies the situation of the drama as the point at which the 
two opposed metaphysical elements of spirit and matter converge. It is the site of 
Bergson’s evolutionary ‘vortex’ in which ‘life […] will appear as a wave which rises, 
and which is opposed by the descending movement of matter’.6 The ‘STAGE 
ARRANGEMENTS’ also convey the sense in which this scene is cut out of the same 
primordial rock face as Ludo’s ramshackle home in the mouth of the cave.7 The 
‘CHARACTERS TAK[E] UP THEIR POSITION AT OPENING OF SHAFT 
LEADING DOWN INTO MIMES QUARTERS’, a site of colliding energies where ‘A 
GUST, SUCH AS IS MET IN THE CORRIDOORS OF THE TUBE’, makes the 
characters’ ‘CLOTHES SHIVER OR FLAP’.8 It is Lewis’s earliest literary application 
to the mouth of the cave as a metaphorical space within which to explore the two 
trajectories entailed in Bergson’s evolutionary hypothesis. 
The tension which this evokes between upward and downward pressures chimes 
with Lewis’s earlier visual works of around 1912 — The Starry Sky or Two Women 
(1912), Man and Woman (1912) and of course Figure Holding a Flower (1912) — 
																																																								
5 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.62. 
6 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p.269.  
7 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.60. 
8 Ibid., p.60. 
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which may assist the reader’s imagination of the scene.9 We have a concrete example 
then of Lewis’s claim in ‘Beginning’ that the ‘waste product of every painting’ — the 
‘discarded matter’ of what Lewis felt he ‘had to keep out of [his] consciousness while 
painting’ — ‘makes the most highly selective and ideal material for the pure writer’.10 
In imagining the scene of Enemy Lewis effectively translated and reinvested his earlier 
visualizations of the Bergsonian dualism into literary terms in order to further explore 
the human being’s susceptibility to slip from their advanced positions in the 
evolutionary scale and merge with inanimate scene which surrounds them, becoming at 
one with matter. 
From the arrangement of the scene we know that the characters will ultimately 
face one of two destinies: either swelling in self, or spirit, sufficiently to liberate 
themselves from the closed domain of matter, or slumping to become immersed in the 
bedrock from which they originally ‘emerged’.11 As in ‘The Ankou’, this is a matter 
ultimately to be decided by the characters’ ability to emancipate themselves from a 
deterministic sign-system and so to gain the power of self-determination. In the case of 
both Enemy and ‘The Ankou’, however, the destiny of the ‘CONDEMNED 
PROTAGONIST’ is already written in the fatalistic mythic narrative by which they are 
bound.12 The description of Arghol, in the first line of the play-text, as being ‘IN 
IMMENSE COLLAPSE OF CHRONIC PHILOSOPHY’ leaves us in little doubt that 
he possesses the kind of consciousness which will tend to constrain rather than liberate 
him from his unfortunate situation.13 His ‘instrument of thought, [is] too heavy’ to 
facilitate his bid for freedom.14  
It is thematically relevant then that the physical appearance of both Arghol and 
Ludo is described as being inanimate. Ker-Orr’s observation that ‘Ludo’s face […] was 
blind’, carrying ‘its own life with the outer world’ and ‘no longer serving to secrete 
thought any more than the foot’, finds close equivalence to the description of Arghol as 
being ‘CENTRAL AS STONE’ and lying ‘LIKE HUMAN STRATA OF INFERNAL 
																																																								
9 Wyndham Lewis, The Starry Sky or Two Women, 1912, pencil, pen and ink, gouache and collage on 
paper, 48 × 62.5 cm, Arts Council Collection, Southbank Centre; Man and Woman, 1912, chalk, pen and 
ink, wash and gouache on paper, 36 × 26 cm, Wyndham Lewis Memorial Trust, G. and V. Lane 
Collection. 
10 ‘Beginning’, p.266. 
11 At the start of the text we are informed that ‘CHARACTERS AND PROPERTIES BOTH EMERGE 
FROM GANGWAY INTO GROUND AT ONE SIDE’ (‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.59). 
12 Ibid., p.61. 
13 Ibid., p.59. 
14 Ibid., p.74. 
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BIOLOGIES’, ‘his hands a thick shell fitting back of head, his face grey vegetable 
cave’.15 These visual descriptions of the outside of these characters are designed to 
reflect their inner makeup. The logic of this is expressed by Ker-Orr in ‘The Ankou’, 
who speculates while examining the rugged facial features of Ludo whether ‘to be lost 
outside is much the same as to be hidden in the dark within’.16 In Enemy a similar idea 
is expressed in Arghol’s description of his ‘unpleasant’ destiny: 
 
I must live, like a tree, where I grow. An inch to left or right would be too much. In the 
town I felt unrighteous in escaping blows, home anger, destiny of here. Selfishness, 
flouting of destiny, to step so much as an inch out of the bull’s eye of your birth. (When 
it is obviously a bull’s eye!) 
A visionary tree, not migratory: visions from within.17 
 
As this passage conveys, the attribution of a solid, inanimate exterior correlates with the 
fixed, deterministic psychology of the character: believing himself to be fixed to a 
certain destiny, Arghol, like Ludo, pinions himself to a fixed biological niche in 
existence, so that the person becomes the existential equivalent of a ‘tree’.18  
 But there is another aspect to this passage which is important to observe. While 
he resolutely fixes himself to his life’s destiny Arghol identifies a subjective source of 
freedom in ‘visions from within’. As it is with Ludo, for Arghol the two attributes 
appear to be correlates of one another: losing one’s ability to engage creatively with the 
external world and thereby becoming ‘lost outside’ entails at the same time a fatal 
inward turn, the subject effectively becoming ‘hidden in the dark within’.19 Like Ludo 
																																																								
15 ‘The Death of the Ankou’, p.113; Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, pp.61, 65. 
16 ‘The Death of the Ankou’, p.113. 
17 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.68. 
18 This episode, we should note, is closely related to an idea expressed by Bergson in Creative Evolution: 
‘a tree never grows old, since the tips of its branches are always equally young, always equally capable of 
engendering new trees by budding. But in such an organism […] something ages, if only the leaves and 
the interior of the trunk’ (p.16). Lewis annotated the following comment in the margin next to this 
passage in his own copy of Creative Evolution during the 1920s: ‘The TREE | [drawing of 5 concentric 
circles] | interesting comparison | with life of a man. | If all his life grew & | grew, like a snowball, | dead 
inside, live only at the surface, till it | filled universe like | the swelling circular | expanding surface of 
tree’ (Paul Edwards’s transcription; personal communication. Harry Ransom Centre Book Collection at 
the University of Texas, Austin). The dialogue which this marginal note opens with Bergson’s idea is 
highly revealing of Lewis’s philosophical temperament, since he places emphasis on the ‘swelling’ 
deadness at the interior of the trunk above the perpetual youth of the buds. Although the note originates in 
the 1920s it illuminates the meaning of Arghol’s claim to be ‘a visionary tree’, since his adherence to 
destiny connotes a state of non-adaption which leaves him figuratively dead inside (‘Enemy of the Stars’, 
in BLAST, p.68). 
19 ‘The Death of the Ankou’, p.113. 
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he is blind, albeit in figurative sense; so enraptured by mythic visions of transcendence 
that he cannot any longer engage rationally with the external world.  
Both characters thus experience a personal collapse of the subject/object dualism 
in a way that calls to mind Lewis’s painting of 1912 The Vorticist (Fig. 10), for in this 
figure also the intensification of one element in this dualistic tension is shown to carry a 
corresponding intensification of the other; as he withdraws further into a hermetically 
sealed recess of subjectivity he falls victim to a materializing pressure which freezes 
him into a static and lifeless situation. Arghol, Ludo and the figure in The Vorticist all 
qualify as archetypal specimens of a tragically transformed (or perhaps it is more 
accurate to say deformed) humanity in Lewis’s pattern of thinking, poised at ‘the 
world’s brink’ and battered by ‘thought heavy as a meteorite’.20 In Enemy, however, we 
find a closer analysis of this traumatic tug-of-war between self and world than anywhere 
else in Lewis’s early works.  
Roughly split into the two sections of dialogue and dream, the narrative 
structure of Lewis’s play demonstrates this tug-of-war clearly. In the first part of the 
play in the ‘wheelwright’s yard’, self is depicted on an ascending trajectory.21 During 
this phase of the narrative Arghol occupies a relatively stable, worldly position in his 
dialogues with Hanp. The turning point of the narrative occurs at page 76, where, 
following his fight with Hanp, a different order takes over, as ‘a dream began valuing, 
with its tentative symbols, preceding events’.22 From this point on Arghol withdraws 
from the real-world stage of action into a ‘dream’ of his life in the city. Withdrawing 
into himself in this way, Arghol’s commanding grip over the direction of the narrative 
is loosened, the ascending trajectory of self is disrupted by a descending movement and 
he becomes effectively powerless in his own story. The textual shift which occurs here 
from dialogue to narration, from present to past, from real-world action and dialogue to 
dream, forms the most significant dramatic node in the play, making all other sectional 
distinctions somewhat irrelevant. 
Charlotte de Mille has recently suggested that Enemy emerges as Lewis’s 
engagement with the vitalist philosophy of Henri Bergson deepened ‘to encompass the 
psychological and societal affects of the condition of degradation’.23 For de Mille this is 
seen especially in ‘Arghol’s battle against the communal tendencies of his 
																																																								
20 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.70. 
21 Ibid., p.62. 
22 Ibid., p.76. 
23 de Mille, ‘“Blast … Bergson?”’, p.144. 
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consciousness’, represented by Hanp, and the sense in which ‘his attempt to define his 
own identity is simultaneously rendered futile by the constraints of his environment’.24 
The narrative shift which occurs at page 76 introduces us to the particular nature of 
these environmental constraints, for here in Arghol’s dream of ‘[h]is room in the city’ 
we learn the manner and equipment of the self’s imprisonment in the modern world.25 
The inward turn of the modern subject is essentially linked to its material submission to 
the processes of the modern machine-age world, a dreamlike delirium being part and 
parcel of the external cage of materialization in which the self is ultimately caught.  
Like one of the figures in The Crowd (Fig. 20), Arghol is caught within his own 
religious dream of freedom, an intoxicant which pacifies him as he is dehumanized — 
‘congealed and frozen into logic’ — by the social and technological controls of the 
modern city.26 In a sense the second half of the narrative can therefore be understood as 
an isolated and detailed treatment of one of the caged figures depicted in The Crowd, 
whose personal narrative of freedom and destiny (their ‘inferior religion’) is juxtaposed 
harshly with the external conditions of their life, according to which they are mere 
specimens in a sociological survey. Our introduction to Arghol’s dream room carries an 
exacting and controlling tone which is telling in this respect:  
 
A black jacket and shirt hung on nails across window: a gas jet turned low to keep the 
room warm, through the night, sallow chill illumination: dirty pillows, black and thin in 
middle, worn down by rough head, but congested at each end. […] His room in the city, 
nine feet by six, grave big enough for the six corpses that is each living man.27 
 
The contents of the room are listed here in a coldly rational tone reminiscent of a crime 
scene inventory. Yet at the same time, when we acknowledge the sense in which the 
narrative of Enemy follows the gruesome procedure of a sacrifice ritual (a feature which 
I shall explore in more detail later on in this chapter) this passage may also appear as 
having an incantatory tone which is designed to prepare the scene in all the necessary 
and seemingly inconsequential details for the ritual taking place.  
This duality within the language of the text — between mythic and modern 
modes — helps to clarify the thematic relation which the narrative of Enemy has with 
																																																								
24 Ibid., p.144. 
25 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.76. 
26 ‘Inferior Religions’ (1917), p.316. 
27 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.76. 
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The Crowd. In the latter part of the narrative we are entering the interior of one of those 
grim cells in the diagrammatic grid which represents the modern city, learning about the 
personal world (the ‘inferior religion’) of one of the ‘cyphers’ in Lewis’s ‘new human 
mathematic’ at the same time that we carry the detached perspective we had on the 
outside, perceiving just another room in the city.28 Crucially these two perspectives are 
not mutually exclusive. Rather they become significant in the narrative through their 
simultaneity, as opposite viewpoints which encounter each other in a constant process 
of juxtaposition.  
Just as the narrative as a whole turns upon a dramatic node which departs the 
real-world realm of action and dialogue for a dream, so the text throughout is animated 
by a see-saw tendency to slip between two narrative modes, appearing as a mythical 
incantation on the one hand, and as an expression of the controlling rationality of 
modernity on the other. This susceptibility which Enemy has to be read in these two 
opposed ways is crucial to my following analysis of the text. But before we explore this 
tension in detail, it is important to spend a little more time elaborating the myth which 
Enemy presents. Now that we have observed the way in which the narrative joins 
together the pattern-units which were being developed in earlier works, we are in a good 
position to explore the full mythic structure which Lewis’s narrative presents.  
 
(ii) The Mythic Structure of Enemy of the Stars 
 
Orientalism was very much in vogue in London during the decade or so before the war. 
Indeed Pound and Lewis had been first introduced in 1909 by Laurence Binyon because 
of their shared interest in the art and religion of the East.29 It is unsurprising then to find 
numerous symbolic elements derived from Eastern myth in Enemy. James Selby has 
convincingly shown that Lewis made as much use of the Hindu Sankhya dualism as he 
did of the Kantian subject/object distinction in the symbolic conflict between Arghol 
and Hanp. Arghol, he suggests, faces the existential dilemma which is represented in 
Hindu mythology by ‘perusha’, a masculine principle symbolizing the ‘archetypal 
																																																								
28 ‘Inferior Religions’ (1917), p.316 and p.315.  
29 Binyon was the keeper of prints and drawings at the British Museum who published three works on 
Oriental art between 1908-1911 – Painting in the far East (1908), Japanese Art (1909) and Flight of the 
Dragon (1911). The context of the introduction of Lewis and Pound is described by Timothy Materer in 
Pound/Lewis: The Letters of Ezra Pound and Wyndham Lewis (p.3).  
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intelligence’ of the percipient, who stands opposed to ‘prakriti’, a feminine ‘holistic 
principle’ symbolizing material life and nature.30  
Encountering prakriti, perusha may decide to ‘love her and lie by her’ and in 
doing so submit to the cycle of samsara, or he may choose to ‘leave her’ in order to 
‘realize his true distinctness from prakriti’ and thus to attain ‘final release’ or 
‘moksha’.31 The metaphor of seduction ties very closely with the warnings which Lewis 
issued in both issues of BLAST about any attempt of the subject to marry or otherwise 
abscond with object in an vitalist-inspired love affair.32 Arghol’s aspiration to escape, 
his attempt to ‘burst Death’s membrane through’ is, in light of Selby’s mythological 
excavations, therefore explicable as a bid for transcendence.33 Failure would mean 
continued enslavement to the material world in countless other lives. But significantly, 
it is not explicitly disclosed in the narrative what Arghol’s ‘banish[ment] from matter’ 
really amounts to: whether reabsorption into the cycle of life or the final release entailed 
in moksha.34  
The matter ultimately comes down to how we conceive the selfhood of which 
Arghol is deprived. Arghol’s paradoxical descriptions of self — as, on the one hand, the 
last remnant of ‘the ancient race’, a ‘sacred act of violence’, and on the other hand as ‘a 
loathsome deformity […] affliction got through indiscriminate rubbing against [one’s] 
fellows: Social excrescence’ — play upon an important ambiguity in the Western 
conception of selfhood which is clarified in Hindu and Buddhist philosophy.35 In 
Eastern philosophies a firm distinction is drawn between the worldly self or ego (the 
jiva) and the immortal, ‘true self’ (Atman). In Enemy both connotations are used 
interchangeably in Arghol’s discussion of self and so we are left with a lingering doubt 
as to which of these finally gets the upper hand; whether, for example, Arghol’s true 
self (Atman) is curtailed in its bid for transcendence, his worldly self (jiva) thereby 
being ploughed back into the realm of material existence, or whether his banishment 
																																																								
30 Selby, ‘Enemy of the Stars: An Inquiry into its Intellectual Sources’, p.33. 
31 Quoted from Svetasvatara Upanishad in Selby, ‘Enemy of the Stars: An Inquiry into its Intellectual 
Sources’, p.33. 
32 See Lewis’s use of the metaphor of Narcissus in ‘Futurism, Magic and Life’ in BLAST (p.134-135) and 
‘Art Vortex: Be Thyself’ in BLAST 2 (p.91).  
33 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.68. 
34 Ibid., p.84. In light of this, Scott W. Klein’s claim about Arghol’s ‘failure of transcendence’ would 
seem to oversimplify the matter (The Fictions of James Joyce and Wyndham Lewis: Monsters of Nature 
and design (Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 57-58). Lewis was almost certainly aiming for 
tension without resolution and so leaves it an open question what Arghol’s banishment from matter 
ultimately stands for. 
35 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, pp.66, 71. 
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from matter signifies the transcendence of the true self from the world and the bodily 
shell it occupied there. The only certainty we are left with is that Lewis leant upon 
Eastern religious sources in order to highlight a paradox within the Western concept of 
self, which served to intensify the tension in the denouement of his drama.  
 Alongside these important elements of Eastern myth there is another mythic 
tradition at work in the structure of Enemy’s narrative which is important to highlight. 
Paul Edwards has described Enemy as a ‘parable about Gnostic aestheticism’, drawing 
our attention to a theme in Lewis’s writings that has been well established.36 In 
‘“Monstrous Starlight”: Wyndham Lewis and Gnosticism’ (1996) Michael Nath has 
also demonstrated Lewis’s adherence to the Gnostic cosmological myth in writing the 
texts of The Human Age and suggests that the fundamental dualism which lay at the 
heart of Gnostic philosophy might be taken as a characteristic element in Lewis’s 
personal philosophy. It is not difficult to trace this Gnostic mythic structure back to 
Lewis’s Vorticist works, particularly Enemy. To identify the chief correspondences, we 
may note the strict dualism of two metaphysical principles and the division which is 
wrought in the self as a consequence of this; the stars personified as oppressive rulers 
(Archons) of the material world, implementing the law of Universal Fate 
(Heimarmene); and salvation conceptualized as transcendence of the present context 
and a return to the original purity of the spirit-world.  
Lewis’s choice of the name ‘Arghol’ would seem to further bear out the Gnostic 
connection. It is a linguistic sign unusually rich with beneficial connotations in this 
context. Hugh Kenner initiated the debate about the possible meaning of ‘Arghol’ by 
suggesting that Lewis’s protagonist was named after ‘the double star Algol (Alpha 
Persei)’, in the northern constellation of Perseus.37 For Kenner, the case for this 
derivation of the name was self-evident since it described: 
 
the very condition of [Arghol’s] existence —[to] waltz eternally about a common center 
of gravity with this unluminous companion, which eclipses his light with clockwork 




36 Edwards, Painter and Writer, p.164. 
37 Hugh Kenner, Wyndham Lewis (Connecticut: New Directions, 1954), p.23.  
38 Ibid., p.23. 
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Although it went unnoticed by Kenner, this characterization of Arghol as a double-sided 
astral being would also provide an important thematic link with Gnostic myth. Alan 
Munton has challenged this interpretation, however, asking: ‘why should the enemy of 
the stars be named after a star, or stars?’39 Munton’s challenge is blunted by the fact that 
the text itself provides clues that this is the case. Paul Edwards cites a section of the text 
which explicitly references Arghol’s dependence on the astral system which he opposes 
for his vitality: he is, after all, ‘FECUNDED BY MAD BLASTS OF SUNLIGHT’.40 
Alongside this must be counted Arghol’s own reference to the fact that the force he 
opposes is also the source of his personal vitality and rebellious agency:  
 
Energy has been fixed on me from nowhere — heavy and astonished: resigned. Or is it 
for remote sin! I will use it, anyway, as prisoner his bowl  
or sheet for escape: not as means of idle humiliation.41  
 
As this passage implies, the energy which Arghol conceives as a potential source of 
escape is tied up with the situation of his imprisonment. It is as if he is being handed the 
cell-key by his gaoler as a grim joke designed to confirm his captivity. 
Thematically, it actually makes great sense for Arghol to be conceptually linked 
to the system he opposes. Arghol’s ‘energy’ is to be understood in similar terms as the 
paradoxical nature of ‘language’ we examined in the previous chapter, as both the 
prison and the key to emancipation. In the terms which Lewis later provided in his 
commentary on Enemy, Arghol is like ‘the man of his word’ caught within the 
deterministic web which is imposed upon him by his adherence to the fallacy of a 
natural language. Whether he is read as a textual entity trying to break free from the 
determinism of the text, or as a deviant, double or two-faced star attempting to break 
free from the astral system, his identity with the system he opposes correlates with a 
central theme of Lewis’s thought at the time and reveals an important relation to 
Gnostic pessimism about the human condition.  
It is not clear precisely which Gnostic sources Lewis made use of at the time of 
writing Enemy, but there are numerous thematic overlaps with William Blake’s own 
Gnostic-inspired myth as it was presented in Jerusalem, the Emanation of the Giant 
																																																								
39 Alan Munton in his notes on Enemy of the Stars (1914), in Collected Poems and Plays, p.220. 
40 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.61. 
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Albion (published in instalments between 1804-1820). One clue to this link may be 
found in the name ‘Hanp’, which Paul Edwards and Richard Humphreys have suggested 
may be derived from ‘Hand’, the eldest son of Albion in Blake’s Jerusalem.42 Hand and 
his brothers represent a sort of demonic materialism in Blake’s myth which seeks ‘to 
Vegetate the Divine Vision | In a corporeal & ever-dying Vegetation & Corruption’.43 
Together the brothers are said to ‘become One Great Satan’.44 This correlates closely 
with the symbolic role of Hanp in Enemy, who is equally the representative of a 
murderous materialism. 
A shared thematic core runs through both Jerusalem and Enemy. In Jerusalem 
‘Los cries: “No Individual ought to appropriate to himself | Or to his emanation, any of 
the universal characteristics”’, and we can make sense of the transgressive behaviour 
and ‘criminal’ status which Arghol is given in similar terms as deriving from his 
‘masquerading as Humanity like a child in clothes too big for him’.45 Arghol is a 
representative of those ‘blasphemous selfhoods’ that Los denounces, ‘who dare 
appropriate to themselves universal attributes’ and therefore ‘must be broken asunder’.46 
His destruction within the narrative is symbolic of the material principle gaining 
ascendency over the mind or soul. For both Blake and Lewis this dualistic tension was 
to be explained with reference to the two coeternal metaphysical principles of good and 
evil, spirit and matter; the materialization (or ‘Vegetation’) of the Divine spirit being 
conceived by each as a kind of ‘bastard form’ coming to ‘infect the original’.47  
The full metaphysical pattern of Lewis’s myth is at first barely visible 
underneath the heaped symbols, syntactic disruption and experimental formal 
manoeuvres, but a coherent symbolic narrative runs through Enemy which is written 
shorthand in the line: ‘The sky, two clouds, their two furious shadows, fought’.48 To 
understand this we must strip the line apart into its component parts. The sky — a 
holistic principle indicating the cosmos in its entirety — is comprehensible as the 
battlefield upon which two metaphysical principles (or clouds) are constantly at war. In 
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43 William Blake, ‘Jerusalem, the Emanation of the Giant Albion’, in The Poems of William Blake, ed. by 
W. H. Stevenson (London: Longman, 1971), pp.622-840, IV. 90. 41-2 (p.826).  
44 Ibid., IV. 90. 43 (p.826). 
45 Ibid., IV. 90. 28-9 (p.825); Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.66. ‘[M]asquerading as Humanity 
like a child in clothes too big for him’ is a line taken from section five of the Vorticist Manifesto (BLAST, 
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46 Blake, ‘Jerusalem, the Emanation of the Giant Albion’, IV. 90. 32-3 (p.825). 
47 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.70. 
48 Ibid., p.75. 
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the wheelwright’s yard we observe their two shadows collide. In terms of the Gnostic 
dualism which Lewis utilized in his narrative, Arghol is the emanation of the spiritual 
essence (known in Gnostic writings as the ‘alien God’), who enters into conflict with 
Hanp, the emanation of the material principle represented by the god of creation.49 The 
two central characters of the play thus represent the ‘ancient and valuable iranian 
principle of duality’ between the ‘two characters’ of the ‘killer’ and the ‘maker’ which 
attempts to maintain in ‘violent […] contrast’ and keep at all costs from ‘confus[ion]’.50 
This Gnostic structure provides a way of reading the text which is important to 
highlight.  
 
(iii) Reading Enemy of the Stars as a Metaphysical Shadow Play 
 
The ‘shadow play’ was a popular form of entertainment in Munich during Lewis and 
Wadsworth’s stay there from February to July 1906 and it is possible that Lewis may 
have drawn some inspiration from his experience of this during the city carnival or 
indeed a visit to the Schwabinger Shadow Theatre, as Kate Armond has recently 
suggested.51 This would qualify as an important source for the puppetry metaphor 
which Lewis uses in ‘Inferior Religions’ to explain the function of his early fictions. 
Certainly Enemy may be conceived as a sort of conceptual shadow play itself, in which 
‘God and Fate’ are ‘constant protagonists’.52 Arghol and Hanp are vertically aligned to 
their warring metaphysical overlords. The constant reference to a battle raging in the 
universe at large beyond the immediate scene notionally advises the reader to lift focus 
from the squabble in the wheelwright’s yard to observe the greater sphere of conflict, 
where the ‘ice field of the sky swept and crashed silently’.53 It is a peculiar feature of 
the narrative of Enemy that the further we are taken from the action between the human 
																																																								
49 A fuller account of these aspects of Gnostic myth can be found in Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion: 
The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity, 2nd edn (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991). 
See especially pp.49-51 for a fuller account of the ‘alien God’ and pp.62-68 for an account of the Gnostic 
idea that the God of Genesis was an evil demi-urge responsible for imprisoning the soul (or pneuma) in 
its material prison. 
50 The Art of Being Ruled, p.25. 
51 Armond writes: ‘At the time of Lewis’s stay in Munich, the shadow play was a particularly popular 
form of entertainment and featured as part of the city carnival that Lewis attended. […] the genre 
continued to thrive in Munich’s Schwabinger Shadow Theatre until 1912’ (Kate Armond, ‘Vorticism in 
1915: Official and Unofficial Germany’, in The Journal of Wyndham Lewis Studies, 6 (2015), pp.34-59 
(p.49)).  
52 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.69. 
53 Ibid., p.64. 
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characters ‘the more violent and vivid’ the agency seems to be.54 From the lethargic 
interactions between Arghol and Hanp — even when he fights, Arghol, we are told 
‘d[oes] not hit hard’ for he is ‘[l]ike something inanimate’, a ‘soft, blunt paw of Nature’ 
— we may trace a growth in the reserve of agency in the wider topography (‘THE RED 
WALLS OF THE UNIVERSE’) and further to the stars.55  
Hypallage — the re-attribution of agency from the characters to the normally 
passive scene — was identified by Fredric Jameson as an essential characteristic of 
Lewis’s early prose style. In Fables of Aggression Jameson suggests that Lewis’s 
writings: 
 
offer […] a glimpse of a world in which the old-fashioned substances, like marbles in a 
box, have been rattled so furiously together that their ‘properties’ come loose and stick 
to the wrong places.56 
 
Cantelman’s stroll through ‘the strenuous fields’ in Lewis’s short story of 1917 serves 
as a useful example of this, as does his professed fascination with the ‘imbecility of the 
creaking men-machines some little restaurant or fishing-boat works’ in ‘Inferior 
Religions’ (my emphasis).57 In one sense, when properties do come loose in these early 
works they all end up sticking to the one variegated surface of metaphysical Nature, or 
whatever name Lewis adopts in each particular context for ‘that fat mass you browse 
on’.58  
The effect produced by Lewis’s hypallage in the reader’s consciousness was 
described by Jameson as the ‘delirium of metonymy’: a ‘contamination of the axis of 
contiguity’ causing the characters to melt with the comparatively more active scene.59  
This idea has driven David Graver to raise hypallage from the level of ‘a central trope’ 
to a ‘metaphysical principle’ and the ‘unifying principle of Enemy’.60 A further effect, 
which Jameson and Graver neglect to mention, however, is that Lewis’s use of 
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hypallage in Enemy subtly draws the reader’s consciousness away from the interaction 
taking place between the characters towards the hidden agencies that govern their 
movements. In this way the reader is attuned to a two-tiered organization within the 
narrative.  
By re-attributing the agency normally possessed by human characters to a 
lurking presence beyond the immediate scene, Lewis attained narrative conditions 
which were reminiscent of a puppet show. But equally, in another respect, it allowed 
him to explore the central schema of ritual, the text effectively enacting a ritualistic 
invocation of mythical forces by means of symbolic representatives in the arena of 
sacrifice. Once again we find that both interpretive avenues lie open to us, the two-
tiered structure within the narrative highlighting the puppets’ relation to their master as 
much as the mysterious relationship which exists between a community and the 
mythical and metaphysical forces which ultimately rule over them. This double aspect 
of Enemy, part puppet show and part ritual invocation of the gods, guides us to the heart 
of the text’s significance in Lewis’s early pattern of thinking.  
 
(iv) Theatre of Ritual 
 
Examination of Enemy’s narrative reveals how closely it adheres to the grim procedure 
of a sacrifice rite.61 The characters are two ‘GRAVE BOOTH ANIMALS’ who take up 
their position ‘AT OPENING OF SHAFT’, their clothes ‘full of fiery dust and sinewy 
energetic air’.62 The associations with blood sports which these descriptions conjure is 
confirmed by subsequent references to ‘a human bull rush[ing] into the circus’ and ‘a 
gladiator who has come to fight a ghost’.63 But while Arghol is ‘the prime athlete 
exponent of this sport in its palmy days’, he is also described as having a ‘sacred’ 
significance as a representative of ‘Self […] the ancient race’, and would thus appear to 
represent the sacrificial victim in a scene of tauromaquia highly reminiscent of the 
																																																								
61 Toby Foshay acknowledges this ritualistic element to the play’s narrative, citing particularly the 
description of Arghol as a ‘Foredoomed Prometheus’ in the 1932 version of the play (Collected Poems 
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62 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, pp.55, 60, 55. 
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‘grotesque pantomime’ of ‘Ox-murder’ which Jane Ellen Harrison had described in 
detail in her 1913 book.64  
 From his entrance Arghol is carefully prepared in his role as sacrificial victim. 
The reason the holy Bull must die, as Harrison clarifies at one point in Art and Ancient 
Ritual, is ‘because he is so holy, that he may give his holiness, his strength, his life, just 
at the moment it is holiest, to his people’.65 Arghol is similarly fattened before the 
‘sacred act of violence’.66 ‘Nothing spent, stored rather in strong stagnation’, he 
accumulates in himself an energy ‘fixed on [him] from nowhere’ and wonders at the 
‘superstition’ which curbs his master from killing him outright, concluding ‘[h]e must 
have palpable reason for my being alive’.67  
The moment of Arghol’s execution is even choreographed as a sacrificial 
murder, with Hanp approaching the kneeling figure of Arghol with ‘knife held stiffly at 
arms length’.68 Hanp is equivalent to the ‘Ox-striker’ presiding over the Dionysian rites 
at Athens, and like the death of the ‘holy Bull’ Arghol’s banishment from matter is 
symbolically linked to the rejuvenation of the material world, his ‘blood sinking down, 
a moist shaft, into the ground’ to the ‘[r]elief of grateful universe’.69 In this way the 
‘play’ becomes explicable as a scene of ritual sacrifice, the stage becomes an altar, and 
the reader becomes immersed in the collective worship, joining in the ‘CLOSE 
ATMOSPHERE OF TERROR AND NECESSITY TILL THE EXECUTION IS 
OVER’.70 Care is taken to prepare the reader for their role in the rite, with the 
narratorial voice suggesting that we are embarking on ‘our honeymoon’ and must adapt 
to this ‘strange place for initial stages of our intimate ceremonious acquaintance’.71 
The barbaric spectacle which the text enacts would seem to have thematic 
relevance to Lewis’s quotation of Rousseau’s view in ‘Futurism, Magic and Life’ that 
‘[t]he theatre is immoral, because a place where people go to enjoy other people’s 
sufferings and tears’, since Enemy’s reader is cast in the position of a tourist at a 
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bullfight who plays a tacit part in the execution of the innocent animal.72 In this way the 
text seems to convey the idea which Lewis would later discuss in The Lion and the Fox 
(1927), that the dramatist carries forward the professional responsibility of the ‘public 
executioner’, compelling a human representative onto the stage to adopt a ‘deadly rôle’ 
in order to purge the sins and misfortunes of the community.73  
Its presentation of a spectacle of ritual sacrifice inevitably places Enemy in 
dialogue with certain important anthropological and artistic works which emerged in 
1913. In one sense Lewis’s text may be seen to undertake the project suggested by 
Harrison a year earlier, to reunite the divided elements of the modern theatre (stage and 
audience) into the original ‘orchestral’ space of worship, thereby returning the art of 
drama to the ‘ritual dance’ — the dithyrambs of the cult of Dionysus — from which it 
first grew.74 It is unclear whether Lewis first became acquainted with Harrison’s book at 
the time he was writing Enemy, but there are some reasons to believe that this may have 
been the case. Ancient Art and Ritual had been published during the summer of 1913, 
and would certainly have complemented his already keen interest in anthropology. A 
well-used copy was later found in Lewis’s library, which has no date of publication and 
may be a first edition which Lewis bought at the time it came out.75 Furthermore, 
Lewis’s activity in BLAST appears to engage with Harrison’s idea that modern art 
would ‘recross […] the ritual bridge back into life’, albeit in contradictory terms. While 
Enemy would appear to qualify as the fruition of this project, Lewis’s complaint that 
‘Art merges in Life again everywhere’ in ‘Futurism, Magic and Life’ would seem to 
reject Harrison’s thesis.76  
The earliest readers of Harrison’s book could not have failed to notice that her 
call for modern art to ‘recross […] the ritual bridge back into life’ had already been 
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answered in one emphatic instance.77 Igor Stravinksy’s Le Sacre du Printemps (The Rite 
of Spring) was first performed by Diaghilev’s Ballets Russes at the Théâtre des 
Champs-Élysées on 29 May 1913, at roughly the same time that Harrison was putting 
the finishing touches to Ancient Art and Ritual (the preface is dated June 1913). 
Allegedly the realization of Stravinsky’s dream of ‘a scene of pagan ritual in which a 
chosen sacrificial virgin danced herself to death’, the ballet anticipates Harrison’s work 
by attempting to transform the modern stage into a sacrificial altar.78  
Taken together The Rite of Spring and Ancient Art and Ritual occupy a critical 
point in the development of modernism’s fascination with the primitive which can 
certainly help to inform our understanding of Enemy’s ritualistic narrative. As Butler 
writes: 
 
By the time of its [The Rite of Spring] production in 1913 the aggressive impulses 
[displayed within modern primitivist art] were ripe for the further rationalization offered 
by an anthropological context, which could give to violent emotional materials the ritual 
distance of ‘myth’.79 
 
The idea which Butler expresses here ought to be clarified. The turn to myth, he 
suggests, was already to be identified with certain ‘aggressive impulses’ in the 
modernist psyche before the spring of 1913. But Stravinsky’s ballet marks a moment 
when this latent aggression is channelled by a growing self-consciousness that 
modernism’s ‘myth’ was refracted through a rationalized, anthropological perspective. 
Butler thus draws attention to a perceived conflict which arises in modernism between 
the ‘ritual distance of “myth”’ and its ‘rationalization’ within ‘an anthropological 
context’.  
 Whether or not Lewis worked in full knowledge of either Harrison’s book or 
Stravinsky’s ballet, Enemy emerges directly out of the discourse concerning the 
expressive potential of myth, and its anthropological disclosure, which is set up by these 
works of 1913. One of the defining features of Lewis’s text is the antagonism which it 
presents between the two worldviews entailed by this, imposing rational controls upon 
the mythic forces which from one perspective it unleashes. We have already observed 
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the way in which the text elaborates the procedure of a ritual sacrifice, but it is equally 
important to see how this is compromised by certain decidedly modern references in the 
text. However much the narrative of Enemy may attempt to usher us towards art’s 
sinister past, we are never left in any doubt that it is a drama being performed in a 
modern theatre.  
 
(v) From Altar to Stage  
 
The theatrical context, equipment and personnel of ‘THE PLAY’ are faintly visible 
from the start.80 The reader enters the play-text at page 51 in the same distracted shuffle 
as a theatre audience entering a venue, passing on two occasions the bold play title 
‘ENEMY OF THE STARS’ and the ‘ADVERTISEMENT’ daubing at the entrance.81 A 
picture-gallery of six paintings and ‘decorations’ are placed along the metaphorical 
corridor into the arena, in the ante-room to the play itself, where the reader is 
encouraged to while away the few remaining moments before the call visually absorbed 
in images which have a thematic relation to the narrative.82 Then we are called to our 
seats with the brusque announcement of ‘THE PLAY’.83 Characters and scenes are 
introduced and the audience are subjected to a seduction ritual, invited by the 
proprietorial figure of the narrator into an ‘intimate ceremonious acquaintance’, to 
suspend disbelief while the actors do their work.84  
Awareness of the theatre persists into the narrative action. When Arghol enters 
reeling from the violent attack of his uncle, ‘the super’, the reader’s focus is drawn 
towards a possible interference at the wings of the imagined stage.85 There is a sense in 
which this ‘supernumerary’, an extra in the action, is really part of the theatrical context 
in which the play itself is supposed to be taking place, a stage-hand or even perhaps the 
director himself kicking the clown onto stage after he has missed his cue. The text 
would seem to allow this interpretation, given that Arghol is twice called for, implying 
initial absence from the scene before he receives his beating. A visual staging would 
seem to entail a lone Hanp calling nervously, with a ‘child’s voice hunting its mother’, 
																																																								
80 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.57. 
81 Ibid., pp.51, 55. 
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into the wings for his companion to accompany him onstage now that the play has 
begun.86 
In various ways the reader is encouraged to frame the unfolding narrative with 
extra-narrative knowledge of the backstage and front of house activity within the 
imagined theatre, observing the drama of ‘ritual’ with occasional glances towards the 
equipment and personnel of the theatre in which it is being performed. It is a theme 
which visibly grows out of Lewis’s earlier works which similarly explored a contrast 
between the imaginative world created by an artwork and its material context, like ‘Les 
Saltimbanques’ and The Theatre Manager (1909; Fig. 5).87 But in Enemy the effect of 
lifting the curtain is that a starkly modern light is shone on an otherwise murky scene of 
ancient ritual. The ritual is unmasked, the spell is broken. This is no longer a scene of 
collective worship in which a community speak with their gods, rather it is a pre-
scripted procedure repeated to a different audience each night; a debased form of the 
original rite from which it grew.  
From this perspective the theatre is ‘immoral’ or at least reprehensible not 
because it involves any real suffering but rather because it is a marketplace of 
representations where the original is perpetually counterfeited. Significantly, this was 
the view which Rousseau was really trying to communicate in in his Letter to Monsieur 
d’Alembert on the Theatre of 1758, in one instance describing the theatre as a carrier of 
‘bad faith’.88 In his Letter to d’Alembert Rousseau described the theatre as a place 
where ‘[c]ounterfeiting, forgery, theft, imposture, lying, cruelty […] everything is 
applauded’.89 As the editors clarify in their introduction to Rousseau’s Letter (2004) the 
audience experience is key to Rousseau’s moral stance: 
 
This experience is more fundamental than the content or message of the plays being 
performed. […] The essence of this experience is one of identification with the 
characters portrayed on the stage and forgetting about oneself.90 
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The danger, for Rousseau, lay in the theatre’s ability to corrode the integrity of the self. 
This, we should note, is precisely the effect it has on Arghol, who similarly suffers 
‘degradation […] of the original solitude of the soul’ in ‘some bleak circus’.91 
Rousseau’s meaning was playfully subverted by Lewis in ‘Futurism, Magic and Life’ in 
a way that seems to chime with his strategy in Enemy, evoking an idea of the theatre 
which is at once dangerously real and deceitfully false. What are we to make of this 
two-faced work then?  
In one sense Enemy provides a stark illustration of Harrison’s belief in Ancient 
Art and Ritual that ‘[r]itual must wane that art may wax’.92 As the wheelwright’s yard is 
revealed as a theatrical space Lewis provides his own illustration of the way the 
orchestral space was divided up into an audience and a stage. But it also seems likely 
that in Enemy Lewis was exploring the Nietzschean idea that ‘the continuous 
development of art is bound up with the Apollinian and Dionysian duality’ and all the 
‘perpetual strife’ which that brings.93 In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche had described a 
dialectical process by which the primitive urges behind Dionysian worship — to tear 
apart ‘the veil of māyā” and leave it “fluttering in tatters before the mysterious 
primordial unity’ — had been harnessed by the growing Apollinian tendency in Greek 
culture to harmony, structure and reason.94 For Nietzsche the great flowering of Attic 
Tragedy had been stimulated by the combination of these two opposed drives, the 
intoxicating urge towards metaphysical unity encountering an opposed tendency 
towards sober individuation.95 The result was an aesthetic reconciliation of the eternal 
struggle between self and world. But for Nietzsche, the golden age of Attic Tragedy was 
as fast to fade as it was to blossom. 
As Greek culture grew more confident and more stridently humanist, the 
primitive Dionysian drive was suppressed by a new kind of rationalism that was 
emerging, according to Nietzsche. The Apollonian tendency towards order and rational 
control, or rather a bastardized version of this tendency, gained ascendancy. The death-
blow was struck by Socrates: ‘we may recognize in Socrates the opponent of Dionysus. 
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He is the new Orpheus who rose against Dionysus’.96 This became ‘the new opposition’ 
in Nietzsche’s dialectic: ‘the Dionysian and the Socratic — and the art of Greek tragedy 
was wrecked on this’.97 For Nietzsche art was strongest when it contained within itself 
the two opposed drives of the Apollonian and Dionysian principles, before mythos was 
decisively displaced by logos.  
In Enemy a rather caricatured form of the Nietzschean dialectic appears to be at 
work.98 Hanp and Arghol clearly represent the ‘duality’ of chorus and tragic hero which 
Nietzsche described as ‘the expression of two interwoven artistic impulses, the 
Apollinian and the Dionysian’.99 Indeed Toby Foshay has identified a ‘series of 
parallels’ which the work has with classical tragedy: ‘the action is an agon; Arghol is a 
Prometheus figure; the characters, as in classical drama, wear masks designed to 
amplify their voices’.100 Lewis’s ‘HEATHEN CLOWNS’, however, would be more at 
home in a Punch and Judy show than an Attic Tragedy.101  
Hanp, the voice of common sense and thus the critical vent for the audience, 
calls Arghol down from his lofty perch with enticements of food and gestures of 
reconciliation with the world. But Arghol knows well the parameters of his tragic role 
and the necessity to first ‘be very rich or eminent in some way, and then suddenly lose 
all my money or my social position’.102 He is perpetually driven to higher moral ground 
— even to the melodramatic whine ‘[a]nything but yourself is dirt. Anybody that is. I 
do not feel clean enough to die, or to make it worth while killing myself’ — in order to 
perform his ‘tragic drop from hubris and happiness to misery and disaster’.103  
The Dionysian altar is there still but it is now once again simply a stage. The 
grim procedure of the sacrifice rite is shown to pass naturally over into the logical 
schema of the tragic narrative. And because of this the spirit is somewhat changed, we 
are no longer being called to participate in a ritual, accepting an invitation to primal 
unity as we previously thought we were, rather we are set apart from the action as 
spectators of an imagined drama. We learn that this ‘new un-Dionysian spirit […] 
reveals itself most plainly in the dénouements of the new dramas’, for the gods have 
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been replaced with narrative devices.104 In this respect Enemy is like a puppet-show in 
which the strings are visible. Occasionally we may also glimpse the hand which moves 
them. 
 
(vi) Narratorial Conflict  
 
After his fight with Hanp, Arghol succumbs to a dream of Berlin. It is the moment of 
Arghol’s ‘tragic drop’ and another presence, perhaps identifiable as the narrator, 
assumes control of events. Arghol is pacified into a dream-state and harried ‘through 
confused struggles and vague successions of scenes’.105 Suddenly he rouses himself 
from his dream-stupor, and ‘a new state of mind assert[s] itself’.106 At this moment the 
combative narratorial voice enters as a deus ex machina taking ‘the place of 
metaphysical comfort’ in Arghol’s narrative.107 The voice mercilessly mocks Arghol’s 
‘awakening’:  
 
A riddle has been solved. 
What could this be? 
He was Arghol once more. 
Was that the key to something? He was simply Arghol. 
‘I am Arghol.’ 
He repeated his name — like sinister word invented to launch a new Soap, in gigantic 
advertisement — toilet-necessity, he, to scrub the soul.108 
 
The speaker of these mocking lines is impossible to identify with certainty given the  
use which Lewis makes of free indirect narration throughout the text. We may identify 
it with the figure of the narrator or indeed with Arghol himself. But because the 
narrative technique which Lewis deploys shuttles us back and forth between a third-
person perspective and the first-person perspective of Arghol and Hanp we cannot tell 
who is ultimately responsible for condemning Arghol.  
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 One interpretative possibility is raised by the introductory note which Strindberg 
included at the front of ‘The Dream Play’, under the title of ‘A Reminder’ in 
Björkman’s translation. There Strindberg wrote:  
 
the author has tried to imitate the disconnected but seemingly logical form of the dream. 
[…] The characters split, double, multiply, vanish, solidify, blur, clarify. But one 
consciousness reigns above them all — that of the dreamer; and before it there are no 
secrets, no incongruities, no scruples, no laws.109 
 
These guiding principles relate closely to Lewis’s Expressionist experiment, providing 
further compelling evidence for the possibility that Lewis drew upon ‘The Dream Play’ 
as a source for his 1914 text.110 Crucial to observe is the distinction which Strindberg 
highlights between the play’s characters and the ‘one consciousness’ which ‘reigns 
above them all’. In Lewis’s play a similar distinction is found, albeit more severe and 
violent than Strindberg’s, which takes the form of an irreconcilable conflict between the 
play’s condemned protagonist and the ruthless narratorial voice which governs over him 
and finally descends to ‘banish’ him ‘from matter’.111  
A further interpretative possibility is found in Michael Seidel’s notion of 
‘Fourth-estate narration’. This idea originates in Seidel’s analysis of the narrative 
technique in James Joyce’s Ulysses and the need which he expressed there to account 
for ‘[a]nother kind of narration’, which is not ‘interior’ to the characters’ psyches but 
which is ‘militantly exterior’.112 The relevance of this to Enemy should be clear, for in 
Lewis’s 1914 text it is also ‘almost as if another layer of narration runs parallel to the 
ones that advance the action, a narrative mode that is more supplemental than 
sequential’.113 Both Strindberg and Seidel provide useful clues to the puzzling conflict 
which instigates Arghol’s downfall. Certainly Arghol appears to be condemned by a 
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consciousness which does not belong to either of the two central characters, but which 
rather ‘reigns above them’ as a ‘militantly exterior’ overlord, before whom there can be 
‘no secrets, no incongruities, no scruples, no laws’. For the sake of terminological 
clarity I shall refer to this presence as the play’s nefarious and controlling ‘narrator’ in 
his role as master of ceremonies, presiding over the ritual sacrifice in which Arghol has 
been cast as the sacred victim.  
The most significant aspect of this sudden rift in the narration is the distinction 
which it highlights between mythic and modern modes, with Arghol’s bid for mythical 
transcendence being effectively collapsed by a claustrophobic and possessive 
rationality. The narrator performs the function of ‘God and Fate’ in the narrative, 
condemning Arghol to his unpleasant destiny.114 But he also represents the ‘Socratic 
tendency’ towards rational illumination, banishing the mysteries perpetuated by 
myth.115 In this way Enemy presides over a rite of its own, though in this case the 
hangman is found to deal in symbolic death. 
On the verge of personal destruction Arghol grips hold of that last vestige of self 
and tries out his authentic name: ‘I am Arghol’, enacting the mythic notion that the 
name is what it names.116 These are the only words he is able to speak in this section. 
For the narrator this has the circular significance of a truism, since ‘[h]e was simply 
Arghol’. But Arghol is trying out some of that primitive magic, conjuring his real self 
through the act of naming himself, stoking the fire of life by means of ‘a dynamic 
subjectivism’.117 It is an instance of what James George Frazer calls ‘Imitative Magic’ 
in The Golden Bough (1890), the principle being that ‘like produces like’, so that the 
name has a direct influence on the person.118  
Arghol’s attempt to coerce the objective world to obey his ego is, however, 
undermined by the narrator.119 His last effort of sorcery is disrupted, as the narrator 
compares Arghol’s desperate outburst to an ‘advertisement’. In this critical episode in 
the narrative the thematic ‘depth’ is found ‘on the surface’ of the text, as Arghol is 
transformed into a dramatic ‘product’ locked into the dense units of text which present 
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his tragedy as a form of kitsch entertainment.120 The fact that this ultimate act of 
degradation is conducted with reference to an advertisement is important, for it recalls 
to the reader’s mind both the advertisement which precedes the main text and the sense 
in which Lewis had modelled the typography of BLAST on the dense units of text used 
in contemporary adverts. In effect, Arghol is denied his bid for authenticity and 
transformed into a consumer product. This is the moment of Arghol’s defeat. It revolves 
around mastery over language, and by extension, control of the narrative itself.  
Arghol represents the primitive mythic psyche which intuits an identity between 
the word and the object which it denotes. He thus commits the naturalistic fallacy of the 
man of his word, as Lewis characterized him in ‘Physics’. The narrator correspondingly 
represents the empowered man of words, who is emancipated from the determinism of a 
one-dimensional sign-system and uses the power which this gives him to condemn 
others who are. In this way Enemy highlights the fallacy of the ‘Romantic desire for 
authenticity’ as an ideal which is ‘inevitably compromised by the very condition of 
being’, as Paul March-Russell writes.121 The narrative reveals the sense in which ‘to live 
is also to act — and be acted upon — in [and by] the world’.122 The following passage 
from Bergson’s Time and Free Will is likely to have played some role in Lewis’s 
developing thought at this time: 
 
Consciousness, goaded by an insatiable desire to separate, substitutes the symbol for the 
reality, or perceives reality only through the symbol. As the self thus refracted, and 
thereby broken into pieces, is much better adapted to the requirements of social life in 
general, and language in particular, consciousness prefers it, and gradually loses sight of 
the fundamental self.123 
 
This account of the role which society plays in the evolution of selfhood helps to 
explain the tragic situation of Arghol. Indeed it is almost a summary of the play’s 
narrative. Arghol is representative of Bergson’s philosophy, striving to re-access the 
‘fundamental self’ and thus to throw off the self ‘that the baffling requirements of 
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society had made’.124 He is, however, unable to return to the original self which 
Bergson’s philosophy advances. In Lewis’s hands, the self, once corrupted, is shown 
unable to return to its longed-for state of purity.  
Arghol is thus representative of the Bergsonian hypothesis, put on trial for his 
fallacious romanticism. In the ritual organization of the narrative Lewis notionally 
adopts the dramatist’s professional role as ‘hangman’, upholding the law which he laid 
down in BLAST 2: ‘[y]ou must catch the clearness and logic in the midst of 
contradictions: not settle down and snooze on an acquired, easily possessed and 
mastered, satisfying shape’.125 Whether we identify the play’s militant ruling 
consciousness as the ‘narrator’, Arghol’s own alter-ego, or indeed as the author qua 
puppet-master intervening conspicuously in the activities of his marionettes, Arghol’s 
narratorial opponent in Enemy implements the force of this ‘logic’ in the lives of his 
unfortunate characters, exuding a fanaticism in his role as executioner.  
 
(vii) Anthropology of the Wild Body  
 
Like Lewis’s earlier short stories and character sketches, Enemy is thus a work which 
explores the narrator’s control over the characters, or ‘puppets’, within his command.126 
The rivalry which takes place in Enemy between the narrator and Arghol may be seen to 
derive from the carnivalesque showdown between the proprietor of the circus and the 
clown, ‘the people’s favourite’, in ‘Les Saltimbanques’.127 But it is perhaps more 
relevant to note the sense in which the tone of the narrator in Enemy anticipates the 
aggressive, controlling narratorial style of Ker-Orr in The Wild Body (1927). Like 
Arghol, the unfortunate figure recruited to play the ‘principal rôle’ in Ker-Orr’s 
‘comed[ies]’ would remain ‘convinced […] that he [is] taking part in a tragedy’ as 
‘extremely complex and unmanageable forces [are] set in motion’ for his master’s 
‘edification’.128 
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In ‘Inferior Religions’ — published in 1917 but written during the Vorticist 
period — Lewis provided the fullest account of the strategy behind this narratorial 
style.129 These works, he suggested, were inspired by an anthropological interest: 
‘These studies of rather primitive people are studies in a savage worship and 
attraction’.130 The characters in these pieces he described as ‘carefully selected 
specimens of religious fanaticism’ which are ‘congealed and frozen into logic’, evoking 
the sinister power suggested by anthropological texts to scorn the ‘primitive’ people 
they wish to understand.131 With their ‘Totems’ and ‘Gods’ shown to be ‘illusions 
hugged and lived in’, the springs of vitality from which they once drew their strength 
are polluted.132 They exist thereafter as ‘cyphers’ in ‘a new human mathematic’, and 
thus as ‘shadows of energy, and not living beings’.133 
It is not so evident in the earliest short stories of 1909-1911, but by the time of 
Enemy and ‘A Soldier of Humour’ (1917) the figure of the narrator becomes like a 
totalitarian leader of the narrative over which they preside, imposing their iron will on 
the plot and jealously controlling their characters.134 This type in Lewis’s early work — 
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what he described in ‘Inferior Religions’ as ‘the Wild Body, the generic puppet of all’ 
— is fully realized in Ker-Orr and the narrator of Enemy, each of whom appear to be 
partly modelled upon the figure of the anthropologist among the savage peoples of their 
studies.135 The effect which this has in the narratives is to highlight the conditions of 
control: ‘to foreground the act and technical apparatus of persuasion, to reveal the forms 
of power, the “art” by which one is ruled’, as Tyrus Miller writes.136  
Lewis’s narrators examine their characters and interrogate their interior worlds, 
before hunting them out of their superstitions into the cold light of logic. In this way 
they represent an all-pervading rationality invading the mysteries of the spirit-world, in 
the case of Enemy reducing a shamanic ritual to a performance on the stage of a modern 
theatre. Their victims, Arghol and Monsieur de Valmore in ‘A Soldier of Humour’, 
suffer something like ‘extermination by museumification’, as Jean Baudrillard has 
described it.137 The following passage from Simulations (1983) might help make this 
point more clearly:  
 
mummies do not decay because of worms: they die from being transplanted from a 
prolonged symbolic order, which is master over death and putrescence, on to an order 
of history, science and museums — our own, which is no longer master over anything, 
since it knows only how to condemn its predecessors to death and putrescence and their 
subsequent resuscitation by science. An irreparable violence towards all secrets, the 
violence of a civilisation without secrets.138 
 
This might almost be taken as a summary of Lewis’s narrative strategy at this time, as it 
was expressed in ‘Inferior Religions’. The irreparable violence of the narrator to his 
characters’ secrets provided the model for many of Lewis’s early fictions. Arghol is 
transplanted from a scene of ritual and thrown into a modern theatre. He is congealed 
and frozen into logic by the narrator, who exhibits the tendency which Nietzsche 
described as ‘aesthetic Socratism, whose supreme law reads roughly as follows, “To be 
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beautiful everything must be intelligible”’.139 It is thus really mythos which is being put 
on trial in Enemy. 
This would seem to carry an ironic twist for Harrison’s theory since the way 
back to ritual is forcefully blocked, ‘the past is preserved as the destruction of the 
past’.140 Lewis takes to a logical extreme Harrison’s view that ‘the Churches of to-day 
must and should become the Museums of to-morrow’.141 He illustrates how in the 
theatre as much as in museums and galleries — what Lewis described in ‘The Essential 
Purposes of Art’ as ‘mausoleums of dead languages’ — we touch the sacred only by 
having it broken in pieces before our eyes.142 In Enemy this degradation is suffered 
equally by the self.143 The quest for original purity is in all cases dealt a severe blow 
with the realization that ‘the bastard form infects the original’.144 
But nevertheless some of that original mythical darkness is unleashed in the 
arena. While mythos is put on trial in Enemy, it is ultimately undone by its own grim 
logic. The modus operandi of logocentric debasement is shown to be essentially no 
different to the sacrifice rite of the ancient savage, as a representation of mythic man is 
ritually desecrated at the altar of the new religion.145 The narrator helps to indicate one 
of Lewis’s key ideas at this time: that very primitive instincts stir within logocentric 
control.146 He thus occupies a liminal position and in his forays between the ‘primitive’ 
and ‘civilized’ worlds he is able to bring back the aura at least of art’s sacred origin. He 
is, like Kurtz in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1899), a trickster who plays off 
both sides for his own gain; an archetypal figure in Lewis’s early fictions whose 
ultimate role is to ‘catch the clearness and logic in the midst of contradictions’.147 In this 
way Enemy conveys the power which art has to order, structure and control, but it also 
communicates the ‘magical quality in artistic expression — a recognition that the artist 
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is tapping the supernatural sources and potentialities of our existence’, as Lewis wrote 
in Time and Western Man.148 
Although this figure of the narrator is clearly derived from Nietzsche’s idea of 
an independent warrior guided only by a personal morality of strength, it is possible to 
observe here one of the ways in which Lewis was disentangling his own thought from 
Nietzsche’s heavy influence. For Nietzsche this idealized human specimen had been 
conceived as the embodiment of non-rational instincts, and thus entirely purified of the 
rational logos of Socratism and modernity. But in Enemy Lewis attempted to show how 
the Dionysian spirit was present all along within the rational controls entailed by 
‘Socratism’, and that modernity was already a ‘primitive’ situation.149 In this way Lewis 
anticipates the work of Adorno and Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), 
who thirty years later would suggest that ‘enlightenment with every step becomes more 
deeply engulfed in mythology’.150 Enemy thus marks a significant point of departure in 
Lewis’s imaginative life, a moment when he made Nietzschean models serve his own 
purposes.151  
It seems possible that Lewis may even have modelled Arghol partly on 
Nietzsche who, as a modern ‘cynic’ philosopher, may have reminded him of 
Shakespeare’s Timon.152 Arghol would be a very convincing portrait of Nietzsche in the 
guise of his own detested ‘theoretical man’ — who ‘no longer dares entrust himself to 
the terrible icy current of existence: he runs timidly up and down the bank’ — since he 
is similarly stationed at ‘the world’s brink’ in ‘collapse of chronic philosophy’, without 
ever being bold enough to take the plunge.153 The defenestration of Max Stirner’s book 
in Arghol’s dream of Berlin may, in light of this comparison, be read as a humorous 
portrait of Nietzsche’s furious disavowal of influence in the face of mounting 
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accusations of plagiarism; the philosopher of the ‘self’ casting away the figure of his 
hated teacher.154  
The episode with Stirner’s book has equal relevance to Lewis, however, and the 
transition which he was making in his Vorticist work, because in Enemy and his other 
contributions to BLAST Lewis was exorcizing his own earlier dependence on the ideas 
of Nietzsche and Bergson. While Lewis acknowledged the impact which Nietzsche had 
on his early thought he took care to clarify that ‘what I like least about Nietzsche’ is the 
‘titanic nourishment for the ego’, the aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy which he 
supposed attracted the ‘majority of people’.155 We may surmise then that Nietzsche’s 
heavy influence on Lewis’s work notionally departs with Stirner when the ‘ego’ is cast 
out of the window in Arghol’s ‘room in the city’.156  
But as much as he was distancing his work from early influences, Lewis was 
situating himself and Vorticism within modernism in a way that is important to observe. 
What he explores in Enemy, in terms which marry with more recent cultural criticism, is 
one of the defining features of modern art: that it is deprived of an essence.157 By 
viewing the artistic quest for origin through an anthropological lens, he suggests that the 
only ‘origin’ attainable in the modern world is a corrupted version reconstituted out of 
modern anthropological knowledge. Enemy then serves as a parable for modernity’s 
desecration of the sacred. It conveys how susceptible the modern world is to wish-
fulfilling fallacies: the turn to myth, which was supposed to keep ‘the flame of [High] 
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culture alive’, is revealed as an instance of the ‘less elevated’ forms of Kitsch popular 
culture; a burlesque theatre-house entertainment and not a sacred ritual.158  
Yet in various ways the text also entices us into its own ritualistic ‘play’ and 
mythical vision. It is itself enacting a ritual of sorts, as we have seen, breaking apart the 
original stability of the self in a way which would have brought Rousseau to tears. In 
Enemy Lewis effectively performs Rousseau’s nightmare vision of the theatre, 
dramatizing Rousseau’s view that the actor’s profession involved the ‘traffic of [the] 
self’.159 He takes care to lure his audience as much as his characters out of themselves 
and into an ‘intimate ceremonious acquaintance’ with the spectacle.160 In doing so he 
affirms the power which art has to create realities of its own. Enemy is thus itself an 
instance of myth, at least as Nietzsche understood it, in the sense that Lewis used it to 
crystallize his present historical moment into a metaphysical vision ‘sub specie aeterni 
and in a certain sense as timeless’.161 
Mixing mythos with logos, myth with modernity, Enemy carves out a conceptual 
home of its own within modernism, dancing with the contradictions with which it is 
inscribed. It demonstrates the dualistic strategy of Vorticism clearly, preferring a 
mercenary status to partisan allegiance to either side in the struggle. Like many of his 
fictions it appears that Lewis used Enemy as a test bed for ideas put forward in his 
critical and philosophical prose. It is a work invested with many of the theoretical 
tensions which had grown out of modernism’s séance with the past. The result is a text 
which is often troublingly obscure and paradoxical, and yet which allows us to take a 
measure of the competing ideas about the quest for origin at a key moment in 
modernism’s development.  
	
w w w 
																																																								
158 In this way Enemy explores what Robert Scholes has described as the ‘paradoxy’ of ‘High and Low’ 
cultures in modernism. I refer particularly to his discussion of Clement Greenberg’s distinction between 
the avant-garde and Kitsch (Paradoxy of Modernism, p.7). 
159 Rousseau, Letter to D’Alembert, p.309. At the end of his Letter to d’Alembert Rousseau expressed his 
concern about the effect the theatre has on the integrity of the self in terms which reflect the degradation 
which Arghol suffers, by ‘prostitut[ing]’ himself to his audience (‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.73): 
‘What is the talent of the actor? The art of counterfeiting himself, or putting on another character than his 
own, of appearing different than he is, of being passionate in cold blood, of saying what he does not think 
of naturally as if he really did think it, and, finally, of forgetting his own place by dint of taking another’s. 
What’s the profession of the actor? It is a trade in which he performs for money, submits himself to the 
disgrace and the affronts that others buy the right to give him, and publicly puts his person publicly on 
sale. I beg every sincere man to tell if he does not feel in the depths of his soul that there is something 
servile and base in this traffic of oneself’ (Letter to d’Alembert, p.309). 
160 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.59. 
161 Nietzsche, ‘The Birth of Tragedy’, p.137. 
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In this chapter we have identified the central ‘pattern’ of Lewis’s Vorticist works as a 
dualistic tension between the two opposed worldviews: mythos and logos. We have 
observed that Enemy presents what we might describe as a myth about myth.  
On the one hand, the text performs the grim procedure of a sacrificial ritual and presents 
a mythical narrative about the modern condition, but this is complicated by another 
tendency which the text exhibits, to rationalize and thereby unravel the mythic pattern 
which has been woven. While Lewis takes great care in designing and building a mythic 
structure for his artworks, he invests equal energy in disassembling — or perhaps it is 
more theoretically relevant to say deconstructing — the myth he has elaborated. In the 
final chapter of this thesis I turn to consider the deeper significance of this tension in 
Lewis’s Vorticist works, exploring especially the contribution which Lewis’s 
mythopoeic activities make to the philosophical discourse of modernity. 
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Chapter 5 
Lewis’s Vorticist Myth and the Philosophical  




Having identified the dualistic tension between mythic and modern worldviews as the 
central theme in Lewis’s early pattern of thinking, one other significant task remains to 
be done. As yet we have no decisive indication of the interpretative outcome of the 
mythos/logos dualism as it features in these works: whether, for example, Lewis 
ultimately wished to denounce modernism’s turn to myth, or whether he simply aimed 
to highlight the fallacy of seeking a mythical home in anthropological sources. For Val 
Plumwood a dualism always ‘results from a certain kind of denied dependency on a 
subordinated other’.1 Applying these rigorous terms to Lewis’s Vorticism we are led to 
suppose that either the mythic or the modern worldview ultimately triumphs at the 
expense of the other, the relation between the two being an essentially negative 
correlation.  
But in Enemy, as we have seen, the dualistic tension results in no clear 
resolution. The negative correlation of denied dependency seems to operate on both 
sides of this dualistic tension: the ‘mythic’ is gained only through the lens of 
anthropological rationality, at the same time that the ‘modern’ is infused with a 
primitive ritualistic darkness. The possibility remains that Lewis’s dualistic strategy 
really is as mercenary as it claims to be, depending ultimately upon an unresolved state 
of theoretic conflict. Certainly we must be prepared to postpone identification of any 
definitive or essential position in Lewis’s works of this period and instead remain 
receptive to the arena of significance which is opened by strategies of juxtaposition and 
paradox. With this in mind I have adopted a particular method in this chapter, focussing 
upon the two roles which ‘myth’ is made to play in Lewis’s Vorticism: as a route back 
to sacred origin and as a calamitous dead-end for modern subjectivity. I shall begin by 
																																																								
1 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 2003), p.41. 
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considering the possibility that Lewis’s creative effort across two arts in the end 
constitutes a genuine instance of myth. 
 
(i) Lewis and Gnosticism: The Case for a ‘Totalizing Mythography’ 
 
In The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms Ernst Cassirer comments that ‘[a]nyone aiming at 
a comprehensive system of human culture has, of necessity, turned back to myth’.2 This 
idea provides a useful start point for our analysis of the mythic credentials of Lewis’s 
Vorticism, for it presents an explanation of the way in which the modernist ambition to 
renovate culture — to exchange the old for the new world — became manifest in an 
idealized conception of myth. In their world-creating mode, modernists were inevitably 
led back to the content and form of myths, where they found important precedents for 
their own attempt to sketch ‘blueprints for […] a new civilization’.3 But equally there 
was something about the modern world, so markedly different to what had come before, 
which seemed to demand a radically new orientation towards life. Mythic narratives — 
with their depictions of a chaotic universe of warring forces and fluctuating phenomena 
— also provided a highly effective model with which to capture this.  
Lewis’s Vorticist paintings and writings belong at the centre of this tradition in 
modernism. In ‘The New Egos’ he commented on the new type of humanity which the 
modern world was breeding, no longer with eyes ‘in the top of our head, and full of 
blank light’, the eyes of the modern town-dweller ‘sweep life horizontally’.4 The idea 
we are given here is that the vertical orientation of a transcendent God or of objective 
Truth no longer had any place in a world where the human being encounters 
‘everywhere fraternal moulds for his spirit, and interstices of a human world’.5 The old 
ways of conceptualizing the world were outmoded. The modern world, we are led to 
suppose, resembled a mysterious labyrinth more than a divine hierarchy. It was a 
situation in which ‘[o]ne feels the immanence of some REALITY more than any former 
human beings can have felt it’.6 This new orientation towards an immanent rather than 
																																																								
2 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms Volume 2: Mythical Thought, trans. by Ralph 
Manheim (London: Yale University Press, 1955), p.3. 
3 Rude Assignment, p.135. 
4 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.141. 
5 Ibid., p.141. 
6 Ibid., p.141 
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transcendent reality is an important aspect of Lewis and modernism’s turn to myth. One 
of the key practices of mythopoeia, as Cassirer writes, is to ‘grasp’ reality ‘according to 
its own immanent, structural law’ (my emphasis).7 In his Vorticist paintings and 
writings Lewis explored humankind’s new and unsettling relation to the ‘real’ in the 
modern world, and in his careful interpretation of the ‘structural law’ which 
underpinned this new reality he elaborated a myth of his own. 
In making the claim that Lewis’s Vorticism constitutes a genuine instance of 
myth, however, more interpretive problems than solutions are raised. We may 
immediately discern two major issues which need to be clarified. In the first instance we 
must ask: what is the meaning and importance of the claim that Lewis’s Vorticism 
qualifies as myth and not merely a collection of literary and artistic works which use 
mythical sources? What are the qualifying criteria for a ‘myth’ and why is the 
qualification significant in this instance? Crucial to our approach here is the theoretical 
antagonism which has been established between the mythic and the modern 
worldviews. 
Michael Nath’s ‘“Monstrous Starlight”: Wyndham Lewis and Gnosticism’ 
provides useful co-ordinates for our analysis of the mythic credentials of Lewis’s work. 
In this essay Nath focuses his analysis on the presence of elements of Gnostic myth in 
the texts of The Human Age and enquires whether we may ‘discover in Lewis a 
transition from conceptualization to totalizing mythography?’8 With reference to Hans 
Blumenberg’s monumental Work on Myth (1985) he clarifies the nature of the debate. 
In essence, it comes down to this: whether we understand Lewis’s work as being 
coherently rooted within a specific mythic tradition, interpreting present historical 
conditions in terms of that myth’s ‘fundamental configuration’; or whether we view his 
work as an ‘art myth’ which stands apart from any single tradition, while 
simultaneously uprooting mythical ingredients to serve a relatively more spontaneous 
act of creation.9 In order to explore the possibility of a deeper, more fundamental 
resonance with Gnostic myth, of the sort suggested by Nath, it is important to see how 
																																																								
7 Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, p.4. 
8 Nath, ‘Monstrous Starlight’, p.159. 
9 For Nath this is clarified in Hans Blumenberg’s conceptual distinction between ‘art myths’ and 
‘fundamental myths’. He writes: ‘Whereas the fundamental myth is formed through an evolutionary 
process, so that its latest, surviving configuration is also its fundamental (because necessary) 
configuration, the art myth is a comparatively spontaneous and individual creation, which adapts its entire 
mythic inheritance to present conditions’ (‘Monstrous Starlight’, p.158). 
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far the mythic ingredients in Enemy of the Stars fit the Gnostic ‘pattern’, and indeed 
which variant of the Gnostic tradition it most clearly belongs to. 
There is a text from what Hans Jonas calls the ‘Iranian doctrine’ which may help 
to illuminate in more precise detail the Gnosticism of Enemy of the Stars. There is no 
evidence that Lewis was aware of this text at any point in is career, so my purpose in 
elaborating its thematic comparison with Enemy is to highlight affinity rather influence. 
The ‘Hymn of the Pearl’ is a prose narrative from the apocryphal Acts of the Apostle 
Thomas which describes the seeker of gnosis as ‘a stranger’ on a singular mission in the 
world:10 
 
When thou goest down into Egypt and bringest the One Pearl which lies in the middle 
of the sea which is encircled by the snorting serpent, thou shalt put on again thy robe of 
glory and thy mantle over it and with thy brother our next in rank be heir to our 
kingdom.11 
 
The complex symbolism at work here is brought out well by Jonas. The pearl 
symbolises the ‘pneuma’, or soul ‘in the supranatural sense’, a metaphorical designation 
which is common among many mythological systems.12 The serpent, the sea and Egypt 
are all stock Gnostic symbols of materialism which, however, refer to different spheres 
and aspects of the soul’s material enslavement. Numerous Gnostic writings describe the 
outermost circle of the material universe as being surrounded by ‘the earth-encircling 
dragon of the original chaos, the ruler or evil principle of this world’.13 This is depicted 
visually as a dragon which surrounds the world, swallowing its own tail.14  
Egypt at the time the ‘Hymn’ was written stood as a symbol of worldly 
oppression through its role in Israel’s bondage in ‘The Book of Exodus’ and through its 
association, by peoples of the East, with death — as, for instance, ‘the home of the cult 
of the dead, and therefore the kingdom of Death’ — and in the case of the ‘Hymn of the 
Pearl’, with slumber and loss of personal vitality.15 ‘Seas or waters’, Jonas writes, are 
																																																								
10 The ‘Hymn of the Pearl’ is found in the apocryphal Acts of the Apostle Thomas where it is named 
‘Song of the Apostle Judas Thomas in the Land of the Indians’, but Hans Jonas provides a translation 
from the original Syriac text in The Gnostic Religion (pp.112-129). 
11 Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, p.113. 
12 Ibid., p.125. 
13 Ibid., p.116.  
14 Ibid., p.117. 
15 Ibid., p.118. 
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‘standing gnostic symbol[s] for the world of matter or of darkness into which the divine 
has sunk.’16 
 The ‘Hymn’ is most interesting to our present purposes because of the way in 
which it conceptualizes the divided self, for here both the natural worldly self and the 
supranatural, true self (pneuma) are conceived as garments to be worn. In the first 
instance, arriving as a stranger to his ‘fellow-dwellers in the inn’, the seeker of the Pearl 
clothes himself ‘in their garments’ to evade detection, but in their company he 
succumbs to the fleshly pleasures of meat and drink.17 ‘Through the heaviness of their 
nourishment’ he falls ‘into deep slumber’ and grows forgetful of the pearl for which he 
had been sent.18 This impure garment which the stranger puts on to conceal his true 
identity from the Egyptians stands for the physical body and the material self 
(equivalent to the jiva in Eastern religions).19  
 But the Divine self is also conceived as a garment which the seeker must put on 
to attain completion. When finally he is roused by ‘the call’ and throws off the ‘filthy 
and impure garment’, the stranger seizes the pearl from the snorting serpent and returns 
to his home in the East.20 On his way he encounters his ‘robe of glory’ which had been 
sent out to meet him:  
 
As I now beheld the robe, it seemed to me suddenly to become a mirror-image of 
myself: myself entire I saw in it, and it entire I saw in myself, that we were two in 
separateness, and yet again one in the sameness of our forms […] And I cast the royal 
mantle about my entire self. Clothed therein, I ascended to the gate of salutation and 
adoration.21 
 
As this passage clarifies, salvation in Gnostic myth takes the form of a reunification of 
the divided self. In attaining Divine Unity the ‘stranger’ becomes synthesized with ‘the 
mirror-image of himself’; suggesting, as Jonas makes clear, the intriguing possibility 
																																																								
16 Ibid., p.117. 
17 Ibid., p.113. 
18 Ibid., p.114. 
19 Ibid., p.118. 
20 In the ‘Hymn’ the call takes the form of a letter from his father, the King, which ‘rose up in the form of 
an eagle […] and flew until it alighted beside me and became wholly speech’ (Jonas, The Gnostic 
Religion, pp.114, 115. 
21 Ibid., p.115. 
	 173	
that this represents ‘a twin brother or eternal original of the saviour remaining in the 
upper world during his terrestrial mission’.22  
  ‘Duplications of this kind abound in gnostic speculation’, Jonas explains at one 
point, and clearly they also help to explain a great deal about the divided self as it is 
treated by Lewis in Enemy.23 Like the stranger in the ‘Hymn of the Pearl’, Arghol also 
observes a distinction between the self that is of Divine origin, ‘the ancient race’, and 
the self that is a ‘loathsome deformity […] got through indiscriminate rubbing against 
[ones] fellows’.24 He is the archetypal Gnostic stranger in the world, rendered passive 
by mankind, hunted by the stars, and ultimately ruled over by ‘God and Fate’.25 Unlike 
the central figure in the ‘Hymn of the Pearl’, however, Arghol appears unable to attain 
gnosis.  
What appears to set Enemy apart from the Gnostic myth to which it is otherwise 
so closely related is the fact that its narrative forecloses the possibility of salvation, 
opting rather to display the depth of the human soul’s material entanglement and the 
impossibility of overcoming this. In the first place Arghol demonstrates the strain 
undertaken to rouse oneself from slumber to hear the call (he is described as being in a 
‘collapse of chronic philosophy’). Once roused, however, he faces an even more 
impossible task to distinguish which is the ‘bastard’ self and which ‘the original’. Hanp 
presents himself both as Arghol’s divine other-half (Arghol says to Hanp at one point ‘I 
wanted to make you my self’) and as a cumbrous and distracting acquaintance 
(‘impudent parasite of his solitude’).26 
As the scene and narrative of Enemy makes clear this pessimistic intensification 
of the Gnostic tragedy is partly to be explained in terms of the new historical situation. 
Berlin, ‘the great city of their world’ and a harbinger of a new kind of materialism, 
																																																								
22 Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, p.123. Jonas relates that in the Mandean Liturgies for the Dead it is 
written: ‘I go to meet my image and my image comes to meet me: it caresses and embraces me as if I 
were returning from captivity’ (The Gnostic Religion, p.122). The thematic resemblance that this Gnostic 
distinction between the two parts of the self has with ancient Egyptian, Zoroastrian and Malay schemas, 
which may have been known to Lewis, is important to note. In ancient Egyptian mythology the self is 
distinguished into five component parts of which the ‘Ba’ (the individuated, unique self, or personality) 
and the ‘Ka’ (the vital spark which gives life to that personality) form a significant dualism. In 
Zoroastrianism the true self is understood as a ‘Fravashi’, a personal spirit. In Malay mythology the 
‘conception of the Human Soul (Sĕmangat) is that of a species of “Thumbling,” “a thin, unsubstantial 
human image,” or manikin, which is temporarily absent from the body in sleep, trance, disease, and 
permanently absent after death’ (Walter William Skeat, Malay Magic: An Introduction to the Folklore 
and Popular Religion of the Malay Peninsular (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1965), p.47).  
23 Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, p.123. 
24 Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, pp.66, 71. 
25 Ibid., p.69. 
26 Ibid., pp.73, 78. 
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stands in the place of Egypt as a symbol of worldly oppression.27 This aspect of the 
narrative is clarified in the line: ‘[s]omehow […] the City had settled down on 
Arghol’.28 The fact that Arghol and Hanp are employed in the manufacture of wheels 
and are occasionally beaten by ‘the Super’, Arghol’s uncle, is also relevant to note.29 
This might lead us to suggest that the Gnostic myth is indeed being reaffirmed and 
updated with subtle references to the contemporary situation.  
Mixed in with this gnostic myth about forestalled transcendence are numerous 
other mythical ingredients, however, and it would be wise to observe how themes 
borrowed from Eastern religion intersect with the Gnostic elements in Enemy before we 
are led towards any firm conclusions about the mythic credentials of	Lewis’s Vorticism. 
The Hindu and Buddhist sources excavated by James Selby interact with the basis of 
this Gnostic myth in a remarkably coherent way. In the first instance, the Sankhya 
marriage of perusha with prakriti corresponds closely with the imprisonment of the 
Gnostic pneuma in the material world. Both mythic systems present a dualism which 
cuts through the heart of human life, suggesting that we are composed of two opposed 
metaphysical principles, broadly identifiable as spirit and matter.  
Where the Hindu and Buddhism traditions do differ from Gnosticism is in their 
distinct conceptions of ‘life’ in the context of salvation. Salvation for each entails the 
severance of spirit from matter and its subsequent reunion with the One, a 
transcendence or sublation of the two opposed principles which results in a state of 
unity. But while Eastern religions comprehend this unity as a state of non-being, a 
metaphysical void, Gnosticism treats it as the attainment of a more complete Life in the 
presence of the Divine Being. Curiously, this incongruence between the two myths does 
not raise any apparent problems of coherence within Lewis’s own myth, because the 
most striking feature of this is its rigorous adherence to Dualism against all forms of 
monism. 
In most historic instances the function of the mythical dualism is that it must be 
overcome for salvation to be achieved. Hindu, Buddhist and most Gnostic traditions 
																																																								
27 Ibid., p.72.  
28 Ibid., p.72.	
29 The relevance of the wheel here is that it symbolizes the endless and repetitive cycle in which they live, 
reflecting ‘the plight of the Soul in the labyrinth of the hostile world’, as it is conceived in Gnostic 
thought. According to this, the soul or pneuma, once captured in matter, is condemned to an endless cycle 
of existence — ‘she dies, forever to be reborn’ — and thus bears a clear resemblance to the cycle of 
samsara in Eastern religions (Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, p.67).   
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share this feature.30 But as the first principles of the Vorticist Manifesto make clear, the 
essential function of Vorticism was to maintain discord between two opposed principles 
at all costs. In Lewis’s handling, the reduction of two opposed principles to One is 
reversed, with every effort being made to maintain the dualism and prevent it slipping 
into Oneness. The strictness of the dualism which Lewis posits makes it comparable 
only with the Manichean configuration and so we are left to inquire why Lewis adheres 
so keenly to the Manichean Dualism?31 
 
(ii)  Lewis’s Vorticism as Manichean ‘Art Myth’  
 
Perhaps the clearest expression of the rationale behind Lewis’s adherence to the 
Manichean Dualism can be found in the description which he gives of his purpose in 
writing The Art of Being Ruled over a decade later. There he writes that the principal 
ailment of ‘the present ‘“transitional” society’ was its confusion of two rigidly opposed 
principles or ‘virtues’:32  
 
The virtues that we are apt to confuse in our excessive officially promoted pragmatism 
are the disruptive and the creative ones: or rather, katabolism comes too much to be 
described as life. If I kill you, that is a different thing from giving birth to you. 
In our society two virtues are badly contrasted, that of the fighter and killer 
(given such immense prestige by nineteenth-century darwinian science and philosophy) 
and that of the civilizer and maker. But the ancient and valuable iranian principle of 
duality is threatened. We confuse these two characters that we violently contrast. The 
effort in this essay is to separate them a little.33 
 
																																																								
30 Neoplatonist and Valentinian variants are examples of moderate Gnostic dualisms. 
31 In his analysis of ‘Physics of the Not-Self’, Toby Foshay has highlighted what he describes as Lewis’s 
‘inconsistency in claiming an equivalence between the monism of Platonism and (advaitic) Hinduism and 
the dualism of the war of the powers of light and darkness in Manicheism’ (Wyndham Lewis and the 
Avant-Garde, p.35). But this reading takes Lewis’s use of these religious and philosophical systems too 
much at face value and neglects to observe the aspect of Platonism and Hinduism which he actually 
harnessed in his own works. Lewis does not adopt these models wholesale, but rather borrows those 
elements which serve his strategy. Underlying the monistic metaphysic of Platonism and Hinduism is a 
structural dualism between two opposed elements. Lewis highlights this dualistic tension while 
downplaying the implicit suggestion that this can be overcome, and Oneness attained. 
32 The Art of Being Ruled, p.25. 
33 Ibid., p.25. 
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As this passage indicates, Lewis’s dualistic methods leant ultimately upon moral 
foundations. Up to now we have appraised his adherence to dualism as an analytical 
strategy and a theoretic device with which to explore the consequences of supporting 
each side in a conflict. But in his effort to reaffirm the ‘valuable iranian principle of 
duality’ (the Manichean school of Gnostic thought) Lewis reveals a deeper level of 
attachment to dualism.  
Catabolism, the process by which complex substances are broken down into 
smaller particle-units, is the scientific metaphor which Lewis uses to stand for the 
interbreeding of the ‘disruptive’ with the ‘creative’ virtues which he perceived to be 
taking place in his contemporary society. His concern that the modern world was 
initiating the collapse of hallowed dualistic distinctions and rendering even the most 
pressing issues of life and death relative is everywhere present in Lewis’s Vorticist 
works. From around the time of the Timon of Athens portfolio in 1912 Lewis’s visual 
works used what Jameson has termed ‘the square and the round’ principles as a 
symbolic shorthand for the inorganic and organic realms respectively. As we observed 
in chapter three, gradually the ‘square’ structures of the inorganic realm come to 
swallow the ‘round’, indicating a devastating conclusion to the process of 
dehumanization which he perceived to be occurring in the modern world.34 The same 
dynamic is found in Enemy, where the integrity of the self is broken apart, Arghol 
succumbing in the end to a process of ‘extermination by museumification’.  
 Clearly then, Lewis’s Vorticism has its conceptual roots in the strict duality 
presented by the Manichean tradition of Gnostic thought. But this alone does not entail 
the conclusion that what we encounter is an instance of ‘Gnosticism’ rather than simply 
‘dualism’, as Nath suggests. Indeed, upon closer examination this idea seems deeply 
problematic. Lewis’s myth behaves strangely when it is placed in the Blumenbergian 
schema which Nath deploys, in a way that is important to observe. For Blumenberg the 
most basic function of myth — the aspect which would qualify it as ‘fundamental’ — is 
to exert explanatory control over the world and thereby to lay to rest the anxiety 
inspired by what he calls the ‘absolutism of reality’.35 As a rationalization of a 
recalcitrant reality, it therefore shares the same function as science. 
																																																								
34 Jameson, ‘Wyndham Lewis’s Timon: The War of Forms’, p.26 and p.25.  
35 Hans Blumenberg, Work on Myth, trans. by Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), 
p.3. 
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Blumenberg thus rejects the ‘from mythos to logos’ schema which was born out 
of Enlightenment philosophy. Myth and metaphor, logic and science are, in 
Blumenberg’s theory, distinct but simultaneous endeavours in ‘making human existence 
possible by overcoming the problem of our biological nonadaption, our constitutional 
deficit of instinct’, as Robert Wallace comments.36 For Blumenberg, history is not to be 
conceived as ‘a teleological sequence’ but as a gradual ‘working through of solutions to 
one original all-encompassing problem, the problem of the “absolutism of reality”’.37 
The criteria against which we are supposed to judge whether a myth is fundamental or 
contingent (artistic) are thus essentially teleological and historical. For a myth to qualify 
as fundamental it must pertain to an ancient tradition which seeks to make of the world 
a conducive home for human culture.  
At first sight Lewis appears to conform to Blumenberg’s definition here. In 
‘Inferior Religions’ he expresses a similar conception of myths and religions as 
essentially ‘illusions’ to be ‘hugged and lived in’: 
 
They are like little dead Totems. Just as all Gods are a repose for humanity, the big 
religions an important refuge and rest, so these little grotesque idols are […] it is a 
world in a corner of the world, full of rest and security.38   
 
This account ties closely with Blumenberg’s account of myth as a way of imaginatively 
managing the scale and force of reality, for Lewis also conveys the sense in which 
fetishes and idols help his savage subjects to centre the world on their lived experience. 
In ‘Inferior Religions’ he also makes it clear that this is not restricted to a primitive type 
of human. The civilized also have ‘attendant objects or fetishes’ which offer them 
‘regular food for vitality’.39 So even the anthropologist may be regarded as fetishizing 
the specimens of a savage humanity which he gathers to dissect at the altar of his 
rationality. All, in the end, qualify as inferior religions, the anthropological pursuit is 
itself a totemic fiction, a myth designed to mold reality into a pleasing shape for the 
																																																								
36 Robert M. Wallace in his introduction to Blumenberg’s Work on Myth, p.xi-xii. 
37 Ibid., p.xiv. 
38 ‘Inferior Religions’ (1917), p.316. 
39 Ibid., p.316. Just as the ‘wheel at Carisbrooke imposes a set of movements on the donkey inside it’, so 
all human beings are like ‘intricately moving bobbins’ subject to a particular fascination for ‘a set of 
objects or one in particular’ (‘Inferior Religions’, p.315). For John Constable it was ‘[a] stormy 
landscape’, for Leonardo ‘a red rain on the shadowed side of heads’ and for Korin ‘the symmetrical 
gushing of water, in waves like huge vegetable insects’ (‘Inferior Religions’, p.319). For Lewis it is the 
‘specimens’ of a savage humanity which he, as their creator, fetishizes.  
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human subject. Lewis thus shares with Blumenberg the psychological characterization 
of the shared motive underlying both mythic and scientific ways to knowledge: they are 
both equally attempts of the human subject to rein in the vast expanse of the objective 
world — to control the perceived absolutism of reality — so that it can be made a place 
of rest and security. But what constitutes ‘security’ for Lewis, as an artist living in the 
historic situation of modernism, is very different to what it signified to the ancient 
mythmaker or the modern scientist.  
 From Lewis’s perspective the greatest threat to human culture was the 
impending triumph of humankind’s bid to domesticate the once wild external world. In 
The Art of Being Ruled he wrote that ‘[w]e are all slipping back into machinery, 
because we all have tried to be free’, communicating the sense in which the technos 
which had first liberated humankind from the terror and drudgery of a life enveloped by 
Nature, and spurred the species on to such an advanced stage of organization, was now 
its greatest enemy.40 The reason for this was that it was perceived to be collapsing the 
dualistic tension between self and world, subject and object, which — Lewis agreed 
with Nietzsche on this point — had first brought art into existence. The interpenetrative 
union of subject/object which was widely hailed by philosophers, writers and artists in 
these years in this sense reflects the metaphysical situation of the modern world as a 
moment when ‘the energy concealed in nature is unlocked’ and ‘no longer stands over 
against us as object’, as Martin Heidegger puts it.41 Lewis realized that the valuable 
principle of duality was threatened in the modern world and stood rigidly opposed to the 
drive towards ‘a unity in everything’.42 His Vorticist myth reflects this.  
Thus in contrast to the account of myth given by Blumenberg, Lewis’s myth 
finds ‘security’ in a wild rather than a domesticated world. In common with 
Blumenberg’s theory, it is explicable as an attempt to create a conducive home for 
human culture, but this, for Lewis, involved the renewed separation of subject from 
object, self from world; not their union. Vorticism is not an attempt to fit in with the 
world or allow art to merge any further into life, rather it arises from the struggle to 
																																																								
40 The Art of Being Ruled, p.125.  
41 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, in Basic Writings, ed. by David Farrell 
Krell (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), pp.307-342 (p.322). This quotation in a full: ‘[when] the energy 
concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up [...] We 
call it the standing-reserve [...] Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over 
against us as object’. For Heidegger, the consequence of this is that ‘the illusion comes to prevail that 
everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct [...] it seems as though man 
everywhere and always encounters only himself’ (‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p.332). 
42 Time and Western Man, p.277. 
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stand out against the reigning uniformity and resist absorption into the mechanism.43 
While ‘Blumenbergian man creates his “symbolic forms” in order to overcome his [...] 
self-contradictory natural state as a creature lacking the instincts to fit into a “niche” in 
nature’, Lewis, on the other hand, affirms this self-contradictory state and relishes his 
role as ‘an oddity outside the machine’, the enemy of all who seek coherent self and a 
safe niche in existence.44  
In this sense the orientation of Vorticist myth towards the historical context of 
modernity is of mythos against logos. Enemy particularly juxtaposes these two ways of 
knowing the world, conceptually aligning myth with the ‘creative’ principle and 
logocentrism with the ‘disruptive’, as we observed in chapter four. In this way Lewis’s 
myth is a bid to evade domestication and a programmed effort to ‘rewild’ a tamely 
uniform and rational world.45 Far from being a safe shelter from the dread of an 
uncontrollable reality, Lewis’s myth is an attempt to absolutize the modern reality and 
prevent it falling into the clutches of the comprehensive and universal logic which is 
entailed by ‘katabolism’.46 Examined within the Blumenbergian schema which Nath 
utilizes, Lewis’s myth is thus a counteroffensive movement against the prevailing urge 
towards unity of subject with object which underpins all historic mythological and 
scientific endeavour. It is a myth anchored in the modern world and the altered situation 
of humankind there, which starts not from the traditional problem of the ‘absolutism of 
reality’, but from the new problem facing humankind: the omnipotence of human 
rationality.  
T. E. Hulme’s distinction between ancient and modern variants of abstraction in 
art is relevant to this distinction. Both are expressions of a divorce between humankind 
and nature, but whereas the former may be read as an expression of humankind’s dread 
at being unable to control natural forces, the latter emerges out of a situation of 
humankind’s technological mastery over nature. Lewis’s myth belongs to this latter 
category. It figuratively serves to stall rationality’s implacable drive towards ultimate 
																																																								
43 In support of this claim I refer to Lewis’s complaints in ‘Futurism, Magic and Life’ that ‘Art merges in 
Life again everywhere’ (BLAST, p.132) and the modern situation is one in which ‘Art has to behave itself 
and struggle’ (BLAST, p.133). 
44 Robert M. Wallace in his introduction to Blumenberg’s Work on Myth, p.xv; Lewis, ‘Physics of the 
Not-Self’, p.195. 
45 Robert Caserio has suggested that ‘the creators of modernist works are negative demystifiers’ in that 
‘they unmask absolutism, rationalism, idealism—and all illusions’ (The Novel in England, 1900–1950 
(New York: Twayne, 1999), p.82). Lewis’s activities during Vorticism provide an eloquent counterpoint 
to this idea. 
46 In Roland Barthes’ terms it is a programmed effort to ‘multiply signifiers, not to attain some ultimate 
signified’ (S/Z (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p.165. 
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mastery over nature by re-instating an imaginative gap between the human subject and 
the external world; meting out agency from the already bloated human subject to the 
external world in order to attain an equal distribution of power between the two, and 
thus prevent the dualism from collapse.47 As a myth of modernity Vorticism ultimately 
serves to mystify and ‘make-strange’ the all-too-rational structures of the modern world. 
Mythos is being set strategically against logos, in the Enlightenment schema, precisely 
to shake the rationalist foundations of the present civilization.  
William Blake once again provides a useful correlative for our analysis of 
Lewis’s Vorticism’s mythic credentials. Blake scholars routinely describe his oeuvre as 
constituting a ‘mythology’, emphasizing the interconnected symbols and mythemes 
which run through his poems and paintings. As Leo Damrosch notes, Blake’s myth also 
overlaps at numerous instances with the central ideas of Gnostic myth, yet in his view 
this was ‘not because he “was” a Gnostic but because the Gnostic form of 
Neoplatonism’ — represented for Damrosch by the philosophical teachings of Plotinus 
and Valentinus — ‘arrived at similar answers by an analogous route’.48 The 
characteristics which Blake shares with the Gnostic form of Neoplatonism are to be 
found especially in the reconciliation of dualistic and monistic metaphysical 
interpretations which is offered by the doctrine of emanationism. Thus, despite adhering 
to an emanationist metaphysic which closely resembles Plotinus’ philosophy, Blake’s 
myth stands apart from the Gnostic tradition in Damrosch’s view.  
What is crucial to observe is the way in which both Blake and Lewis revert to 
myth, and Gnostic models in particular, in their respective critiques of modernity. 
Although their mythological endeavours clearly resonate within the fundamental 
structure of the ancient mythic tradition of Gnosticism, the orientation of mythos in both 
Blakean and Lewisian systems is as a category opposed to logos. These are not, as 
Blumenberg would have it, sibling techniques in a programmed domestication of the 
wild. The original impetus of ‘fundamental myth’ would thus appear to be lost in these 
‘art myths’ which emerge after and about modernity. Indeed the broader function of a 
‘myth’ which is composed after the Enlightenment and which is motivated by critical 




47 This, it should be noted, is the ultimate function of Lewis’s use of hypallage in Enemy of the Stars. 
48 Damrosch, Symbol and Truth in Blake’s Myth, p.168. 
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(iii) Myth as the Other of Enlightenment Modernity 
 
Lewis’s myth may have grown out of the Gnostic tradition, but it is important to look 
towards a more recent discourse on myth in order to appreciate the full significance of 
Lewis’s creative efforts in this period. In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 
(1987) Jürgen Habermas provides clues to the proper historic situation and cultural 
significance of Lewis’s myth: 
  
Since the close of the eighteenth century, the discourse of modernity has had a single 
theme under ever new titles: the weakening of the forces of social bonding, 
privatization, and diremption — in short, the deformations of a one-sidedly rationalized 
everyday praxis which evoke the need for something equivalent to the unifying power 
of religion. Some place their hope in the reflective power of reason, or at least in a 
mythology of reason; others swear by the mythopoetic power of an art that is supposed 
to form the focal point of a regenerated public life. What Hegel called the need for 
philosophy was transformed from Schlegel until Nietzsche into the need — critical of 
reason — for a new mythology.49 
 
It is precisely as an expression of this need for a new mythology, rather than as a 
renewed utterance of an ancient mythological system, that Lewis’s Vorticist works 
appear most significant. Clearly Lewis’s Vorticism was in part a response to the 
Nietzschean idea that ‘[i]n the forms of a revived mythology, art can reacquire the 
character of a public institution and develop the power to regenerate the ethical totality’ 
of the community.50  
In this Lewis was not alone. Numerous modernists similarly used myth as a 
teleological foundation for modern art. Where disagreement arises, this concerns the 
manner in which myth and ritual are to be evoked in order to instigate a cultural rebirth 
appropriate to the modern situation of art. It is relevant to note that during the time that 
T. S. Eliot was formulating his own schema for a ‘mythical method’ he criticized 
Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring in his ‘London Letter’ of October 1921 for delving too 
wholeheartedly into the ‘entertaining stories’ which anthropological studies of myth 
																																																								
49 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p.139. 
50 Ibid., p.88. 
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provide without giving a ‘sense of the present’.51 These comments provide a crucial 
indication of the direction in which Eliot’s own theory of modern art was leaning in 
1921, for in The Waste Land (and indeed in Joyce’s Ulysses) the ‘immense panorama of 
futility and anarchy’ which Eliot associated with the modern world was treated as the 
essential substance of the poetic narrative; myth being used as an organizing structure 
which could bring form to what would otherwise be a chaos.52 Myth, for Eliot, is 
significant for the reason that it makes ‘the modern world possible for art’.53 
Eliot’s criticism of Stravinsky is echoed by Adorno, who similarly questioned 
the effectiveness of art’s retreat into an idealized primitive past. In Philosophy of New 
Music (1973) Adorno expressed the view that the primitivist innovations which were 
pioneered by Stravinsky ultimately failed for the reason that they represented the 
modern artist’s familiar ‘aesthetic flirtation with barbarism’ without ‘being burdened 
with meaning’.54 He extends the claim to Picasso’s Cubist paintings, suggesting that the 
musical experiments that were being undertaken by Stravinsky and Schoenberg drew 
their principal inspiration from contemporary ‘developments in painting’.55 The criteria 
to which Adorno appeals in his critique of modernism’s ‘archaism’ are important to 
highlight.56 ‘For Adorno’, as Butler clarifies, ‘the main task of Modernism is to evolve, 
and, what is more, to do so in a law-governed manner as shown in the work of Hegel 
and Marx’.57 From this perspective works like The Rite of Spring and Les Demoiselles 
D’Avignon attempt to conceal their ‘reactionary aim’ while encouraging their audience 
to ‘participat[e] in the collective force in magical regression’, as Adorno puts it.58 The 
end result is that the aura of mythical enchantment is simulated by an artist motivated 
primarily by disenchantment with his own historical situation.  
																																																								
51 This quote in full: ‘[i]t was interesting to anyone who had read The Golden Bough and similar works, 
but hardly more than interesting. In Art there should be interpenetration and metamorphosis. Even The 
Golden Bough can be read in two ways: as a collection of entertaining stories, or as a revelation of that 
vanished mind of which our mind is a continuation. In everything in the Sacre du Printemps, except in 
the music, one missed the sense of the present’ (T. S. Eliot, ‘London Letter’, The Dial, 71.4 (October 
1921), pp.452-455 <http://www.std.com/~raparker/exploring/tseliot/works/london-letters/london-letter-
1921-10.html#paragraph-1> [accessed 7 April 2016], p.453).  
52 Eliot, ‘Ulysses, Order and Myth’, p.167. 
53 Ibid., p.167. 
54 Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, p.108. 
55 Ibid., p.141. 
56 Ibid., p.120. 
57 Butler, Early Modernism, p.118. 
58 Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, p.112 and 119.  
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The idea which both Eliot and Adorno wish to communicate is presented by 
Lewis also in the axiom that ‘Art must be organic with its Time’.59 The great danger 
with modernism’s turn to myth was that art might ultimately become enveloped by its 
own negative orientation towards the present condition of culture, and thus be prevented 
from reacquiring the character of ‘a public institution’. This is clarified by Butler:  
 
As the language of rhythm, or the ambivalently emancipated dissonances of atonality, 
or the multiple perspectives of Cubism dominate a work, there is a very significant loss, 
which is compounded by the appeal to the primitive, collective, and mythical depths of 
the unconscious. It is part of the destruction of our sense of the individuality of human 
character, and of a corresponding critical commitment to a personal sensibility as 
projected through an innovatory artistic language.60  
 
Butler’s comments here capture the naivety which stalked modernism’s turn to myth. 
As a bid to regenerate the ethical totality of the community, modern art is often 
peculiarly incapacitated by its own methods. Through the very ‘techniques of 
strangeness’ which gave modernist works of art their primitive aura, there comes a loss 
of communicability which threatens to close art off from its wider public altogether.61 
Thus, in a figurative sense, myth was modernism’s mirage oasis, a dreamt of source of 
communal nourishment which never really materialized.  
As a quest for modernity’s alienated ‘other’ in myth, and an expression of an 
essentially aesthetic relation to reality, Lewis’s Vorticism is, in one sense, just one 
among many art myths of the avant-garde. But it is an art myth which is strangely 
duplicitous, playing a double hand. While Lewis presents a myth against modernity — 
typical of the contemporary context of modernist primitivism — it is also a myth which 
is both crystallized and deconstructed self-consciously through an anthropological 
perspective; through the lens of the radicalized Enlightenment, in a manner of speaking. 
Enemy of the Stars especially demonstrates that pure myth is not possible to the modern 
artist, merely a montage of mythic typologies cobbled together out of anthropological 
knowledge and modernity itself, through which glimpses of the original mythical 
darkness are nevertheless discernible. Lewis stands therefore with one foot inside and 
the other outside the nineteenth-century discourse on the mythic renewal of art, 
																																																								
59 Lewis, ‘Manifesto’, in BLAST, p.34. 
60 Butler, Early Modernism, p.118-119. 
61 See Kugel, The Techniques of Strangeness in Symbolist Poetry (1971). 
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highlighting both the power and the weakness of myth as a source of art’s salvation in 
the modern world.    
The key theoretic development made by Lewis’s Vorticism within this discourse 
is the step which it takes beyond the ‘messianic’ traditions which precede it, presenting 
instead an essentially ambivalent critique of the theoretical terrain upon which 
modernism’s turn to myth stands. It is important to understand more about the 
messianic traditions from which he departed before we can situate Lewis’s contribution 
to this discourse with more precision. In Habermas’s view Nietzsche’s Dionysian 
philosophy may be read as a radical development of the ‘Romantic messianism’ which 
had dominated early nineteenth-century critiques of Enlightenment modernity.62 As he 
points out, the key shift in theory and sensibility which marks Nietzsche off from his 
Romantic predecessors was in disentangling the redemptive promise of the god 
Dionysus (‘the god who is coming’) from the figure of Christ; the two being perceived 
by his Romantic predecessors as ‘parallel’ figures, both having ‘died and left behind 
bread and wine until [their] return’.63 
In Romantic messianism the investment of a primordial Dionysian potency in 
the figure of Christ had served a particular purpose. It provided a way of maintaining 
the integrity of roots of Western culture while at the same time disavowing the 
rationalism which had grown from these roots, suggesting that the spiritual deficit 
within modernity could be accounted for by reconnecting Western culture with a prior 
stage of its own development. Romanticism in this way kindled hopes for modernity’s 
redemption, indicating a way in which ‘the principle of subjectivity — deepened and at 
the same time authoritatively brought to dominance by the Reformation and the 
Enlightenment — could lose its narrowness’ through renewed devotion to the 
Dionysian figure of Christ.64   
Nietzsche enters this discussion as the first theorist to suggest that this toxic 
rationalizing and subjectivizing tendency within Western culture may be traced beyond 
the modern epoch back to the Christian and Socratic roots from which, he argued, it had 
first emerged. In the philosophy of Nietzsche, as Habermas writes: 
 
																																																								
62 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p.92. 
63 Ibid., p.91.  
64 Ibid., p.92. 
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the criticism of modernity dispenses for the first time with its retention of an 
emancipatory content. Subject-centred reason is confronted with reason’s absolute 
other. […] A ‘break-up of the principle of individuation’ becomes the escape route from 
modernity.65  
 
In this way Nietzsche took a radical step beyond the critical parameters of 
Romanticism. Observing no way of reconciling the modern logos with the lost mythos 
of humankind’s past, he sets these two principles against each other in dynamic conflict, 
calling ultimately for a revolution which would overthrow the ‘bastard form’ in favour 
of the ‘original’, to use Lewisian terminology.  
Lewis — a key figure among what Rebecca Beasley has described as the ‘anti-
romantic modernists’ — stands in relation to Nietzsche as Nietzsche had stood to his 
Romantic predecessors, taking a step beyond the theoretical parameters which he 
inherited.66 Yet this step is not one of radicalization or intensification of the critique of 
modernity. Rather it takes the form of a theoretical withdrawal from the discussion, 
which serves to highlight the theoretical parameters within which it was taking place. In 
light of this, it is not difficult to observe the functional value which Gnostic myth had in 
Lewis’s developing thought. In Lewis’s Vorticism the role of Nietzsche’s (and 
Romanticism’s) Dionysian principle, the god who is coming, is transposed into a 
Gnostic idiom of the ‘alien God’, the God who is perpetually absent.67  
 
(iv) The Role of the ‘Alien God’ in Lewis’s Dualistic Pattern of Thinking 
 
The most marked effect of Lewis’s theoretical manoeuvre in replacing the Dionysian 
with the Gnostic mythological model is that the criterion of the subject’s salvation is 
removed to an impossible distance. Both ‘origin’ and ultimate ‘destiny’ are in this way 
forestalled and the practical business of life highlighted. In Time and Western Man 




65 Ibid., p.94. 
66 Beasley, ‘Vortorussophilia’, p.47. 
67 A fuller account of the ‘alien God’ of Gnostic religion can be found in Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, 
pp.49-51. 
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If there is a God, we can say, we have, for this life, our backs turned on each other. This 
must be so for things to be bearable at all for us as creatures: for such unrelieved 
intimacy as would otherwise exist, such perpetual society — of such a pervasive, 
psychic, overwhelming kind — would not be socially possible. We at least must 
pretend not to notice each other’s presence, God and ourselves to be alone. […] To 
confront or ‘encounter’ God is for us physically impossible, we can conclude; we can 
only see God, if at all, from behind.68 
 
As these comments clarify, Lewis was alive to the consequences of encountering God 
‘face to face’. Such an encounter, as he makes clear, would be inimical to life. A few 
lines on he writes: ‘As we define ourselves, we negate Perfection, understood as an 
absolute Unity […] Whatever happens, we are bound to shut the door upon Mr. 
Bradley’s Absolute, or upon Spinoza’s God’.69  
As this makes clear, Lewis stood for a life lived under the principium 
individuationis and thus against all doctrines of unity, whether religious or 
philosophical. The ideal of ‘Perfection’ is discouraged by Lewis in ‘Essay on the 
Objective of Plastic Art in Our Time’ also, the ultimate rationale there being that the 
arts — and all human endeavour — test our ‘relative’, not absolute, ‘prowess’: ‘you 
must not mix it too strongly, or vitalize it too much: for he who sees God, dies’.70 For 
Lewis the ultimate aim of all human endeavour is the cultivation of a bearable and 
productive surface life, free from the ecstatic paralysis of union with the Absolute. He 
presents a pragmatic solution to the problems of existence which, rather than making 
any bold claims for ultimate redemption, seeks simply to reconcile the human subject 
with its relatively limited sphere of agency.  
 ‘[Q]uestions of fusion and separation’ are central to Lewis’s developing pattern 
of thinking during the Vorticist period and remain a dominant theme throughout his 
career.71 They become more distinct in his critical works of the 1920s. In ‘The Critical 
Realists’ he called in the support of the Canadian philosopher Roy Wood Sellars to help 
him formulate, in more theoretical terms, his antagonism towards the doctrine of unity 
which he perceived to dominate contemporary philosophical discourses. He quotes from 
																																																								
68 Time and Western Man, p.372. 
69 Ibid., p.372. 
70 ‘Essay on the Objective of Plastic Art in Our Time’, pp.25, 30. 
71 ‘The Critical Realists’, p.25. 
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Sellars’s 1916 book Critical Realism: A Study of the Nature and Conditions of 
Knowledge: 
 
‘[…] I open my eyes and perceive concrete things. What are concrete things? They are 
not merely character-complexes. They are co-reals to be adjusted to, independent, 
common, and full of various capacities… Perceived things are co-real with the 
percipient, and independent of him in exactly the same way and to the same degree that 
they are independent of one another […] Mr. Bergson desires a penetrative intuition of 
the object in which the subject and the object somehow merge’. […] But Mr. Sellars at 
least disposes of this sticky, adhesive flowing together. Fresh air once more passes 
between people’s legs.72 
 
The common-sense epistemology which Lewis advocates here can be easily traced back 
to BLAST and particularly the humorous warning which he presented to the artist of his 
day, not to lean too near ‘the surface of Life’ for fear their nose would be ‘nipped off’ 
by ‘some Pecksniff-shark […] or other lurker beneath [their] image’.73 The creative 
subject’s penetrative intuition of the object-world is depicted in this instance as a sort of 
deadly tryst in which the lover will be consumed by the beloved.  
Lewis’s reference to Narcissus in this passage from ‘Futurism, Magic and Life’ 
communicates his concern about the solipsistic trait to withdraw into subjectivity which 
was evident within his contemporary culture. But equally the ‘Pecksniff-shark’ which 
lurks ‘beneath his image’ is a metaphor for the encroachment of object into the territory 
traditionally associated with subject. Lewis’s comments resonate with the general 
tendency among his contemporary fiction writers to either heighten subjectivity so 
thoroughly that the objective world is negated — Joyce, as Eliot writes in his first essay 
on Milton (1936), dispenses entirely with the ‘visible world’ around half way through 
Ulysses — or else to attain a sense of what Virginia Woolf described in The Waves 
(1931) as ‘the world seen without a self’.74 Despite the different orientations of these 
alternative ‘routes to modernism’, as Rosemary Summer convincingly argues, they are 
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73 Lewis, ‘Futurism, Magic and Life’, in BLAST, p.134-5. 
74 T. S. Eliot, ‘Milton I’ (1936), On Poetry and Poets (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), pp.138-145 
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both ‘doing the same thing’.75 Whether ‘penetrative intuition’ was to be sought through 
the interior or the exterior world, modernist writers ran in parallel lines towards the 
collapse of the subject/object dualism. For Lewis, the maintenance of the dualism was 
of critical importance in ensuring the proper functioning of art.  
In Lewis’s pattern of thinking object — referred to elsewhere as ‘Nature’, the 
capital ‘N’ indicating its metaphysical status — plays a significant supporting role in 
artistic creation as the eternal antagonist of the human subject. In his early thought this 
deadly other is cast in a vindictive and mischievous role, exploiting human pretensions 
and always having the last laugh. In ‘Inferior Religions’ he described it as the ‘bogey of 
True Life’ and ‘the Sovereign force beneath the surface’.76 In both this description and 
the one offered in ‘Futurism, Magic and Life’ in BLAST we are given the idea of a 
hidden power always lurking beneath the surface of life, and advised that the subject 
‘should only approach so near as is necessary for a good view’.77 This position is 
reiterated in the second issue of BLAST:  
 
There is Yourself: and there is the Exterior World, that fat mass you browse on. […] Do 
not confuse yourself with it, or weaken the esoteric lines of fine original being. Do not 
marry it, either, to a maiden. […] The thought of the old Body-and-Soul, Male-and-
Female, Eternal Duet of Existence, can perhaps be of help to you, if you hesitate still to 
invent yourself properly.78 
 
The invitation to unity is again depicted here as an attempt at seduction which the 
subject must refuse if it is to preserve its personal integrity and creative potency. In a 
way that is reminiscent of Odysseus’s close encounter with the song of the Sirens, 
Lewis conceived the subject’s enticement to marry or otherwise abscond with object as 
a sure route to destruction.   
 However attractive the sublime union may appear — even if, in the guise of the 
Absolute, it is the dream that propels human endeavour forward — we must, according 
to Lewis, be sufficiently prudent to realize that it would be a catastrophic destiny to 
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76 ‘Inferior Religions’ (1917), p.318. 
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78 Lewis, ‘Wyndham Lewis Vortex No.1’, in BLAST 2, p.91. 
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seek in life. The passionate religious invocation of a blessed after-life is, for Lewis, in 
the end an invitation to death. It is likely that his respect for Gnosticism springs largely 
from its classification of the relationship between God and humankind — extreme 
among mythical and religious systems in its pessimism — as one of apparently 
insurmountable separation.  
Art and religion in this way come to be understood by Lewis as phenomena 
which perform a serious function in maintaining a necessary separation between subject 
and object. He writes in an unpublished section in the proofs of ‘The Perfect Action’: 
 
Art is identified — it is identifiable — with the arrival on the scene of the individual or 
Subject: and its disappearance is coeval with the death or suppression of the Subject [...] 
Both art and religion are phenomena of separation [...] They are the expression of a 
cleavage between an inside and an outside, a Self and a Not-self [...] They are terms to 
express the same foreign principle that comes into existence when the cleavage between 
one thing and another is sufficiently great to require this third principle. They are the 
organization, as it were, of nothing: and the ‘god’ is always the separator, the necessary 
third principle, for subject and object, once the subject has been born.79 
 
His mythological or religious ‘position’ comes more clearly into focus here, since the 
principal value of God, or whatever principle of metaphysical Unity we may wish to 
fetishize, is that it functions as the benefactor of the artist, offering the subject a sort of 
metaphysical privacy wherein ‘human individuality [could] be regarded as [its own] 
kind of artificial godhood’.80 These later discussions on the function of art and religion 
resonate closely with the pattern of thinking which Lewis developed in his Vorticist 
works. Throughout all these works we find Lewis in a complex relationship with the 
thought of Nietzsche, struggling to free himself of Nietzsche’s Dionysian messianism 
whilst simultaneously developing a more complex Gnostic messianism of his own.  
Lewis’s opposition to Nietzsche and his modernist adherents was based on his 
observation that the Dionysian hypothesis ultimately failed at precisely what it claimed 
to achieve. In attempting to emancipate the subject from its narrowing path in modern 
existence, to offer a way out of a claustrophobic and isolated form of selfhood, 
Nietzsche presented the ideal of a regained union with the vital, chthonic pulse of 
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Meat and Postmodernism’, p.236-237. 
80 Time and Western Man, p.372. 
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existence. But for Lewis the turn to myth and ritual was itself an inward turn, which 
lured the modern subject into a nostalgic trance, and thus prevented it engaging 
productively with its new historic situation. It amounted in the end to a naïve 
withdrawal from the subject/object dualism and thus, contrary to Nietzsche’s own 
wishes, ultimately heralded the dissolution of art. Lewis’s adherence to dualism presents 
a warning then, that what his contemporaries celebrated as a way of freeing the modern 
subject from its narrowing sphere of agency was in reality a decisive step further 
towards subjective immersion, which tokened the death or suppression of the subject 
and the extinction of art. 
For Lewis, ‘[t]he Romantic retreat into subjective expression is not only 
impoverished but also naïve’, as Paul March-Russell writes.81 But equally, insofar as 
‘the freedom of the artist and the absolute priority of personal vision’ became the 
theoretical basis for his own art philosophy, ‘then it appears as only an extreme 
romantic individualism’, as Levenson states.82 The Romantic aspect of Lewis’s Gnostic 
messianism ought not to be overlooked. But this is a kind of Romanticism which goes 
very much against the grain of modernist primitivism, taking great care to bolster the 
ailing subject/object dualism and thereby to re-invigorate hopes of modernity’s 
redemption. From Romantic and Dionysian variants of messianism, Lewis moved in the 
direction of the fundamental dualism of Gnosticism, which appealed to him for the 
security which it vouchsafed art as a phenomenon requiring metaphysical separation in 
order to flourish. 
How Lewis came to this critical position is a matter which is important to 
pursue. We are now familiar with the sense in which his philosophy never entirely 
settled in a solid and durable ‘system of thought’. Rather what we encounter is a fluid 
‘pattern of thinking’ which was susceptible to alterations at each stage of its 
development. An important stage of this process, which has so far been absent from the 
analysis, is to be found in Lewis’s earliest known writings. There is a moment during a 
very formative period of Lewis’s early development as a painter and writer when we 
find him wrestling with questions of fusion and separation in a way that reveals a great 
deal about his move beyond Nietzsche’s influence.  
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(v) The Subject/Object Dualism and the Aesthetic Redemption of 
Modernity  
 
In a journal entry of August 1908 we can tap into an important moment in Lewis’s 
intellectual development, when Nietzsche’s Dionysian hypothesis loomed large in his 
thoughts. This was written at a significant moment of change in Lewis’s life, during the 
last summer of seven years which he spent travelling the European centres of culture to 
study art, literature and philosophy. In August Lewis escaped the social and romantic 
entanglements of his life in Paris for a summer sojourn with his mother on the Brittany 
coastline.83 One evening, as he entered the deserted square in the small Breton town of 
Clohars after the village fete had faded into evening, the twenty-four year-old Lewis 
perceived among the local inhabitants of the town the materials for philosophical 
speculation about the different orientations within human nature.  
He begins by observing the way in which the village elders had positioned 
themselves apart from the evening’s festivities: 
 
the group of four or five men come together [...] having now created their own & 
particular atmosphere, each man still robed, physically & spiritually in the garment of 
strangeness or rather in the nakedness of strangeness84 
 
In Bergsonian terms these men are the dried out remnants of a wave of life, left exposed 
by the departing tide of the community’s celebration. Although united in a 
‘brotherhood’ we are told that each man is ‘still robed, physically & spiritually in the 
garment of strangeness’. Here ‘strangeness’ is being used to signify individuation, the 
separation of the self from the crowd. Lewis’s vacillation over whether this is more 
accurately described as a ‘garment’ or a ‘nakedness’ indicates that, at this juncture, he is 
uncertain whether the individual is an essential or contingent unit of ‘life’ and thus 
whether the principle of individuation or the principle of unity is the profounder 
philosophical characterization of human nature.  
Nevertheless, Lewis clearly wishes to convey the sense in which these men 
parade a thicker, more pervasive sense of self than those who continued carousing into 
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the evening. As he would write around ten years later in an unpublished essay entitled 
‘William James, Russell and Pantheism’:85 
 
What life is busy doing, fundamentally and all the time, in its material evolution, is 
getting individuality; separating itself, fencing itself off, intensifying its particularity. 
But that can only be done by a progressive hardening and stabilizing — by a 
compromise between itself and death. [...] It makes the mould as resistant as it can, and 
gets as much fluid and fiery ‘sensation’ into it as it can.86 
 
Although these ideas are obviously derived from Bergson’s theory of the evolution of 
species, they readily apply to the isolated outcrop of individuals Lewis discusses in 
‘Breton Journal’. The old men in the square represent the residue of the day’s 
celebrations, but they are also the densely layered counterparts of their youthful vigour, 
reclining within the weighty ‘garments’ of selfhood, which a lifetime has gathered as a 
mode of insulation against envelopment by the ‘wider mechanism’ of life.87  
 The spectacle of the old men leads Lewis to muse about the other faction at the 
fete who revel in a scene of bacchanalian rites:  
 
The[se] fêtes are essentially orgies. […] All these people bring all their indignations, all 
their revolts, and bewilder’d dreams, and sacrifice them [...] instead of keeping 
jealously their passions & reveries hidden in their hearts, they come here and fling all to 
the winds, leave themselves bare, make a bonfire of what the intelligence tells us is 
most precious.88 
 
The thing the intelligence tells us is most precious is implicitly the self or ego. The 
function of the dance is that it affords those who partake in it a moment of union which 
is achieved precisely because the sober, individuated self is dissolved in dance. As 
Frank Kermode writes in ‘Poet and Dancer before Diaghilev’, the dance ‘belongs to a 
period before the self and the world were divided, and so achieves naturally that 
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“original unity”’.89 This idea, which was central to Nietzsche’s theory in The Birth of 
Tragedy, clearly exerted a great theoretical attraction to the young Lewis. He continues: 
 
Many in these fêtes, in the society of their comrades or of some one met there, know the 
sweetness of this union, & a melancholy at this death, — this dissipation, this gross 
throwing away of something born to the ideal, without knowing the cause of either.90 
 
His admiration for the dancers and fascination with the glorious ‘dissipation’ which it 
involves, reveals that Lewis was at this stage deeply attuned to Nietzsche’s Dionysian 
philosophy. 
 Yet there are already subtle indications of his later theoretical departure from 
Nietzsche. In the first instance this can be seen in his vacillation over the proper 
orientation of self: whether towards personal individuation or dissolution within a 
collective unity. His later support for the philosophy of the subject against Nietzsche’s 
Dionysian philosophy was founded on theoretical support for the former interpretation, 
but at this early stage he remains undecided, preferring to explore the two sides to 
human existence as opposed but complementary aspects of life. Significantly, however, 
we can already discern a binary logic in Lewis’s thinking at this time. A few lines after 
his comments on the ‘sweetness of union’ he explores the value of the antagonism 
between self and world, subject and object, suggesting that the strength of one depends 
on the correlative strength of the other:  
 
The world must not distend with our spirits, if we are to be gay: if material life grew 
larger & fairer materially & not only by the spell of our imagination, in our moments of 
inspiration, we should not feel the interior change, & have no measure by which to 
judge the greatness of our souls: & for the proper explosion of our animal spirits, on 
occasions of festivity, cramped material conditions is almost an essential.91 
 
This passage is highly informative of the way in which Lewis tended, from a very early 
stage, to analyse phenomena in what Wragg has termed ‘structurally binding 
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dualities’.92 Indeed, it appears to demonstrate that Lewis’s use of dualistic 
interpretations is contrary to the definition provided by Val Plumwood. Lewis’s 
dualistic encounters, rather than resulting from the ‘denied dependency’ of a superior 
element on an inferior counterpart, appear to result from a necessary and mutual 
dependency between two alternative and thus conceptually opposed elements. For the 
spirit to ascend, matter must descend; for the self to grow to greatness, the world must 
provide it with ‘cramped material conditions’. Without such limiting factors, ‘spirit’ or 
‘self’ would exist in a void.  
 Here then we can already observe the rationale that would lead Lewis to support 
the absolute Dualism of Manichaeism: the two elements in the dualism are mutually 
dependent on one another. Crucially we also find, in the realization of his own status in 
the fete, Lewis’s earliest formulation of the role and responsibility of the artist as a 
perpetual outsider: 
 
The artist, in his defiance of Fate, has always remain’d a recluse, & the enemy of such 
orgaic participation of life, and often lives without prooving [sic] this emotion felt in the 
midst of it’s wastefulness.93 
 
This passage is significant, for it demonstrates how ‘the search for Dionysus [is] 
blocked by the artist’s cultural marginality’, as Wragg suggests.94 Baudelaire’s 
conception of the artist as ‘flâneur’ — an outsider observing critically from a distance 
the ways and means of social participation — informs Lewis’s critique of Nietzsche’s 
Dionysian hypothesis. His comments indicate that he was already at this stage inclining 
towards a conception of art as a phenomenon of separation and thus as an activity which 
depended upon the comprehension of ‘life’ in terms of the principle of individuation. 
Despite being registered in a tone of anguish at not fitting in with the orgiastic rites of 
the community, Lewis’s early realization of the role of the artist thus initiated the 
disentanglement of his own thought from that of Nietzsche.  
 Lewis’s early relationship with Nietzsche was a complex process of give and 
take. He denounced the orgiastic participation in life which Nietzsche had rhapsodized 
about and affirmed instead the artist’s responsibility to stand back from the void of 
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primordial unity, preferring to hold fast to ‘what the intelligence tells us is most 
precious’.95 In this way he gestures towards a redemptive possibility within reason and 
the philosophy of the subject, a view which is entirely opposed to Nietzsche’s radical 
solution. But some aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy became stock ideas in Lewis’s 
own pattern of thinking. He accepted wholeheartedly, for example, Nietzsche’s 
emphasis on the centrality of art and affirmed Nietzsche’s dialectical definition of art as 
a synthetic phenomenon which grew out of the colliding forces of reason and myth.  
As the following passage in Time and Western Man indicates, Lewis also 
affirmed Nietzsche’s dialectical definition of ‘action’: 
 
action is impossible without an opposite — ‘it takes two to make a quarrel.’ The 
dynamical — or what Nietzsche called the dionysiac, and which he professed — is a 
relation, a something that happens, between two or more opposites, when they meet in 
their pyrrhic encounters. The intellect works alone. But it is precisely this solitariness of 
thought, this prime condition for intellectual success, that is threatened by mystical 
mass-doctrines.96 
 
Here Lewis uses Nietzsche’s relational theory to temper the more ‘fanatical’ and 
‘religious form of the doctrine of action’ which was prevalent among his 
contemporaries.97 He supports Nietzsche’s definition of ‘action’ as something which 
occurs when two forces collide. He disapproves, however, of the way in which 
Nietzsche’s modernist inheritors had gleaned from this the rationale for a pseudo-
mystical conception of ‘Action’ and ‘Life’, and the messianic purpose which these 
served in elaborating a new route of salvation for a spiritually bankrupt humankind. 
There are thus clues in this passage that Lewis did not oppose Nietzsche as much as the 
radical incarnation of his key ideas in modernism. Certainly the relational, dualistic 
structure of Nietzsche’s Dionysian philosophy, and the primacy which it gave art as a 
world-changing activity, appear to have shaped Lewis’s early thought to a profound 
degree. The way Nietzsche’s philosophy would be read by the majority of Lewis’s 
contemporaries — as a battle cry for absolute ‘Action’ and ‘Life’ — has more to do 
with a general tide change which was occurring in European thought at the close of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. 
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The German logician Gottlob Frege gave voice to this in his 1894 review of 
Husserl’s The Philosophy of Arithmetic, where he declared that there had become a 
great ‘confusion of the subjective with the objective’ in contemporary philosophy and 
called ‘for the sun of truth to [once more] penetrate the fog which arises out of the 
confusion of psychology and logic’.98 Frege’s comments serve as an effective 
seismograph of the will to collapse all traditional dualisms which dominated philosophy 
at this time. Lewis’s Vorticist works reflect a similar idea. The ultimate purpose of 
modern art, as Lewis conceived it, was to maintain the dualism of subject and object 
against all threats of collapse. From this perspective, the ‘Breton Journal’ clearly 
provides the blueprint for the later Vorticist art myth. The artist, according to Lewis, 
was a solitary creature who occupied the middle ground in an eternal tug-of-war 
between individuation and immersion, battling ceaselessly to maintain the sacred 
dualism against all threats of collapse. 
 
(vi) BLAST: The Handbook of External Culture for Inner Barbarians 
 
We may now be in a better position to assess the situation of Lewis’s Vorticism within 
the philosophical discourse of modernity. This discourse, as Habermas notes, has 
largely been defined by two opposed critical camps which grew out of the 
Enlightenment. On the one hand there are those who advocate a ‘radicalized 
enlightenment’, seeking to balance modernity’s spiritual deficit by means of reason 
itself.99 On the other hand there are those who seek to abandon the path of reason 
altogether in favour of modernity’s absolute ‘other’ in myth and ritual. For Lewis, 
modernity (and the privileged position which it affords reason) is not affirmed or 
negated in itself. Rather, it is conceived as the stage or battlefield upon which the 
conflict raged between these two opposed critical positions. 
In his Vorticist works Lewis adopted a dualistic strategy in order to interrogate 
the validity of each position in this discourse from the perspective of its antithetical 
other. At the heart of his own philosophy we find the pragmatism of an artist who 
knows well the value of ‘separation’ and so fights willingly for any side in a conflict but 
always to ensure a balance of power. In an illuminating section of Rude Assignment 
(1950) entitled ‘Nature of Change in My Political Position’ Lewis presented the view 
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that ‘[n]o one holds to one opinion without modification, naturally, an opinion being in 
the nature of a rough working hypothesis, a logical product of experience’.100 It is 
reminiscent of the maxim which is sometimes accredited to John Maynard Keynes: 
‘When the facts change, I change my mind’.101 With this statement of pragmatism 
firmly in mind, we can begin to clarify which side in the discourse of modernity Lewis 
‘discharged’ his energy on during the Vorticism period.  
Rather in the same way that Nietzsche, according to Habermas, was using 
reason as a ‘ladder’ which could be cast away in order to ‘gain a foothold in myth as the 
other of reason’, Lewis appears to have used Nietzsche’s invitation to ‘the mythical 
home’ as a theoretical ‘ladder’ to be cast away.102 The central paradox within Lewis’s 
Vorticism is the sense in which myth is constructed precisely so that it can be 
deconstructed, and it seems that this can be explained at least in part by Lewis’s 
exploratory mode of dialectical reasoning and the underlying pragmatism upon which 
this rests. Observing a sinister tendency within the Nietzschean and Bergsonian factions 
of modernism, Lewis — in what we might characterize as an act of theoretical 
espionage — chose to explore these principles himself; seeking the mythical home in 
his own artworks so that he could perceive more clearly the consequences of this.  
The most significant result of this effort is Enemy of the Stars and its radical 
portrayal of the modern subject’s claustrophobic internalization, as Nietzsche had 
described it in On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life (1874):  
 
Knowledge, taken in excess without hunger, even contrary to need, no longer acts as a 
transforming motive impelling to action and remains hidden in a certain chaotic inner 
world […] and so the whole of modern culture is essentially internal: on the outside the 
bookbinder has printed something like ‘Handbook of Inner Culture for External 
Barbarians.’103 
 
For Lewis — who had the benefit of viewing certain of the consequences of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy crystallized in the intuitionist philosophy of Henri Bergson — Nietzsche 
had mistaken the ‘prison’ for the ‘key’, and vice versa. While Nietzsche had identified 
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the Dionysian principle as the only hope for the subject’s emancipation, Lewis could 
perceive the natural consequence of this as the subject’s destruction. And while 
Nietzsche had viewed the philosophy of the subject as essentially a process of 
claustrophobic interiorization, Lewis considered it as yielding a situation in which 
‘[f]resh air once more passes between people’s legs.’104 
 His perception of a topsy-turvy logic in Nietzsche’s arguments led Lewis, in 
customary dualistic fashion, to invert the structure of critique. Thus we find in Lewis’s 
critical writings of this period a deep-seated cynicism about the hopes of attaining the 
desired purity in myth. Indeed BLAST itself may be read as a creative riposte to what 
Nietzsche scornfully termed the ‘Handbook of Inner Culture for External Barbarians’. It 
is, in a sense, quite the opposite of what Nietzsche would have imagined as an apologia 
on behalf of the individuated subject: a Handbook of External Culture for Inner 
Barbarians. In various instances Lewis’s writings in BLAST would seem to accord with 
this idea. Not only does it clarify the meaning of the Vorticists’ claim to be ‘Primitive 
Mercenaries in the Modern World’, but it also marries humorously with a section of the 
dialogue between Arghol and Hanp in Enemy of the Stars. 
 As they discourse on ‘destiny’ in scene two, Hanp complains to Arghol that ‘[i]t 
is not the destiny of a man like you to live buried in this cursed hole’.105 In response 
Arghol explains ‘[o]ur soul is wild, with primitiveness of it’s own. It’s wilderness is 
anywhere — in a shop, sailing, reading psalms: it’s greatest good our destiny’.106 It is a 
small exchange but one filled with significance for Lewis’s critique of Nietzsche. Hanp 
appears to represent Nietzsche’s concern about the internalizing tendency of the modern 
subject, but we should note that he is himself a less than flattering portrayal of the 
‘external barbarian’ which Nietzsche had in mind. For his part, Arghol presents the idea 
that a ‘primitive’ soul finds itself quite at home in even the most mundane settings of 
the modern world. We may read this then as an exchange between the external and the 
internal barbarian which serves to invert Nietzsche’s heroic philosophy, while 
analogously revealing the sense in which the great radical of nineteenth-century 
philosophy was himself so deeply planted in his own ‘cursed hole’ that he was unable to 
perceive the sense in which a primitive soul was native to the modern world. 
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In light of this it seems likely that Lewis’s concept of the ‘wild body’ was in part 
derived from his reading of Nietzsche; being explicable as an attempt to satirically draw 
the primitive soul out of its self-imposed cage into the cold light of day. Certainly the 
narrator of ‘A Soldier of Humour’ — Arthur Pine in the 1917 version and Ker-Orr in 
that of 1927 — compels a comparison with Nietzsche’s ‘magnificent blond brute’ in 
The Genealogy of Morals (1887), who, ‘avidly rampant for spoil and victory must get 
loose again [and] return to the wilderness […] from time to time’.107 Just as Nietzsche’s 
‘beast of prey’ — with his ‘thirst for enemies and antagonisms and triumphs’ — takes 
delight in devouring placid lamb-like creatures, so too does Lewis’s soldier of humour 
gnash his grin in the passive faces of the characters which populate his adventures.108  
But once again, in Arthur Pine and Ker-Orr we find a rather satirical portrait of 
Nietzsche’s ideal ‘barbarian’, who, denied his primordial forest, is forced to divert his 
hunting expeditions into hotel drawing rooms and restaurants; the vast wilderness of his 
dreams becoming transposed into a rather more quotidian scene of European café-
culture. In writing ‘A Soldier of Humour’ Lewis was certainly keen to elaborate the 
‘burlesque encounters’ of a modern day Don Quixote and found highly suitable 
materials for the characterization of this figure in Nietzsche’s ‘blond brute’.109 Clearly, 
Nietzsche’s philosophy presented Lewis with material that was ripe for satire. But in the 
end we find both tragic and comic modes being used to denounce modernism’s turn to 
myth in these early writings. What had been venerated and idolized by artists and 
writers throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century as a source of cultural 
rebirth, becomes explicable, in Lewis’s hands, as a dangerous cul-de-sac, a cursed hole 
within which art and the creative subject were being entombed.  
 The central interpretative issue here, which was raised at the start of this chapter, 
is whether the mythos/logos dualism in Lewis’s Vorticism resulted from a kind of 
‘denied dependency on a subordinated other’, with one principle being favoured at the 
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expense of the other; or whether Lewis is truly as free from ‘Action and Reaction’ he 
claims to be in BLAST.110 It is important to note then that a singular position does 
appear to emerge through this dialectical opposition, with Lewis indicating support for 
the redemption of rational modernity above the wholesale turn to myth. In this way, the 
rational logos notionally comes out on top. Yet it is also crucial to observe the sense in 
which this position remains contingent and pragmatic. For Lewis, the drive towards 
unity — the keynote of both modernism’s turn to myth and the ‘Time-worship’ he 
believed to prevail among contemporary philosophers — carried the catastrophic 
consequence of collapsing the hallowed dualism of subject and object.111 His support 
for the rational logos against the anti-rationalist conception of myth is thus a technical 
theoretical measure designed to rebalance the dualism and maintain the structure of 
opposition around which human life, and (crucially) art, is organized.  
 
w w w 
 
A final word should be said here about the role played by Lewis’s ‘two arts’ in ushering 
me towards this interpretation. The predominantly literary focus of my analysis here has 
inevitably conditioned its outcome, to a certain extent. This is not merely because 
Lewis’s writings — with the possible exception of Enemy of the Stars — serve as 
rational expositions of the issues which they deal with and thus pertain naturally to the 
preserve of logos, although this does seem significant. But more specifically, Lewis’s 
critical and philosophical writings from the time of Vorticism become devoted to a 
particular purpose: namely to expose the dangers inherent in the drive towards ‘unity in 
everything’ and denounce those of his contemporaries who Lewis believed were most 
actively promoting this.112  
Focussing on these writings, we naturally become accustomed to the great noise 
which Lewis makes in denouncing pseudo-mystical ideas about ‘Time’ and ‘the 
mythical home’ which modernism inherited from the philosophies of Bergson and 
Nietzsche. This has the subtle side-effect that we are distracted from Lewis’s own 
creative dependence on mythic themes and structures, a subject about which he is 
virtually silent in his critical writings. Thus in depending so heavily on Lewis’s critical 
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and philosophical writings for my analysis of his earliest fictions and paintings, I have 
inevitably prioritized the discursive over the expressive and the expository over the 
experimental aspects of his work.  
To look again at the paintings, however, and especially the development which 
occurred in the 1920s and 1930s, we may safely say that this was the realm of Lewis’s 
creative output more naturally conducive to mythopoeia. A further instalment of this 
study of the mythos/logos dualism in his works, which set its focus primarily on the 
paintings, would reveal that myth was never eradicated from Lewis’s work, and would 
likely conclude that the presence of mythic themes and symbols grows and becomes 
more dominant over time. Paintings such as Figures in the Air or On the Roof (1927), 
Manhattan or New York Mystic (1927; Fig. 26), Red Scene (1933-36; Fig. 27) and the 
numerous paintings entitled Creation Myth illustrate how deeply ingrained mythic 
narratives about the origin and destiny of humankind were in Lewis’s imagination and 
how fundamental these were to his creative instinct.113  
The symbolic classifications which emerge in these later works use a visual 
vocabulary which is distinct from that which Lewis developed in Vorticism and so 
cannot be explained in the same terms. But they share with the earlier abstract works a 
mystical quality, similarly communicating the sense in which the symbol is ‘an 
expression of man’s urge to speculate in metaphysical terms’ which points ‘past the 
physical world to “something that moves beyond the senses”’.114 These enticing 
speculations on the development of Lewis’s myth must be left to one side for treatment 
in another work. But it is important to highlight the sense in which this glimpse into the 
mythopoeic aspect of his paintings reveals the provisional nature of the conclusion I 
have reached here, having depended so heavily on textual sources.115  
113 Wyndham Lewis, Figures in the Air or On the Roof, 1927, pencil, pen and ink, watercolour and 
gouache with papier collé, 29.2 × 16.5 cm, private collection; Manhattan or New York Mystic, 1927, pen 
and ink, watercolour and gouache with papier collé, 37 × 25 cm, private collection; Red Scene, 1933-36, 
oil on canvas, 71.1 × 91.4 cm, Tate Galleries; see especially Creation Myth No. 17, 1941, charcoal and 
graphite with watercolour and gouache on wove paper, 50.1 × 34.9 cm, National Gallery of Canada, 
Ottawa.  
114 A. De Ruijter, Review of Symbolic Classification by Rodney Needham, p.171; Levenson quoting from 
W. B. Yeats’s Ideas of Good and Evil (1903) in A Genealogy of Modernism, p.110. 
115 We should note, therefore, that while Lewis’s paintings and writings from the Vorticist period 
certainly work together as mutual expressions of a particular pattern of thinking, it is also important to 
remain attuned to the distinction which exists between different expressive mediums. Paintings and 
writings utilize different organizational structures in order to communicate — equivalent perhaps to the 
mythos/logos distinction — and so we are naturally required to adopt alternative models of thought 
depending on whether we are viewing a visual work or reading a text.  
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Conclusion 
In this study I have set out to examine the role which myth plays in Lewis’s 
Vorticist pattern of thinking. Some preliminary research into the context of 
modernist primitivism and the precise formulation of Vorticist aesthetics and 
philosophy was required to access this question. We may say that the ‘stage’ had 
to be set as well as a narrative outline of the ‘drama’ clarified before the ‘role’ of 
myth could be properly assessed. That stage was provided by a philosophical 
tradition of skepticism about the benefits of unbridled rationality which had 
grown out of the Enlightenment and the scenery cut from Nietzsche’s Dionysian 
philosophy, especially the call for a return to the mythical home which lay at the 
heart of this. The drama was then shaped by Lewis into a dualistic encounter 
between two opposed worldviews. Personified in characters like Arghol and Ludo 
and of course the ‘creaking men-machines’ of Lewis’s early fictions, myth is 
found to play the role of a tragi-comic hero in Lewis’s Vorticist works, which can 
only be properly understood when placed in relation to its antagonist in the drama 
— the villain of the piece — which is always a representative embodiment of the 
rational logos of modernity (Ker-Orr, the ‘narrator’ of Enemy, or perhaps even the 
anthropological author of these ‘primitive’ narratives himself).1  
The dualistic structure of opposition we find here corresponds closely with 
‘the struggle between chivalry, “celtism,” Christian mysticism, on the one hand, 
and the “scientific spirit” of the renaissance mind and of the modern world on the 
other’, which Lewis identified as the ‘the master-subject of Shakespeare’s plays’ 
in The Lion and the Fox (1927).2 Wearing the familiar livery of the ‘lion’ and the 
‘fox’ in Lewis’s Vorticist works I have also identified the ‘master-subject’ of a 
struggle between ‘barbaric’ and ‘civilized’ worldviews, mythos and logos, which 
is ‘the form which all the deeper conflicts therein take’.3 Clearly, as early as the 
1 ‘Inferior Religions’ (1917), p.315 
2 The Lion and the Fox, p.201. 
3 Henri Gaudier-Brzeska, ‘Mr. Gaudier-Brzeska on “The New Sculpture”’, The Egoist, 6.1 (1914) 
<http://library.brown.edu/pdfs/1305050375234379.pdf> [accessed 6 June 2016], pp.117-118; The 
Lion and the Fox, p.201. Gaudier writes: ‘The archaic works discovered at Gnossos are the 
expressions of what is termed a “barbaric” people — i.e. a people to whom reason is secondary to 
instinct. The pretty works of the great Hellenes are the productions of a civilized — i.e. a people to 
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Vorticist period Lewis had conceived the outline of ‘a ground plan of history’ and 
historical consciousness, and ‘through the constant comparing of everything with 
everything’ had systematically juxtaposed alternative ‘world pictures’ in order to 
better characterize the ‘spirit’ of his own time.4 With this dialectical approach to 
history Lewis highlighted the essential dynamic — when this is understood as ‘a 
relation, a something that happens, between two or more opposites, when they 
meet in their pyrrhic encounters’ — which had run continuously from the 
Renaissance down to his own time: the gradual overcoming of ‘the ancient race’ 
by ‘the new one’.5 
The situation and function of art in this gradual epochal shift was a central 
concern of artists. There is an implicit question faced by all (though answered by 
few) artists from the moment the modern world began to take shape: would art 
stand for the departing glory of a mythical past or would it defect to the side of an 
ever-growing materialism? This apparent ultimatum became more pronounced in 
the modernist period, for by the early years of the twentieth century the exterior 
world and the situation of human life within it was perceived to have been 
irretrievably altered by the new human relationship with machinery. Lewis’s 
response to this question, we should note, marries with the response he identified 
in Shakespeare’s plays and ties in also with the dualistic conception of art which 
he inherited from the writings of Nietzsche (as a phenomenon originally formed 
out of a conflict between Apollonian and Dionysian tendencies). Art, for Lewis, 
would have to stay true to its mixed ancestry and become ‘mercenary’, playing off 
the strengths and weaknesses of each side in the conflict taking place, ‘but always 
for the SAME cause, which is neither side or both sides and ours’.6  
His focus on the perceived conflict within which art and the human subject 
had been situated enabled Lewis to evade partisan allegiance to either side — of 
the kind found in Cubism, Futurism and Kandinsky, for example — and thereby 
afforded him a more detached, theoretical perspective from which to assess the 
whom instinct is secondary to reason. […] The modern sculptor is a man who works with instinct 
as his inspiring force. […] That this sculpture has no relation to the classic Greek, but that it is 
continuing the tradition of the barbaric people of the earth (for whom we have sympathy and 
admiration) I hope to have made clear’ (‘Mr. Gaudier-Brzeska on “The New Sculpture”’, pp.117-
118). 
4 Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, p.123. 
5 Time and Western Man, p.21; Lewis, ‘Enemy of the Stars’, in BLAST, p.66. 
6 Lewis, ‘Manifesto’, in BLAST, p.30. 
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underlying dynamic of the modern world. The result is that — running as a 
continuous thread through both the paintings and writings of this period — we can 
trace a dramatic narrative concerning the modern subject’s quest for a conceptual 
home, an essence and origin, in the new world order. Treated by so many of 
Lewis’s contemporaries as the key to the subject’s emancipation from a 
claustrophobic interiority, myth is shown to have a double aspect in Lewis’s 
works.  
In characters like Arghol and Ludo especially we learn the dangers of 
investing too much confidence in the mythical route of escape from modern 
rationalism, for they willingly lock themselves into a deterministic one-
dimensional sign system which leaves them inert and blind (literally so in the case 
of Ludo) to the possibility of productive engagement with the limited niche of 
existence which they inhabit. In the end they become so entranced by ‘visions 
from within’ that their outward forms ‘congeal’ and they slump into matter, 
becoming the existential equivalents of a rock or tree. Lewis leaves us in little 
doubt that these characters are ‘self condemned’.7 ‘Thinking of the key, each 
confirms a prison’, wrote T. S. Eliot in The Waste Land and in Lewis’s Vorticism 
the logic of this idea, and its broader relevance to modernism’s turn to myth, is 
spelled out in detail.8 For Lewis, myth was the ‘key’ that confirmed the ‘prison’. 
As well as an idealized source of liberation for the modern subject, in Lewis’s 
treatment, myth plays a constraining role, guiding the subject further into its own 
narrowing interior world in headlong retreat from an expanding material world.  
As I have indicated in chapter five, this double aspect which Lewis 
assigned to myth has a philosophical significance which reaches beyond the 
rarefied field of modernist literary and artistic criticism. Lewis’s Vorticism, I have 
argued, makes a valuable contribution to the philosophical discourse of modernity 
by challenging the prevailing Nietzschean hypothesis in a way that resonates to a 
remarkable degree with the work of later twentieth-century critical theorists. 
Andrzej Gasiorek has pointed out that Lewis’s critical work of the 1920s and 
1930s ‘bears more than a passing resemblance to the critique […] of what the 
Frankfurt School theorists dubbed the “culture industry”’ in their works of the 
1940s and 1950s, and we may now be in a position to appreciate another feature 
7 Wyndham Lewis, Self Condemned (Manchester: Carcanet Press, 1983). 
8 T. S. Eliot, ‘The Waste Land’, p.43. 
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of this association.9 The significance of Lewis’s myth can also be clarified in the 
critical idiom of Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis in Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(1944), since here myth similarly falls into an ambiguous and double-sided 
relationship with modernity and the philosophy of the subject.  
On the one hand, Adorno and Horkheimer conceptualize myth as a way 
back to origin, a homecoming which entails reabsorption into primal Oneness 
after the horror of ‘being uprooted’ by modernity.10 On the other hand, myth is 
also explicable as the method by which the thinking subject disentangles itself 
from ‘the primal state of man’.11 In this sense it is a narrative opportunity to 
individuate the self from the mythic forces which constrain it into a deterministic 
niche of existence.12 To put this another way, myth is both the one-dimensional 
sign-system within which the subject is imprisoned and the narrative technique by 
which the subject liberates itself to attain the comparative freedom of a multi-
dimensional sign-system.13 Adorno and Horkheimer cite Homer’s Odyssey as a 
key example of this, for it is a myth which charts the ‘adventures through which 
subjectivity (whose fundamental history is presented in the Odyssey) escapes 
from the prehistoric world’.14 ‘The quintessential paradox of the epic’, they write, 
‘resides in the fact that the notion of homeland is opposed to myth’.15 According 
to this, by overcoming the perils as well as the enticements of myth to return to 
his home in Ithaca, Odysseus is representative of humankind’s ‘emergence from 
his self-incurred immaturity’, as Kant described it, and is a historic marker of 
humankind’s progress towards ‘enlightenment’.16 
The myth we encounter in Lewis’s Vorticist works appears closely related 
to this. Through his paintings and writings of this period we can clearly discern 
the formation of a myth, though in the end this serves to disentangle the subject 
from the constraining power of old, outmoded myths. They are works which 
attempt to refashion and ‘renew our idols’ in order to ‘break up the rhythm of our 
9 Andrzej Gasiorek, ‘Wyndham Lewis on Art, Culture and Politics in the 1930s’, in Wyndham 
Lewis and the Cultures of Modernity, ed. by Andrzej Gasiorek, Alice Reeve-Tucker and Nathan 
Waddell (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), pp.201-221 (p.213). 
10 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p.108. 
11 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p.78. 
12 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p.108. 
13 I adopt this terminology from Paul Edwards’s analysis in ‘Wyndham Lewis’s Narrative of 
Origins: “The Death of the Ankou”’, p.30. 
14 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p.78. 
15 Ibid., p.78. 
16 Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, p.1. 
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naviety’, as Lewis put it in ‘Inferior Religions’.17 At the heart of his Vorticist 
pattern of thinking is thus an awareness that modernity itself compels the assaults 
of reason on its own myths and the constant reinvention or creation of new myths 
better adapted to humankind’s developing historical situation. From this 
perspective Lewis’s philosophy is explicable as an inversion of Nietzsche’s. For 
while Nietzsche used reason as a ‘ladder’ with which to ‘gain a foothold in myth 
as the other of reason’, Lewis used myth as a narrative technique with which to 
emancipate the human subject from the determinism of myth and thereby to gain 
access to a rational discourse concerning the human situation in the modern 
world.18 Myth, in Lewis’s philosophy, is not the end but the means to an end, a 
way of shepherding a community towards a productive and creative rhythm of 
activity. It is a powerful tool which, in his view, ought to be held essentially in the 
preserve of the visionary artist.  
As the maker of myths and the creative force responsible for ensuring 
these are relevant to each new historical situation, the shamanic figure of the artist 
occupies a central importance in Lewis’s pattern of thinking. Lewis’s artist is like 
the guardian angel of a community; a self-exiled outsider who acts and speaks on 
their behalf; a trickster who shuttles between the natural and the supernatural 
realms to bring new gods and idols back to the community which he represents. In 
this sense he is equivalent to Cassirer’s ‘animal symbolicum’, a creature ‘without 
a clearly defined biological niche’ for whom all possibilities remain open, who is 
responsible for continually manufacturing a new ‘niche’ for a community to 
occupy, which can — for a limited period of time at least — provide a meaningful 
‘world in a corner of world, full of rest and security’.19  
The Lewisian artist thus figuratively belongs in the mouth of the cave. His 
business is divided between the two realities which he mediates. On the one side 
he is the ‘marionette player’ who, with his hands inside the cave, operates the 
‘puppets’ in a shadow play which keeps the herd of creaking men-machines 
entranced and contented.20 But he himself exists outside the mythical reality 
which he creates, attuned to shifting dynamics and forces in the external reality, 
																																																								
17 ‘Inferior Religions’ (1917), p.315. 
18 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p.86 
19 Robert M. Wallace in his introduction to Blumenberg’s Work on Myth, p.x; ‘Inferior Religions’ 
(1917), p.316. 
20 Plato, ‘The Republic’, p.296. 
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always prepared to renovate his myths in order to make them more suited to the 
changing needs of the audience he holds captive inside his cave. This idea perhaps 
explains more about the danger which Lewis perceived art to face in the mass, 
rationalized societies of the modern world, since the modern artist was being 
figuratively bypassed by the flood of newly ‘enlightened’ humanity who 
clamoured for a more direct involvement with the ‘Life’ outside the cave.	His 
closing comment in ‘Inferior Religions’ communicates the sense in which Lewis 
believed the modern artist was finding it increasingly more difficult to keep up 
with the scale of this exodus. ‘It is obvious’, he wrote, ‘that we should live a little 
more in small communities’.21  
The modern world may be regarded as the fruition of Plato’s call for 
humankind to leave the mythical cave, to be ‘released from their bonds, […] 
liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and […] look towards the light’, 
realizing in the process that what they ‘saw before was an illusion’.22 The primacy 
which Plato granted rationality in his philosophy certainly set the general course 
of Western philosophy down to the present day. Modernism emerges in this 
historical trajectory as a moment of profound critical reflection on this tendency, 
more attuned to the perceived dangers of mass enlightenment. For Lewis, as we 
have seen, once abandoned this original cave could never be recovered. This was 
the fallacy many of his contemporaries were liable to commit in their 
determination to regain the aura of humankind’s primal situation. But for Lewis it 
wasn’t necessary to turn nostalgically back to a lost past in search of this primitive 
element. It was present all along. As he clarified in Time and Western Man, we 
each possess ‘that extraordinary Aladdin’s Cave, that paradise’ — a ‘magnificent 
private picture-gallery of […] stretched-out imagery’ in which we are ‘allowed to 
wander in […] any direction, and to any private ends we pleased’ — in ‘our 
minds’.23
																																																								
21 ‘Inferior Religions’ (1917), p.319. 
22 Plato, ‘The Republic’, p.297. 
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